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THE MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

EDITOR: H. D. A. MAJOR, D.D.

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A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

Nos. 4 & 5. JULY AND AUGUST, 1926. Vol. XVI.

WHAT IS TRUTH?*

By Sir Oliver Lodge.

I SUPPOSE it may be truly said that whether in Science or in Religion we are all out for truth; in fact nothing else is of any use; but absolute Truth is difficult to come by. The Universe is a very big and comprehensive thing; humanity is, after all, only a corner of it, and it is not surprising that there are and always have been differences of opinion as to what truth is. It may be that real and absolute truth is beyond our grasp: our capacity is insufficient to hold it. We must be content with such aspects of truth as we can perceive, and if some of us perceive different aspects, there is no need to quarrel on that account. All we can do is to be faithful to such truth as we do perceive, and to seek for more.

It will be generally admitted that there are different kinds of truth. There is a truth of Literature, which means I suppose true to human nature, and which seems quite a different thing from true to historic fact. This is the truth which dominates Hamlet, Macbeth, Othello, and King Lear. No one asks, or need ask, if these people really lived and acted in the way represented. It is a platitude to say that the truth of Poetry differs from the truth of scientific fact. If a drama is true to human nature, that is all that is required of it, at least in that direction.

Then there is the truth of Art, which in its highest forms seeks to dive down into the soul of things and represent an ideal which otherwise might be beyond our ken, beyond our sense of perception, beyond the scope of our normal faculties. Of this nature

* Address delivered at the annual public meeting of the Churchmen's Union in the Caxton Hall, Westminster, at 8 p.m., on June 9th, 1926.

perhaps is the truth of inspiration, of intuition, of something physically unperceived and yet mentally or spiritually grasped; grasped perhaps only by a genius in moments of insight, and by him made partially manifest to others. Many things are too big for verbal utterance: not everything can be formulated in words. Fine music, for instance, can awaken a sense of cosmic perception not easy to recover, not easy to convey. Saints have been caught up into the third heaven, and in a period of ecstacy have realized things which it was not lawful or possible for man to utter. The Universe is big enough to contain all these and much more. It cannot be grasped in its entirety by human intelligence: its fulness is not limited by human capacity. The possibilities in the totality of existence must be overwhelming and appalling. Only here and there and occasionally can we hope to express what is true.

Then there is the truth of Science, which at first sight seems limited to actually ascertained fact. But science deals with a multitude of things which are not directly apprehended by the senses. It too is full of intuitions and inferences and guesses and theories. It is based upon sensible fact, but it transcends all direct apprehension, and launches out continually into the Unknown.

There is some analogy between the truths of Science and the truths of Religion. Both have been gradually arrived at by a process of evolution. Our early ancestors were incapable of more than a fragmentary conception of either. Their ideas at one time can have been but little above the animals'. The elaboration of such ideas into Theory or Dogma has been a gradual process involving many intermediate stages, and, in spite of the confidence with which they have been promulgated and the tenacity with which they are held, they are not likely to be complete. The universe is infinite, and therefore not to be wholly grasped by Science. The Divine is surely still more infinite, and therefore Theology can but make inadequate attempts to express it. Both Science and Theology are based on what are considered to be facts; but both strive after generalisations or theories which shall be more inclusive than any assemblies of mere facts, both reach far out into the unknown, the superhuman, the awe-inspiring. Science is concerned both with the infinitely small and with the infinitely great, with the operations of life, its interaction with matter, with problems of infinite

duration and cosmic significance. Surely Religion is too! Both at times tend to consolidate or fossilize into dogma, instead of retaining their birthright of fluidity and freedom.

I trace a certain analogy in the history of the development of Science and Theology. Both are above the heads of the average of mankind, yet Theology in its religious aspect profoundly affects the beliefs and behaviour of every man; and similarly Science, in its applied aspect, has had deep-seated sociological significance. So the reactions of mankind to Religion and to Science have not been altogether dissimilar.

It may be said that Science has no system of rewards and punishments, as Religion has. But wait. Science recognizes that misdoing will be appropriately punished, not by arbitrary decree but by inexorable law. Its punishments are even more severe, less mitigated by compassion and kindliness, than are the punishments of any truly Christian Religion. As Huxley said, the method of Nature is not a word and a blow and the blow first, but the blow without the word: you have to find out for yourself why your ears are boxed. To restore the balance, one School of Theologians invented a savage system of punishment, which put Nature into the shade; and while they were about it, there was nothing to prevent their continuing the inhuman treatment to all eternity! What wonder then if the theories of Theology tended to harden into a fiercely expressed dogma which should put the dogmas of Science likewise into the shade; and that they should require from devotees a wholehearted assent to propositions whose mystery and incredibility only added to their value as a test of submissive credulity. Science has done its best, but never has it been able to approach the virulence of theologians in insisting on detailed doctrine and punishing all those who in the smallest degree departed from it. Science never had the State behind it; it was unable to hand over recalcitrants to the secular arm. Science is not wholly free from priestcraft, but it is comparatively mild in its methods of enforcing its decrees. Ostracism and ridicule are its negative methods: milder these than the positive methods of the thumbscrew, the rack, and the stake. While as to punishment in the next world, militant Science has hitherto contented itself with a negative, saying virtually—Be not befooled with the notion that you will outlive your bodily manifestation, which is the only 'you' that exists.

So there are differences. But differences are obvious; it is similarities which may escape attention. Truth is the basis of Science as well as the basis of Religion, and the history of some stages in arriving at truth contains some instructive likenesses. I will not emphasize them; each can do that for himself. I will only run over the history of Science from this point of view, as a sort of parable or parallel of what might by another better informed person be run over as the history of Religion.

In Scientific history then I note, and presently expound, three stages:

(1) An era of what might be called literalism, or fundamentalism, or bibliolatry;

(2) An era of orthodoxy, ecclesiasticism, and established doctrine;

(3) An era of emancipation, freedom, development, an attempt to restore fluidity, to test and try everything and to hold fast that which is good.

These stages are manifest in Theological history, and in this last era nothing is too sacred for reverent reconsideration —any other kind of reconsideration applied to that which has been the faith of thousands would be unmannerly, ill-bred, and unworthy—but, with all due reverence for the old, no ancient formula is to be treated as infallible, everything is to be subject to the guiding spirit of free enquiry. Oaths and binding declarations are not to be thoughtlessly administered, so as thereafter to enshackle the soul and constrain it to give up the search for truth and degenerate into an unrepining state of fixed and unprogressive orthodoxy. Exaggerated protestations, such wholesale exaggerations as 'With all my worldly goods I thee endow,' 'All this I steadfastly believe,' and other thoughtless declarations inflicted on the faithful in moments of emotion, should be deprecated and gradually eliminated. All these shackles are to be thrown off. The free air of heaven, the Spirit that bloweth where it listeth, is to be welcomed with upturned face and clear eyes and abundant health. While the Spirit which constantly denies is to be relegated to the murky prison from which the shackled guards have let him escape.

Dearth of Ordinands—aye, there may well be a dearth of Ordinands so long as conscientious youth is asked to load himself with chains. A speech-restricted priesthood feels neither free itself, nor is it regarded as free by the laity. Can they be other than cabined, cribbed, confined,—perhaps not in their search for

truth, but in their promulgation of it! Too well are their creeds known and verbally insisted on by the stupid, the vulgar, the illiterate, and the well-meaning. Taking refuge in ceremony and innumerable 'services,' what chance have they of holding the attention of the men who are doing the work of the world? Yet many do! In spite of difficulties the interaction of divine and human is preached with real conviction; men rise superior to their artificially imposed limitations.

Outside the Church, Brotherhoods of working men are active and mutually helpful in a truly Christian and most hopeful spirit. Inside the Church the dry bones are beginning to live. Religion is not a matter of intelligence alone; yet if it be not intelligent it will not survive. The Modernist movement is one of great hope—it has dangers of which itself is aware: it may be tempted to over-estimate scholarship and learning, to undervalue some of the simpler gifts of the Spirit. The intellectual is not all, the pastoral is not all, the sacramental is not all. But there is room for all. There is truth and possibility of development in all these things. The spiritual and the material worlds interact, and when their interaction is more fully recognized I see possibilities of further progress and hope of the coming of the Kingdom.

This may be the outcome of the Modernist movement, if it presses forward to further truth without narrowness and with eyes not too closed to realities at present outside its scope. The danger of a struggle towards light and greater freedom and further truth is lest the enthusiasm be expended in struggle, and none be left to garner in the fruits of victory.

Advance will be made, much undoubtedly is being made, but whether within or outside the Anglican Church, who knows! The Broad Church or Modernist movement is the most hopeful yet; and if, by opposition from the laity or by weakness from within, it crumbles and fails, then I fear the Church is doomed to comparative futility.

I shall now take up my parable and trace the history of scientific development under the above three heads. I was saying that the truth even of Science is not limited to actually ascertained fact: Science deals with a multitude of things not apprehended by the senses, it, like Theology, launches out continually into the unknown.

Looking back over the history of Science, we can trace several stages in scientific development. For many centuries the world was dominated by the Aristotelian philosophy, a tradition handed down from generation to generation, based largely upon ancient writings, which in the course of time acquired a sort of infallible authority. Assertions were made, and not questioned: there was a fundamental body of truth to which appeal could be made, and any departure from it was heresy.

In due course, however, heretics arose. That rather mysterious figure Roger Bacon was a pioneer, far in advance of his time, and was persecuted accordingly. Much later, and in a more congenial atmosphere, Francis Bacon eloquently advocated the right of private judgment, a method of direct appeal to experiment, a claim that each individual could make observations and determine truth for himself; with the implied further claim that if experience ran counter to fundamental tradition, then it was tradition that must give way. The chief heretic to put this into practice, of his own motion and independently, was Galileo; and, like all innovators, he suffered the consequences of his temerity. But the new method of arriving at truth in the end conquered, and in due time attained a kind of orthodoxy and supreme authority, under the splendid reign of Isaac Newton. He and his co-workers and disciples grasped scientific truth to an extraordinary degree. It was felt that at last the universe was comprehended; not indeed was it so felt by Newton himself, but by his followers, who considered that the main principles of existence were now laid down, and all that remained was to follow them up in detail, working out the results with surpassing ingenuity and mathematical skill. Under that scheme we have lived: the vast progress of the nineteenth century is built upon it; and fifty, nay thirty, years ago it seemed as if nothing could disturb its magnificent serenity. It could be added to, supplemented, developed, continually increased, but always along the same fundamental lines. It was felt that the main outlines of the universe were understood, and that there could be nothing so new and different as to be revolutionary. The atoms of matter were there, had been there from time immemorial. Matter and force reigned supreme. Everything was subject to the laws of Dynamics; and, as Laplace said, given the motions of all the particles, the past could be reconstructed and the future foreseen. The universe consisted of

atoms, perfect in number and weight, unchangeable and permanent. The laws of their motion were known, and the theory was certain.

But in our own time a new heresy has arisen, a kind of Modernism which calls all this orthodoxy in question, which pulls up the roots of long-planted ideas, examines them, and finds them deficient; finds some of them indeed imaginary, unnecessary, human interpretations superposed upon the reality of things. The effort has been made therefore to get deeper down to reality, to realize that much which had been thought permanent was changeable, that the vast continuity of the forces of nature were interrupted by a kind of discontinuity, and that all our most cherished ideas must be re-examined, re-cast, and perhaps re-formulated; that matter itself was not permanent, but could pass away into energy; that force might be non-existent; that the consequences of the laws of dynamics were only approximations; that everything must be put once more into the melting-pot.

The younger heretics of our generation, in order to emphasize the truth that they are now enthusiastically advocating, sometimes seek to pull down Newton from his pre-eminence, to look behind and re-examine once more the foundations of Science, and to develop a new system of law and order, a new method of formulation; not so much supplementing, as in some respects discarding and re-creating the old. The creed of Science is being reconstituted. Old traditions are uprooted; and a living spirit of enquiry, which shrinks from nothing, is evolving theories which must indeed be tested by experiment, but are developed much more by the powers of the mind and the inspirations of genius than they are by any actual observation or sense perception.

For the things now dealt with are not sensible realities, or at least they are so suffused with new ideas that their experimental basis is mainly of a negative character. Certain results which were expected on the old view have not materialised; and accordingly a theory of Relativity has entered on a triumphant career, proclaiming a new and surprisingly small list of absolutes, in the midst of a wilderness of humanly interpreted and mainly relative phenomena, dislodged from their late pre-eminence. The indestructibility of matter, which was the fundamental basis of chemistry, is no longer believed in. Even the conserva-

tion of energy is sometimes doubted. Force, the basis of dynamics, is held to be non-existent: and the physical universe is explained, or is attempted to be explained, in terms of a transcendental geometry not given by experience at all. The fundamental abstractions of space and time are laid violent hands upon, and are treated as human inventions. Even the locomotion of matter, the most familiar thing in our ordinary life, is found to be something other than appears. And what the end may be, who is to say!

In this revolutionary age some may be going too far; others in all probability are not going far enough. Aristotelian Fundamentalism has long been discarded; the ecclesiastical orthodoxy of Newton is being overhauled: new ideas are everywhere dominant. The permanence of the everlasting stars is questioned: the birth and death of worlds, their ages, and the processes by which they have come into being, are being calculated and critically examined. The process of evolution is being studied throughout thousands of millions of years. More is known about the interior of a star than about the interior of the earth. The constitution of the atom of matter is unravelled. The nature of energy and of the ether—if indeed there be an ether—is becoming the supreme question.

And what is the result, so far as we have gone at present?

First, an enlargement of the universe beyond all previous conception.

Next, a detection of law and order running through the whole, the same laws ruling in the furthest star as in this little solar system, a constant flux and activity, constant and inexorable change and development, with a possible recurrence and perpetuity of an unexpected kind.

There is no impiety in the proceedings. Humanity is stretching its powers to the uttermost, and is I believe preparing the way for a perception of spiritual truth which has not yet fully dawned on the scientific horizon, but of which I catch the glimmerings that precede dawn.

Can it be wondered at if all this scientific upheaval must have a bearing on the problems and the kind of truth appropriate to Theology? The old interpretations, the old formulae, the old traditions, will have in their turn to be re-examined, re-interpreted, and perhaps re-formulated.

Aye, and we must go further—further than is as yet contemplated. The universe, as I believe, contains the substance of new and unexpected discoveries. The physical universe and the spiritual universe are inter-related: we are only beginning to recognize the possibilities of their interaction. We know that they do interact, by direct human experience: the familiar action of the mind on the body is sufficient to show that. But the constant activity and the full attributes of the Spirit have yet to be revealed. Some of us are exploring in dark corners and working through a jungle into clearer light. My own view is that in these revolutionary times we must be scrupulously careful as to what we assert, and still more stringently careful about what we deny. I believe that the old will be supplemented and improved, rather than destroyed and discarded. The True will remain. Science comes not to destroy, but to fulfil. The universe is as it was, and as it is, in spite of our temporary and plausible discoveries. The older generations had their avenues to truth, just as we have: their truth was not complete, neither is ours. Let no generation think that they are coming to an end of discovery, that their facts are final and unassailable, that their theories are complete. Infallibility is not for man.

In particular, and as an example of what I mean, if I trespass off my ground and on to your ground for a minute, I want to say to all Modernist investigators that, as far as I can judge, the progress of Science is tending towards a strengthening of Theology in all its really vital aspects; that certain occurrences which have been doubted—shall I say the direct voice at the Baptism, the Presences at the Transfiguration, the vision on the road to Damascus—were true happenings. True, that is, not merely because of historical evidence, about which you are better judges than I, but because things like them *can* happen. And I look to the time when the constant interaction of spirit and matter will be more fully recognized, when the term 'spirit' will be extended to human spirit, and the Incarnation can be rationally recognized as both a Divine and a human fact. The Divine and the human are truly inter-related; they do interact: the spiritual world is a reality. The spirit of man is but a fraction, a minute fraction, of the universe: nevertheless it *is* a fraction of the totality of things. And the totality of things, as we apprehend it, is but a fraction, and yet a real fraction, of Divine Reality.

CONVERSION *

By Sir William Ashley.

FIFTY years ago or so I used to be taken by my father, Sunday after Sunday, to Spurgeon's Tabernacle. I vividly remember the great oblong chapel, with an audience, I suppose, of some three thousand; and how I sat with my father in the top gallery, and looked down on the pulpit platform where Spurgeon stood and occasionally moved a few paces, this way and that, as he preached. And the object of innumerable sermons was to bring about Conversion. His hearers not yet converted were first to be made to feel a 'conviction of sin.' Their consciences were to be aroused to the wickednesses they had actually committed. But sins of which they had in fact been guilty were not regarded as an adequate basis for the appeal, even though evil thoughts not ending in evil action were magnified into great black spots on the character. Human nature, it was argued, was inherently sinful. I cannot personally recall any exposition of the *Genesis* apple myth as a historical occurrence and as a sufficient explanation of man's condition by nature, though I have no doubt such exposition was given. But the disobedience in Eden was assumed to be an actual happening; and the Fall was the background of the assumed divine condemnation. We were not, indeed, to be punished for Adam's sin, but for the evil nature which resulted from his sin. I remember how, in a moving hymn, we used to sing:

> He saw me ruined by the Fall,
> And loved me, notwithstanding all:
> He saved me from my lost estate:
> His loving kindness, oh, how great!

Now from this fallen state, we were told, we could not save ourselves by repentance and a subsequent life of virtue:

> Could my zeal no respite know,
> Could my tears for ever flow,
> All for sin could not atone;
> Thou must save and Thou alone.

Indeed, all our righteousness, apart from acceptance of 'the

* A paper read, as guest, before the Canterbury Group, Anglican Evangelical Movement, May 17th, 1926.

finished work of Christ,' was 'filthy rags.' God could not forgive sins, could not even forgive our sinful nature for which we were not personally responsible and remit the penalty, declared to be eternal, because His Justice stood in the way of His Mercy. A penalty had to be paid; and that penalty was the death of Jesus on the Cross. And this substitutionary sacrifice was not enough in itself to effect its object. Its blessings could not be brought to individuals either by the sacraments of the Church or by intellectual acquiescence in the doctrine followed by a life of virtue. The man or woman under conviction of sin was supposed to require a sense of 'assurance.' This might come in the midst of a life of sin or of indifference, in listening to a rousing sermon; or—and this was represented as a very frequent case—there would be a period of gloom, of agonizing anxiety, of despairing prayer, until suddenly the soul fixed on some text, such as 'Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners,' and then there was a sudden sense of realization, a sense of confidence and happiness, a sense of blessed assurance. This was Conversion. Every Christian had to pass through this moment of realizing and assuring faith; mankind were divided compendiously into the Converted and the Unconverted; the event could be dated on a particular day:

> O happy day that fixed my choice
> On Thee, my Saviour and my God!
> Well may my glowing heart rejoice,
> And tell its rapture all abroad.
> Happy day, happy day,
> When Jesus washed my sins away!

I should not dream of denying that all this represented actual psychological experiences in very many instances. But it was represented as the normal course for all Christians; and I remember how as a hardworking schoolboy, with perhaps a quick temper, but, I think I may say, not conspicuously failing in my duty, I wondered and wondered how I could ever get the initial conviction of sin, and how I was to go through the agonizing and wrestling which must be my portion if I was ever to 'find the Lord.' It was a dark tunnel from which I shrank, and which indeed I felt no adequate motive to enter.

Now I suppose the theological doctrine at the back of this theory of Conversion fifty years ago is to-day, with most educated Protestants, as dead as the doctrine of witchcraft. Men

and women, I believe and hope, are now rare indeed who effectively believe any longer in the Fall, even among American Fundamentalists. They may not say so; they may not think they have quite given up the doctrine, and they may try to philosophize it in some more or less unreal way. But what the normal, fairly intelligent Englishman at any rate believes in now is, not the Fall of man from sinless human perfection, but the Rise of man from animality. An eternal hell has gone; if it remains at all, it is 'an eternal hell eternally uninhabited': and the substitutionary doctrine of atonement has gone likewise. There is, indeed, much suffering in the world which by a slipshod use of the word we call 'vicarious'; that is to say, there is suffering due to no offence, no action even, of the sufferer, but occasioned by the misdeeds of others. Reflect on syphilis and mental deficiency: a terrible thought. But we can no longer believe in a God who lets off *A* from a just penalty (even if we could agree that eternal damnation is a just penalty for anything) because *B*, however good, suffers a very different penalty. We have no use for that sort of God. In the past, men who revolted against such a conception had often no alternative but what was called infidelity. To-day the whole atmosphere of Christian churches on this side of the Atlantic is such as to allow us to drop all that and yet believe in God the Father, and in one Lord, Jesus Christ. Indeed, the younger generation have never had to shake off the incubus which weighed upon their parents. I imagine that to most of them what I have been describing will seem as far away from their daily thoughts as astrology.

Of Conversion as taught by the evangelical clergy of the Church of England down to fifty years ago I cannot speak from personal knowledge. But I gather from my general reading that the teaching in the Evangelical Anglican pulpit was the same as I have described as proceeding from Spurgeon. Yet it had a less unimpeded course, less opportunity to scare and alienate the young, because of the use of the Prayer Book. In the Thirty-nine Articles is set forth the Lutheran doctrine of Justification by Faith, which, as we shall see in a moment, was the theological background for the doctrine of Conversion in the form we are now considering; and the particularly wicked Article XIII gave countenance to the worst extravagances as to the not mere inutility but positive sinfulness of the virtue of the

non-converted. Fortunately, however, neither 'conversion' nor 'assurance' occur even in the Articles. And the spirit of Morning and Evening Prayer and the Communion service—which on the face of them were surely sufficient for the instruction of an ordinary congregation—and of the forms also for Baptism and Confirmation, is quite evidently very different from that of 'a simple gospel service,' as it was called, centreing on Conversion. The Prayer Book conception is that every baptized child is a member of the Church: that in Confirmation and the Lord's Supper means are provided for the strengthening of faith and the resolution to live a life of service. There may be repeated need for repentance, and repeated assurance of God's forgiveness. But the sharp distinction between the unconverted and the converted, with Conversion a crisis occurring only after reaching 'years of discretion,' taking place once and dividing life into two periods—of darkness and light—is quite alien to the Book of Common Prayer. However, such is the illogicality of mankind, that many Anglican clergy honestly taught the doctrine of Conversion in the form I have outlined and at the same time honestly used the forms provided for Matins and Evensong.

Let us look, then, more closely at the history of this particular Conversion doctrine. It is an amalgam of two sets of ideas: the idea of sudden mental or spiritual change, and the doctrine of substitution. These two have no necessary connection. It may be held that a great reversal of attitude, either in belief as to the nature of God or the Universe, or in moral behaviour, or both conjoined, is desirable for some men and women, or even for all men and women; and yet it need not be held that this change is conditional upon an illuminating appreciation of a particular 'scheme of salvation.' Indeed, as William James has abundantly shown in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, conversion is a phenomenon which has occurred in many sects and indeed in all the higher religions. We commonly think of Conversion as bound up with a particular scheme of salvation because in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in England they were in fact so connected. But when there has been a sense of oppression and dissatisfaction and a subsequent sense of deliverance, the sense of deliverance is bound to be wrapt up with the currents of teaching and emotion which have been play-

ing upon the troubled individual. A perfectly genuine and lasting conversion is no security for the truth of the intellectual conceptions which seem to explain it.

The two groups of ideas we may provisionally call the emotional and the doctrinal. For the emotional there is little basis, and for the doctrinal hardly any at all, in the documents of primitive Christianity. By primitive I mean the actual teaching of our Lord Jesus. Our evidence as to that teaching consists almost entirely of two documents: the Gospel of Mark, reproduced largely by Matthew and Luke, and the collection of sayings and parables of our Lord from which Matthew and Luke draw the material not taken from Mark. In the synoptic narrative, formed from the union of these two sources, the Gospel is not a doctrine about an Atonement by sacrifice, but a conviction of the near approach of the Kingdom of Heaven, for which men and women must prepare themselves by repentance. Repentance is represented, as by psalmists and prophets, as an evident possibility within the range of the human will. It is assumed that, quite apart from Jesus and any attitude they might take toward Him, there were good men who needed no repentance. It is true that what specially characterized Jesus was His love of the outcasts, His passion to bring sinners to repentance. But that there were righteous as well as sinners, apart from His mission, it never occurred to Him to deny. A sudden sense of newness of life does occur in the synoptic scriptures: but it is in the case of demoniacs and an adultress and the dying thief.

> The dying thief rejoiced to see
> That fountain in his day:
> And there may I, *though vile as he,*
> Wash all my sins away.

That is affecting. It may have a certain justification; but it is not the atmosphere of our Lord's own time and circle.

It may be thought that after our Lord's crucifixion, and the spread of the belief in His resurrection, the later theology at once came into existence. But this was by no means the case. We must not suppose that the *Epistle to the Hebrews*, with its elaborate working out of the sacrificial idea, had much influence for some time among the non-Jewish believers, to whom it was not addressed. And it is a commonplace how little influence was long exercised by the special teaching of Paul in his epistles—

over and above his attack on Jewish exclusiveness. If you turn to the so-called *Epistle of St. Clement of Rome*, which the early Church commonly accepted as scripture, you find yourself in the same atmosphere as in the synoptic Gospels. Jesus is regarded primarily as a teacher of righteousness. But it was a righteousness which in its inwardness and unselfishness went beyond the morality of the Old Testament: 'most of all remembering the words of the Lord Jesus which he spake teaching *forbearance* and *long suffering*.' It was a teaching which came with the added force derived from our Lord's own practice: 'ye see, dearly beloved, what is the pattern that hath been given unto us.' In particular, the Christian ideal of brotherly love glows more brightly because of the wonderful example of love towards men which Jesus exhibited by giving His own life. 'The way of truth' is 'the casting off from ourselves all unrighteousness and iniquity.' Clement does not hesitate to speak of our being 'justified by works.' Through this teaching and its observance 'salvation' is 'found'; it brings with it 'a profound and rich peace.' And that is why Jesus is our Saviour: 'through Him the Master willed that we should taste of the immortal knowledge'; or, as he says in another place, 'through whom Thou didst instruct us, didst sanctify us, didst honour us.'

The same is the point of view in a whole series of the very earliest Christian writings. Thus in the so-called *Second Epistle of Clement*, which Lightfoot describes as 'the earliest Christian homily extant,' there is the same primary conception of Christ as the teacher of the nature of God and of the duty of man. 'The only God, invisible, the Father of Truth, sent forth unto us the Saviour, through whom he made manifest to us the truth and the heavenly life.' And the emphasis laid on 'works' could hardly be surpassed: 'If we be diligent in doing good, peace will pursue us.' Similarly in that 'church-manual of very early date,' as Lightfoot calls it, *The Teaching of the Apostles*, Christianity is represented as the choice of the way of life—which is the love of God and of one's neighbour and the following of 'the golden rule,' rather than the way of death, the way of sin and selfishness. And the eucharistic thanksgiving is this: 'We give thee thanks, O our Father, for the life and knowledge which thou didst make known unto us through thy son Jesus Christ.'

But only too soon the inwardness and reasonableness of Christian teaching was obscured in the West by the growth of a doctrine congenial to a lower stage of civilization than that of the Hellenic East. In the Hellenic world, whose chief gift to mankind was philosophy, Christian theology took the form of the development and incorporation of the Stoic doctrine of the Logos, the divine Reason. In the Roman West, whose chief gift to mankind was the Roman law, Christian theology took the form of the application to the relations between God and man of legal ideas. I do not profess to have read the Fathers for myself; I follow the standard text books when I remind you that it was the lawyer Tertullian at the end of the second century who gave this 'forensic' turn, as it is justly called, to Christian thought. How much of later theology and teaching lies in these emphatic but fundamentally immoral words of his: 'I think it audacity to dispute concerning the good of a divine precept. For it is not because it is good that we ought to obey it, but *because God commanded it.*' In the matter of obedience, 'the first consideration is the *majesty of the divine power*: the authority of him who commands is prior to the advantage of him who obeys.' And this again: 'fear is the foundation of salvation.' Sin being construed as the breach of a command, Augustine made all mankind guilty by elaborating the doctrine of the Fall, on the basis mainly, as all scholars now agree, of a mistaken exegesis of a sentence of Paul. And the forensic substitionary doctrine was completed by Anselm. The question of *Cur Deus Homo?* was answered by the assertion that it was only a man who could represent men, only a God who could give 'satisfaction,' in the legal sense of the term, for the injury or dishonour done to an infinite being by man's Fall and subsequent misconduct. All the mitigation of an idea so repulsive which was involved in the Catholic doctrine of penance and the sacraments and of purgatory dropped off when Luther broke away from the mediaeval system and preached 'justification by faith' alone. But the Reformers did not dream of abandoning the doctrine of vicarious sacrifice which had been built up from Tertullian to Anselm. Faith was, it is true, with Luther, not a mere intellectual acceptance of a particular teaching; it meant a confidence in God and a realization of His saving grace which gave happiness and led to a moral life. But the confidence, it

was assumed, was bound up with the substitutionary sacrifice. And indeed for three centuries that doctrine all over the Protestant world was deemed to be 'the simple gospel.' It was expounded commonly on the basis of a chapter of Paul's *Epistle to the Romans*, seen through the eyes of Tertullian and Augustine and Anselm, and buttressed by a selection of texts up and down the Bible, torn from their contexts and their original application.

But even yet the world had not quite reached the doctrine of Conversion which I began by expounding. It is historically a derivative from Lutheranism. Outside Germany the tide of Calvinism for a time almost swamped Lutheranism; and I doubt whether in the whole of the Puritan literature of the seventeenth century in England, though repentance will be often enough dwelt on, you will find any such emphasis on sudden illumination permanently dividing the life of the individual into a pre-Christian and a Christian period, as became common a century later in Methodist and Evangelical sermons.

In the latter part of the seventeenth century, the Presbyterian movement and the Independent movement which followed it were succeeded by the Baptist and Quaker movements. We may take John Bunyan and George Fox as their most significant representatives. Bunyan's attitude approaches most nearly to that of the later preachers of Conversion. He accepted the doctrine of the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ; as the title of his autobiography shows, *Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners*, he believed in the total depravity of the natural man. He believed also in the working of divine grace in bringing repentance and comfort. But the idea of one single turning moment, permanently doing its work for good, is certainly not prominent. He describes an experience which in later evangelical literature would sound like the account of a conversion:

> 'The word with power did make this joyful sound within my soul, *Nothing shall separate thee from my love.* And with that my heart was filled full of comfort and hope. . . . I was now so taken with the love and mercy of God that I could not tell how to contain till I got home.'

But this process had to be repeated again and again before Bunyan reached a permanent tranquillity. It is quite clear that what pulled him back so often was not any falling into what is commonly called sin, but the doctrine of predestination. When-

ever the poor man was beginning to enjoy 'any comfortable persuasion that' he 'had faith in Christ,' he 'began to find his soul assaulted with fresh doubts . . . especially with such as these, "whether I was elected." For, thought I, if I be not called, what then can do me good?'

George Fox, to his credit, made short work of predestination: Christ died for *all* men, Christ was the Light that lighteth *every* man, he declared. When called upon to make a formal statement of his belief, he was ready enough to echo, and to echo sincerely, the language of his time about propitiation. But in his actual teaching the prominent idea is not of justification by acceptance of a vicarious sacrifice, but sanctification in actual daily life by the inward light, the 'teacher within, Jesus Christ our free teacher.' 'This was the word of God unto professing Christians: that they lived in words, but God Almighty looked for fruits.' George Fox had got back, through the path of mysticism, to the primitive message: 'Repent; bring forth fruits meet for repentance.'

But, by the fourth decade of the eighteenth century, the vitality of predestinarian doctrine had worn itself out. Quakerism also had failed to retain its hold on any large part of the people. And now was the opportunity for Lutheranism once more, but in a more emotional form, to come into the field. Wesley did a great service to the cause of religion in England by frankly disavowing the Calvinist position: Arminianism—the belief in the salvability of every man—was an immense advance in the liberation of the human soul. This, of course, Wesley took over from his High Church training. But to it he now added the Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith, with an intensity of subjectivity and an emphasis on a unique dramatic crisis which went far beyond Luther. To him—as to the Evangelical clergy who remained in the Church of England—the conjoined ideas of sudden conversion and assurance came from the Moravians. We must remember that the original Methodist group was by no means the only voluntary group of earnest men and women feeling after vital religion. The Moravian mission to England stirred the sluggish waters of Conformity and Nonconformity alike in the third and fourth decades of the century to an extent we have quite forgotten. And the theology of the Moravians, as they now presented it,

came not from Huss, their far-off founder, but from the contemporary section among the Lutherans known as the Pietists. The influence of Lutheran Pietism, directly and indirectly through the Moravians, on Methodism and Evangelicalism still awaits its historian.

You may remember that John Wesley assigned his conversion to May 24th, 1738. For ten years he had been a painstaking and conscientious minister of religion. But on that day he 'felt his heart strangely warmed.' He had reached what the Moravians called 'efficient faith'; he had found assurance. A few days later, he rose in the circle of the family with whom he was then staying and, to their astonishment, assured them that he had never been a Christian till within the last five days—from which it followed that the friends around him were still outside the fold. His hostess replied with some justice: 'If you were not a Christian ever since I knew you, you were a great hypocrite, for you made us all believe you were one.' And when his host, in reply to Wesley's assertion that we must 'renounce *everything* but faith,' asked 'Why, then, did our Saviour give us His divine Sermon on the Mount?' Wesley had the consistency to reply: 'That was the letter that killeth.' There could hardly be a more marked illustration of the distance between the mind that was in Luther and the Moravians and John Wesley—good and useful men as they were—and the mind that was in Christ Jesus.

In later years Wesley himself greatly modified his language about what happened to himself on May 24th, 1738. Instead of being a total transition from darkness to light, it was, he said, a stage in illumination—a rising from the attitude of a servant to the attitude of a son. But he was too much committed by his own sermons and publications, too busy with his ceaseless itinerancy and work of administration, to recast his general doctrine. And so he went on saying, and his preachers went on saying, what fifty years ago I heard from Spurgeon:

> 'If you have done no harm to any man, if you have abstained from all wilful sin, *if you have done all the good you possibly could to all men*, and constantly attended all the ordinances of God, all this will not keep you from hell.'

Men and women have always found it easier not only to have what they deem correct opinions than to live a Christian

life: they have found it easier to have warm and comforting emotions than to follow the path of self-denial and service. Doubtless there were many who were converted under Methodist and Evangelical teaching who became different men in their behaviour. But, as Fletcher of Madeley, that evangelical saint, has said, it was only too possible 'to speak in the most glorious manner of Christ and of an interest in His complete salvation and yet indulge the most un-Christian tempers.' Toplady, with his faith in the atoning sacrifice of Christ as 'of sin the double cure,' 'saving from its guilt and power,' carried on controversy, as Southey puts it, 'in so vile a manner and a spirit so detestable' as is scarcely credible.

The problem is not a new one. You will find it already in the Epistle ascribed to St. John. Stress was already beginning to be laid on correct belief: and language was already being used which later orthodoxy could take hold of. But the question was already beginning to be perplexing—how creed and emotion were related to life; and the writer feels compelled to fall back on unmistakable fundamentals—on that evidence about which there can be no mistake:

> Little children, let no man deceive you: he that doeth righteousness is righteous.

GOD*

'Our Father, which art in Heaven.'—Luke xi, 3.

FROM time to time different theological problems tend to come to the front. A particular question may almost monopolize for a period the attention of thoughtful religious men. The endeavour to balance predestination and free-will engaged the earliest attention of the sixteenth century and remains petrified in our Thirty-Nine Articles. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the Deistic controversy over-shadowed theological speculation in England. A century later geological discoveries caused the problem of Creation to be in the ascendant. Discussion of it yielded to animated controversy with

*A Sermon preached before the University of Cambridge by the Right Rev. E. W. Barnes, Sc.D., Hon. D.D., F.R.S., Lord Bishop of Birmingham, on the Sunday after Ascension Day, May 16, 1926.

regard to miracles. We have lately passed through a period when the doctrine of the Incarnation was the object of close study and popular debate. And now, as it seems to me, there is a new shake of the kaleidoscope; and God's nature and mode of action constitute a problem to which men are turning with especial eagerness.

It may be said with truth that all these matters are aspects of one fundamental enquiry. But the way in which we approach the one issue and the importance we give to subsidiary elements within it vary so markedly that each successive wave of attention has a character and significance of its own.

There was never any doubt that, if Darwinian Evolution established itself in educated opinion, the problem of God's nature would become acute. As to the fact of Evolution there is no difference of educated opinion; and, if Darwin's explanation be not exhaustive, it embodies important truths. The ruthlessness of 'natural selection' cannot be disputed. The fittest have survived in a process of struggle wherein, to our thinking, profuse waste and continuous carnage abound. Out of the witches' cauldron man has emerged, with instincts fashioned in it of which in his better moments he is ashamed. Can God, the creator of this process, be good? The question ceased to be academic when the War forced us back to the jungle. The War with its waste and terror, its mental and moral confusion, brought civilized man up against his origin. It emphasized the unreason that we seem to find in the universe. It led many to doubt that a God of power and love rules the world.

So long as the scientific materialism of the last half of the nineteenth century held its ground, man was an evolutionary product whose religion was an illusion and whose moral sense was an enigma. We only needed to extend the range of our knowledge of natural law and every action of the individual could be predicted by solving the appropriate system of differential equations. The reign of such mechanistic beliefs has ended. Men have begun to doubt whether the laws of physics are adequate, or can be made adequate, even in the realm of inorganic nature. An unexpected streak of spontaneity has appeared in the atom itself. The hope of including human volition in an iron network of law has faded. The emergent, the new thing, appears in all our descriptions of the evolutionary process.

Yet, baffled though we may be by the occurrence of the unexpected and unpredictable, the progressive development of scientific thought emphasizes the unity of plan and structure of the universe. The cosmos hangs together. The bundles of regular sequences in it which we have discovered indicate the existence of true cause, of purpose expressed in a single ground-plan. It seems to me that the existence of some sort of a God, to whose Intelligent Will the whole is due, has become an increasingly reasonable belief. But the theoretical existence of a God Who fashions and guides the machine of which we are products is of little significance for humanity. We enquire whether He is the loving Father of Christ's Gospel; and, if He be so, how He reveals Himself to men.

Personally I do not feel drawn to the suggestion, with which some serious thinkers toy, that the universe is, to our modes of thought, fundamentally irrational. That we are so made that we can never hope to discover the scheme of things because the mind of man and the mind of God are in fundamental disharmony seems to me fantastic. That our minds are finite and limited in their power we admit. But it is one of my postulates of faith that that which is rational to the Supreme Mind Who created us must also be rational to us. Abandon this faith and the only value of science is its practical utility. Abandon this faith and you open flood-gates through which every kind of superstition can pour to overwhelm the reasonable spiritual understanding which humanity has acquired slowly and preserves with difficulty. So-called anti-intellectualism is crass scepticism, the natural ally of superstition. That it should be associated with other forms of reaction is natural. It has developed concurrently with the growth of Fascism in Italy. I trust that this country may be preserved from both evils.

Physical science may at the moment have reached an *impasse*. Biological science certainly presents us with problems to which we can see no solution. It may be that certain ultimates, associated with the creative activity of God immanent in the universe, will always be hidden from us. But the remarkable extent to which our descriptive constructions are verified by experiment, over wide ranges of natural phenomena, seems to me satisfactory evidence that there is a harmony between our thought and the Divine plan of the universe. We may allow

that we have not yet built a satisfactory thought-scheme to include all the results of sense-observation. We may hold that, however long humanity may be permitted to interrogate nature, there will remain something which eludes its mental grasp. But there seems to me no adequate reason for believing that our inability results, not from the limitations of our minds, but from some essential defect in our mental processes. To the superstitious fanatic who does not wish to think, it may be comfortable to believe that God has so made us that we cannot think straight; but I doubt whether this belief will permanently commend itself to mankind.

Man is a product of Nature—an emergent in the Divine scheme. Civilized man is the highest emergent of which we have knowledge. I take it then that in him we see, at the highest level we can reach, the end to which the unity behind Nature is tending. If we denote this unity behind Nature by God, we find God's purpose most fully displayed in the evolution of civilized man. The qualities which in our civilization we are perforce developing, and finding increasingly valuable, are those which God has desired to bring into existence. They are the clearest indications we can get of His nature. From one point of view the value of social righteousness is an empirical discovery of civilized man. But, on the other side, God has led man to the discovery by fashioning the environment in which man is placed. Social righteousness is thus an aspect of one of the supreme values of the universe. Such righteousness cannot be made perfect unless throughout humanity the standards of ideal family life prevail. These standards must then be regarded as those of God Himself. He can best be thought of as the ideal Father. We are led to the conclusion that God is Love.

No sooner do we reach this standpoint than the problem of evil challenges it. Why should Nature's ruthlessness and fierce appetite have been used to create man? Why should man himself find God's values by struggling against the passions bred in him by his ancestral past? It may be that thus good comes out of evil. But why is evil an essential part in the plan of the God Who is Love? No answer can be given; but the alternatives are less satisfactory than the conclusion we have reached. We cannot postulate two Gods, for the cosmic process is plainly a unity. We cannot believe that God is morally inert, both good

and evil; for the end of His plan, as we can see it, is the emergence of ethical values. We cannot believe that God is slowly discovering His own true nature, for that is to place God in time, to affirm that the unity behind phenomena is changeable. The problem of evil is an *impasse*, the most impenetrable of all the barriers which man tries to pierce by speculative inquiry.

But the moral constraints of God, which all our social difficulties combine to emphasize, make our duty clear. We must seek goodness through truth, and try to make both increase the beauty of human life. God acts upon us through the forces to which we find ourselves subject. There are, on the one hand, the blind forces of Nature which we try to turn to our own use. The effort demands that we should seek knowledge, find truth, discover the mechanism of the inorganic world. But there are also the forces immanent in human relations. Desire for the City of God is innate. It is possible to scoff at some of its manifestations as a mere wish for material well-being—but there is behind economic struggles a perception that harsh poverty in industrial areas makes spiritual richness impossible. Beauty of living is impossible without a certain spaciousness: and goodness is harmed, vice is created, by conditions which penury imposes. God, in fact, teaches us by our needs. The guidance of His Spirit is implicit in the progress of civilization. He inspires the prophets as they realise more clearly than their contemporaries the conditions under which progress can be maintained and developed. God is not an absentee monarch, nor is His creative ability limited to significant stages of the evolutionary process. He did not merely intervene to create life, or perception, or rational self-consciousness, or moral insight. He continuously works through the machine He has devised. Whether His action be direct as well as indirect is a question to which I find it difficult to attach a clear meaning. When a Hebrew prophet began his message with the words, 'Thus saith the Lord,' did not all his environment unite to produce spiritual perception? I do not believe that we can make a dualism of natural and supernatural. The spiritual is an emergent of the natural, rooted in the rational consciousness without which it could not exist.

We cannot compel God's aid, or gain wisdom from Him, in any other way than by making ourselves receptive to His

influence. Prayer is precisely this setting of ourselves to understand: the attempt to harmonise our deepest experience and to co-ordinate our flashes of insight with the facts of life. That such prayer is answered is the conviction of most of us or we should not continue to pray: it is a fact affirmed with impressive certainty by the spiritual leaders of mankind. Some types of crude petition of the savage or the child receive no answer. But the prayers by which we seek to influence for good the actions of our fellow-men are often unexpectedly successful. It is probable that we thus use a power of suggestion that is then stronger than at other times: and stronger because the enthusiasm generated by the desire for righteousness is peculiarly infectious. If this be so we may surely say that God thus helps those who seek to do His will. In spiritual things the popular maxim that God helps those who help themselves expresses an important truth.

The way in which God's grace, or spiritual aid, is given to men needs to be studied at the present time with especial attention. Differences of opinion, largely based on unexamined prejudices, lie at the root of most of our ecclesiastical and, I would add, of some of our social controversies.

There is the general position that all who try to follow Christ receive His aid: that the Holy Spirit gives His blessing to those who seek it. Within the English Church this position has always been of influence in the evangelical tradition. It was maintained by the Cambridge Platonists of the seventeenth century. It is fundamental in English Modernism. Men who uncompromisingly accept it regard differences of Church organization or tradition as matters of sentiment or convenience. They will not 'unchurch' other Christian communions, for in them plainly the fruits of the Spirit are manifested. This standpoint was affirmed, to the dislike of some among us and the surprise of more, by the Anglican representatives in the recent Joint Conference on Reunion. 'Ministries,' they said, 'which imply a sincere intention to preach Christ's word and administer the Sacraments as Christ has ordained, and to which authority to do so has been solemnly given by the Churches concerned, are real ministries of Christ's Word and Sacraments in the Universal Church.'

The English High Churchman, of the traditional type,

The Public Meeting was held in the evening at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, at eight o'clock. There was a large attendance. The arrangements for this meeting were made by the Secretary of the London Branch, with that efficiency which one has learned to expect of him. Sir Lawrence Jones, Bart., the Chairman of the London Branch, presided. In his opening address Sir Lawrence regretted that Dr. Adami, who was advertised to speak, would be unable to be present. He had to come from a distance, and the uncertainty of trains made a long railway journey a hazardous undertaking for a busy man. Dr. Adami's absence was disappointing, because they wanted to know what men of science were saying about religion. They had come together that evening for instruction, and the subject of the addresses was *Truth as the basis of religion.* A man of science would certainly maintain that in the quest for knowledge—to come to the truth of things was the foundation of all his study and investigation. And if religion were engaged in the same sincere search for truth, it could not ultimately be the adversary of science.

The Dean of St. Paul's, President of the Union, was the first speaker. He said that what stood out in the events of the past year was, in the first place, the deeply lamented death of Canon Glazebrook, who was a heavy loss to them, and one of the wisest of their counsellors. Secondly, the Council passed a vote of confidence to the Bishop of Birmingham, who, he was glad to say, was in good heart about his work, and winning confidence among the laity as well as the majority of the clergy of his diocese. He thought it ought to be known that the Bishops were sympathetic to their aims, but it was not for them to state what they did not believe, but what they believed. If young men had difficulties the proper course for them was to go to a Bishop and explain their position : they were sure, Dr. Inge added, to receive sympathetic treatment.

The Liberal Evangelical movement was progressing : it was showing great strength and energy, and for that reason alone they could look forward to the future with heart and confidence. On the other hand, there were disquieting signs in what was known as Fundamentalism in the United States of America. This movement belonged not only to a backwardness of intellectual development, but was a sign of that recrudescence of superstition which showed itself in various ways. While he had to admit that among a great number of people there was but slight interest in truth for its own sake, there was an increasing number of women who were thinking and reading for themselves, and that fact alone made the principles for which they stood and the work they were doing most important.

He wished to remind them that the Summer Conference would be held this year at Cambridge, and the subject chosen for discussion was the *Sacraments.* In past years their Conferences had maintained a high standard, and brought together men of science as well as men of religion. In conclusion, the Dean urged upon liberal churchmen to bring increasingly to the front their ethical testimony to Christianity. The object to be aimed at, he did not hesitate to say, was a revival, headed by liberal churchmen of puritanism on its best side—a stern opposition to all that poisons the purity of family life, and a dead set against all extravagance and ostentatious display. Their character as liberal churchmen was before the world, without any idea of vote-catching ; and if they laid emphasis on the ethical side of Christianity they would not find many enemies, at any rate among those who held before them the teaching and example of Christ.

Sir Oliver Lodge, who was the next speaker, had written out his address in full and read from his manuscript. He took as his subject

Sir John Barran moved that the thanks of the Meeting be offered to Mr. Henry I. W. James for having audited the accounts for 1925, and that he be re-elected Honorary Auditor for the ensuing year. The motion was seconded by the Hon. Gilbert Coleridge, and carried unanimously.

The business of the meeting having been concluded, the Chairman welcomed the Bishop of Arizona (Dr. Julius W. Attwood) and Dean Washburn, of Cambridge, Massachussets, who were both present. The Bishop of Arizona, when called upon to speak, paid a high tribute to Canon Glazebrook, whom he knew well and with whom he had corresponded. When Dr. Major claimed for the Churchmen's Union that its aims were educational, he would like to add that its effects were inspirational. They should do all in their power to get hold of the laity, because he believed that the majority of men were really in sympathy with the objects of the Union. Dean Washburn, who followed, said that he was not a member of the Churchmen's Union, though he was a member at heart, and many of his pupils had joined the Union. He felt that he could do better work and be of greater service to the Union by not being an actual member of it. If he might venture to make one suggestion it was that an intelligent religion must be made warm-hearted, if it were to win its way among Christian people. The Chairman warmly thanked the two last speakers. It was a great encouragement, not only that they should have attended their meeting, but that they should have addressed them in so instructive and interesting a manner.

After the interval for tea, the Rev. Dr. Morrison, Rector of Marylebone, and a Vice-President of the Union, took the Chair, and called upon Dr. Douglas White to introduce the subject of *The Aims and Methods of the Churchmen's Union.* Dr. White's paper will be published in *The Modern Churchman,* so that it will not be necessary to give an abstract of it here. In thanking Dr. White for his stimulating paper, the Chairman said he was reminded of a saying of Vinet, that truth without the search for truth is not the truth ; and that saying might be taken as definitive of the position of the Churchmen's Union. Dr. White had claimed that the Union stood for free thought, though that habit of mind was commonly identified with hostility to the Christian religion. He suggested it might be better to substitute free-believing for free-thinking, as a more correct descriptive title of the attitude of the Union. In the course of the discussion which followed, the Rev. T. J. Wood complained that statements appeared from time to time in *The Modern Churchman* like 'All Modernists believe,' or 'No Modernist could now accept,' which seemed to commit members to a particular theological position ; whereas, as Dr. White pointed out in his paper, the aim of the Union was to be comprehensive and not exclusive. In reply to Mr. Wood, Dr. Major said that what an editor had to guard against was dullness. *The Expositor, The Interpreter* and now *The Pilgrim* —journals which had maintained a high standard of scholarship, and done good work in promoting the study of theology—had all disappeared, because they had ceased to be attractive. It would be fatal to rule out all positive statements, for the reason that vagueness tended to become dullness, whereas precision attracted attention. Dr. Tollinton, in commenting on the comparatively small number of members of the Churchmen's Union, made the timely reminder that what they stood for was an attitude of mind rather than a definite point of view. It must always be difficult to organize a moderate point of view which was widely held ; nevertheless he was convinced that they represented a large and growing movement among Christian people.

The proceedings terminated with a vote of thanks to the Chairman.

The Chairman then called upon the Treasurer, Sir John Barran, to move that the Statement of Accounts be received and adopted. Sir John, in a speech which was a pleasure to listen to for its terseness and lucidity, was able to show that the Union was in a sound financial position. But in view of certain circumstances which had arisen he had a proposal to make. These circumstances required explanation. Three years ago a special fund was started in order to pay for the services of an Organizing Secretary, and the Rev. J. H. Bentley was appointed at a salary of £200 a year. This Organizing Secretary Fund, as it was called, was only planned as a temporary measure for three years, and expired in March, 1926. It had been well supported, but the Council had to consider what further provision should be made towards meeting the salary of the Organizing Secretary. When the Council met on March 10th last they had before them an offer of the Organizing Secretary to serve the Union without pay, as from the 31st December last. There was some hesitation on the part of the Council as to whether they ought to accept so generous an offer on the part of Mr. Bentley, who had proved an admirable secretary, and had carried out a difficult task with energy and efficiency. On the other hand, they felt that they could hardly refuse so unselfish an offer, so it was resolved that 'The Council of the Churchmen's Union accept with great gratitude the Secretary's proposal, and record their deep appreciation of the generosity of his action, and their intention to give him all possible support in the carrying out of the secretarial work.' Members of the Churchmen's Union should clearly understand that they have in Mr. Bentley an Organizing Secretary who is serving them without remuneration. But, as the Treasurer pointed out, ought members to be released from all responsibility in providing for an Organizing Secretary, in view of Mr. Bentley's unselfish action? He therefore urged that members should, as far as possible, continue their subscriptions to provide for the salary of a secretary, and proposed that a fund should at once be started which shall provide a nucleus for the accumulation of a capital sum to be at the disposal of the Council for the payment of an Organizing Secretary's salary, when occasion required that this should be done. The Treasurer's proposal is, we are persuaded, the right and proper reply of members of the Union to the Secretary's action in renouncing his right to a salary. The Rev. E. St. G. Schomberg heartily agreed with the Treasurer's proposal, and seconded the adoption of the Accounts. The question was raised whether the Union should be charged with a grant of £25 towards the *Call to Action* Committee. Sir John Barran, in reply, explained that the Union was not committed to anything which was done by the *Call to Action* Committee, but the Churchmen's Union was asked to send representatives to serve on that Committee, and in view of that it was felt to be only right that a contribution should be made towards meeting the expenses of the Committee. The motion that the Accounts be received and adopted, on being put to the meeting, was carried unanimously.

In proposing that Sir John Barran be re-elected Honorary Treasurer for the ensuing year, the Rev. F. G. Given-Wilson said that it was three years ago that Sir John kindly consented to act as Treasurer to the Union. The finances of the Union were not then in a very flourishing condition, but in spite of that he was asked to inaugurate a fund for providing the salary of an Organizing Secretary. The Balance Sheet was evidence of how well Sir John Barran had succeeded in putting the finances of the Union on a sound basis, and also in providing for the Secretary's stipend. Dr. Macan seconded, and the motion was carried unanimously.

What is Truth? and his paper was listened to with close attention by the crowded audience. A *résumé* will be unnecessary here, as it will be published in the current number of *The Modern Churchman.*

The Rev. C. S. Woodward, Canon of Westminster, followed. He said he wished to speak as one of the parochial clergy. The work of the parish priest was complementary to that of the theological student and the man of science, inasmuch as there was not much hope for the future of religion unless the parochial clergy could translate the contributions of great thinkers into a language which common men could understand. There were two principles which the parish priest must always have in mind. The first was that he must do his best to avoid teaching anything which he did not himself believe to be true, and he must also have the courage to teach what he did believe, even if it were unpopular with the orthodox. At the same time he had to admit that it was impossible to avoid some language which implied error, until the Prayer Book and Hymn Book were competently revised. But in direct teaching they must not fall back on time-honoured phrases, nor dogmatise on matters in which they had not made up their minds. On the other hand, they must not be afraid of giving expression to beliefs which have become part of their deepest religious convictions. They must not fear authorities, nor even be unwilling on occasion to offend their congregation. The result of holding back or suppressing truth was disastrous alike to those inside and those outside the Church. It was worth a good deal to win the reputation of one who never said what he did not believe to be true, because people would respect and listen to such a man even if they did not agree with all that he said.

In the second place, a parish priest must always make his teaching constructive. Pure negation was valueless and harmful. It was useless to deny a false opinion unless you had something positive to put in its place. False opinions were like the slums: you want to destroy them only in order to build better houses in their place.

Act upon these two principles, and the parish priest will find his people following him. The future was with the Modernists, only they must see to it that the truth found its way into the minds of the common people.

The Conference of Modern Churchmen will be held this year at Girton College, Cambridge, by kind permission of the authorities, from Monday, September 6th, to the following Monday, September 13th. This will be the thirteenth Conference held by the Churchmen's Union, and the subject chosen for discussion is *Sacraments: Their Significance and History.* Rooms may now be booked by applying to Miss Nussey, Upper Ewe Croft, Ilkley.

The two important papers which were read at the Oxford Conference last year on *The Sacraments and Modern Research*, by Dr. Major (Baptism and Confirmation) and the Bishop of Birmingham (the Eucharist), have been printed in pamphlet form and published by Mr. Basil Blackwell, price 6d. In view of this year's Conference on *Sacraments*, it will be very useful to be able to obtain these papers in a cheap and convenient form.

We are glad to announce that a new Branch has been formed in the diocese of Bath and Wells. It will serve the county of Somerset, and its centre is at Wells. The chairman is the Rev. A. H. Bax, late of Balliol College, Oxford, and sometime domestic chaplain to Bishop Ridding, of Southwell. He is now Rector of Radstock, near Bath. The secretary is the Rev. J. C. J. Pavey, who was for some years a C.M.S. missionary in India, and is now Rector of Litton, in Somerset.

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baptized by Nonconformist laymen. I asked whether such baptism was deemed valid. He assured me that it was; and added, as a proof, that the water used was preserved under cover in a jam-jar that it might be applied to the child in case of illness. Such superstition can be exploited; but it ought to be expelled by teaching which gives a truer insight into the activity of God.

The Christian Church must maintain the position that faith must be rooted in truth. God works through the rational consciousness of man. The sacraments of life are not two, or seven, or seventy-times seven; and they are ways in which we perceive God's Will and gain by our understanding strength to serve Him.

I have been sorely troubled by some arguments privately advanced in defence of cults based on Eucharistic theories indistinguishable from Transubstantiation. The psychological effect of these cults on the simple worshipper, it is urged, is good; and we are in a region beyond the reach of reason. Here, of course, we have the familiar combination of scepticism and superstition to which I have already made reference. If it establishes itself in our Church, we shall cease to command the sympathy of educated people in England.

I do not personally fear such an outcome. Extravagances of belief are produced by decay of faith. It is because the reasonableness of faith in God as the loving Father of men has decayed that we get a revival of superstition. If, as I believe, such reasonable faith can be re-established by patient argument, the Church of England will be able to give to the nation the spiritual inspiration which we shall sorely need in the troubled times that lie ahead. Belief in God's love can give us joy in God's service, if it be held with even a touch of Christ's splendid certainty. It can make us 'ever trustful, ever hopeful, ever patient.' You younger men and women who will witness the transformation of an England whose coal supplies are dwindling will need trust, hope, and patience before your days are ended.

THE NEW OUTLOOK

By the Rev. J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc.

THOSE who read the signs of the times prophesy that a new reformation of religion is coming which will be more far-reaching in its results than the movement three centuries ago. It will be the result of a new learning (*i.e.*, of a critical and historical study of documents) and also a new science.

Recently there have been published three volumes of interest to those who watch the reactions between the natural sciences and our religious outlook. The first two books are collective works by scientific experts and include contributions by philosophers and theologians: (1) *Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge* (Blackie, 1925), and (2) *Science, Religion and Reality* (S.P.C.K., 1926). The third volume, *Science and the Modern World* (Cambridge University Press, 1926), consists of lectures delivered at Harvard by Professor A. N. Whitehead.

Though it is true that historical science has far more bearing upon the doctrines of any particular religion, such as Christianity, than has any of the natural sciences, yet the developments of natural science do affect our religious outlook. It is true that to-day it is psychology, anthropology, and perhaps also a particular branch of biology—genetics—which affect our views far more than do physics or biology in general. Yet even physics may not be devoid of religious corollaries. In view of this, the student of the Religion and Science issue cannot afford to overlook recent developments in physical science, in which sphere, as everyone is aware, such notable advances have been made as to transform the science entirely. It is not only theories of matter that have changed, but the whole framework of the universe has been, as it were, constructed anew.

With regard to matter, Professor Soddy's contribution to the first of the above volumes is of great interest. What strikes one's imagination is the pictorial scheme of atomic structure given on page 395. Here atoms display a remarkable resemblance to organisms. The make-up of the atom reveals it as a completely self-contained yet complex unity; and we see in the series of chemical elements an increasing complexity of

atomic structure, distinctly resembling the increasing complexity of organisms at different evolutionary stages. Matter, even inorganic matter, seems to involve system and creative process.

Though Professor Soddy is very cautious in his use of language, and will use neither the word 'organism' nor 'evolution,' Professor Whitehead is more bold or more unconventional:

> 'Science is taking on a new aspect which is neither purely physical nor purely biological. It is becoming the study of organisms. Biology is the study of the larger organisms; whereas *physics is the study of the smaller organisms.*'

We have italicized the significant sentence, which expressly endows atoms and molecules with an organic status. Molecular physics becomes a branch of biology. If this be a sound view, an interesting result follows: matter is in reality organic in its nature. It is true that it does not appear to the eye to be so, nor does it, as we find it in the mass, behave as if it were. But this is because 'the characteristic laws of inorganic matter are mainly the statistical averages resulting from confused aggregates.' A mountain does not behave with any initiative, or appear to be endowed with organic qualities, because the molecules which compose it have had their individuality submerged, so to speak —their behaviour is 'mass behaviour.' The mountain, unlike the molecule, is not a unity, but a loose aggregate. It is not until we get actual living organisms that the unity and individuality of the atom or molecule is seen repeating itself—in a much higher degree, of course. This may seem fantastic, but it is not necessarily so in reality. What the view involves is that we get a truer version of reality in an organism (whether this be an atom, or a star-fish, or a man) than we do when we consider a block of iron—and, *a fortiori*, than when we consider only certain abstract qualities of the iron, its mass and inertia, and so forth, which apart from the iron have no existence, and which yet have been exalted by generations of physicists into the only ultimate realities.

Both Professor Whitehead in this volume, and Professor Eddington in his essay in *Science, Religion and Reality*, attempt, furthermore, to make comprehensible to the lay mind the new framework of the universe, which involves

> 'the conception of a four-dimensional space-time (*i.e.*, a fourfold order of events) in which there is no straight-cut separation into space and

time, although there is a definite structural arrangement which is the genesis of the separation by the various possible observers.' [1]

Physicists have often manifested an impatient intolerance of metaphysics. But Professor Whitehead is as destructively critical of common-sense views of substance and quality as Berkeley ever could be; and both he and Professor Eddington fearlessly examine the presuppositions upon which their science rests. Not Mach himself could be more radical than they. They show how 'abstract' physics is; how it deals only with certain selected aspects of experience, and so on. The claim of physics to be an exact science 'is only allowable because its subject-matter is much more restricted than is commonly supposed.' Physics deals, not with all qualities, but only with those that are exactly measurable; and, even then, it is with the measurements, and not with the qualities themselves, that it deals. Its subject-matter consists, not of the qualities, but of certain 'pointer readings' by which these are measured. And all the time the essence of even such measurable qualities as mass, weight, and so on remains inscrutable. As for the essence of immeasurable qualities, such as you get in the higher organisms, or in the values which seem to emerge out of the relationship between mind and its material environment, these lie far out of the range of physics. Yet they are not on that account any less real or less fundamental. In all likelihood, the essence of things is revealed in them. *A propos* of this, Professor Eddington makes a most significant remark:

> 'I venture to say that the division of the external world into a material world and a spiritual world is superficial, and that the deep line of cleavage is between the metrical and the non-metrical aspects of the world.' [2]

All this is far more hopeful for a spiritual view of things than the dogmatic and rigid outlook of some physicists of a generation or two since. The fact is that theologians have a lesson to learn here, from this open-minded readiness to test, and then to embrace, what is new. In physics we have genuine freedom of thought; what is traditional is respected, but it does not become a limitation of thought. Professor Eddington has a profound reverence for Newton, but he does not sit at his feet so much as stand on his shoulders. Hence in physics there is

[1] *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 193.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 200.

movement and progress. We cannot forbear to quote some remarks of Professor Whitehead in this connection, though they may seem brutally frank:

> 'For over two centuries religion has been on the defensive, and on a weak defensive. The period has been one of unprecedented intellectual progress. In this way a series of novel situations have been produced for thought. Each such occasion has found the religious thinkers unprepared. Something which has been proclaimed to be vital has finally, after struggle, distress and anathema, been modified and otherwise interpreted. . . . Consider this contrast: when Darwin or Einstein proclaim theories which modify our ideas, it is a triumph for science. We do not go about saying that there is another defeat for science because its old ideas have been abandoned. We know that another step of scientific insight has been gained. Religion will not regain its old power until it can face change in the same spirit as does science.' [3]

This, however, is by the way, and we must move on to the next sphere of natural science—biology. Here, save in the intellectual desert of the American Middle West, evolution goes without saying. The *mode* is still highly doubtful, and dispute still rages with regard to it, but the *fact* is certain. But the centre of gravity has shifted from the evolution issue to that of the physico-chemical or non-physico-chemical nature of life. On the whole the tendency now is, amongst the younger biologists, towards physico-chemical, or mechanistic, interpretations. We may not like this, and we may prefer to keep company with the older school of Professors J. A. Thomson and J. S. Haldane, but it is so. Mr. Needham writes uncompromisingly as follows:

> 'Neo-vitalism as well as vitalism is unsatisfactory, and we are left with the conclusion to which we were brought from the historical evidence—namely, that at the present day the triumph of mechanistic biology is undoubted and it has no serious rivals.' [4]

But the truth is that, in consequence of the change of view amongst physicists themselves, even this issue is receding into the background. If we admit that biology is nothing but highly complex physics and chemistry, we have to admit also that no physicist or chemist can tell us what is the essential nature of *his* subject-matter. The biologist passes us on to the chemist for explanations, but he meets us only with a note of interrogation—*Omnia abeunt in mysterium*. Science is as unsatisfying as theology.

[3] *Science and the Modern World*, p. 263.
[4] *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 246.

Passing on to psychology, it certainly would be true to say that here terrors do lurk in the way. Psychologists tell us (1) that ethical ideals are a superstition, and (2) that religious experience is a form of self-delusion, or, in extreme cases, as in those of St. Paul or St. Francis, a form of nervous disease. Of course psychology, being the *enfant terrible* among sciences, must be allowed a good deal of latitude, and we are all for giving the psychologists all the rope they desire. But here there is one distinctly hopeful sign. When the New Astronomy appeared, the Church met it with persecution; when the New Biology raised its head, the Church, no longer being in a position to persecute, had to be satisfied with disapprobation; but when the New Psychology came, the clergy were the first to rush into her arms, and use it to produce a New Apologetic for everything from candles to confession. In so far as the new psychology assigns to the intelligence a subordinate *rôle* in the human personality, the instincts of the clergy probably guided them aright. But psychology condones superstition only on the same terms as it condones immorality, and you can have what you like from her if you consent to pay her price. The simple fact is that the New Apologetic allows us to believe everything because there is no distinction between true and false; just as the New Ethic allows us to do everything because there is no distinction between good and bad.

Naturally, Dr. Brown's essay in *Science, Religion and Reality* allows no scope to nonsense of this kind. Psychologists, he reminds us, are not in a position to tell us everything. They

> 'have approached the question of the validity of religious experience along psychological lines, not always realizing that, by the very method they have adopted, they are challenging or denying that validity. In other words, just as psychology as such cannot do justice to the validity of knowledge, psychology cannot do justice to the validity of religion.'

Nevertheless the question of the validity of religious experience does remain, but this is less a psychological than a philosophical problem. Dr. Brown offers us the following reflections upon this subject:

> 'It is very obvious that experience, as we know it, occurs and comes to us under the forms of space and time, because we are embodied minds, because we are limited, finite parts of the universe, and yet we have in us powers that can in some way lift us beyond these limits. It seems quite clear that one such power is that of thought;

another is the direct insight of aesthetic appreciation; and religious experience in its mystical form may prove the greatest power of all in this direction. When, in the mystical experience, we have the feeling of timelessness, it is quite conceivable that we *are* passing beyond the limits of time and proving, to ourselves at any rate, that time is appearance and not reality, and that immortality is not something we have to wait for at the end of this life, but something we can and do achieve in varying degrees while still living this life. That has been the view of leading philosophers throughout the ages. We find Aristotle urging his readers, ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν, to be immortal as far as possible, even in this life.' [5]

To pass on to anthropology, this science also, like psychology, has been utilized to apotheosize the irrational. Primitive man, we are told, is a creature swayed by passion and superstition, and the taint is ineradicable, even in those who call themselves civilized. Without disputing the evident fact that reason is a weak faculty in most human beings, even in those who enjoy the benefits that scientific civilization has bestowed upon them, we cannot rest content with this. Nor is it at all certain, if we are to credit Dr. Malinowski—whose essay *Magic, Science and Religion* is in some ways the most interesting of the collection under review—that primitive man is such a blockhead as it suits us to suppose. In fact, the New Anthropology is administering grave shocks to the equanimity of those who regard themselves as civilized and our humbler brothers as barbarians. Primitive man has no very large stock of what we call science, but he uses what knowledge he has in a rational manner, and deals with his environment in the way in which experience has taught him is most profitable. Sometimes, it is true, it seems beyond his power to deal with practical problems which may arise (for his outlook throughout is realistic and practical), and here he has recourse to magic. But even magic has a clear *rationale* of its own; there is, so to speak, no nonsense about magic; it proceeds along recognized principles, chiefly imitative, and recourse is only had to it when science fails. The savage does not flee to the magician to build him a boat; experience has taught him to do this with a skill and patience which might surprise a civilized artizan. But when the savage wants rain, as he cannot compel the clouds, he goes to one who is thought to be able to do so, and no doubt he gets as much satisfaction from him as we do from our meteorologists.

[5] *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 322. This last saying was a favourite one with R. L. Nettleship.

It was said at the opening of this article that though the natural sciences affect religion in general, it is *historical* science which chiefly affects a particular religion, such, for example, as Christianity. These essays hardly touch upon historical and critical problems. Professor Webb, however, in his essay *Science, Christianity and Modern Civilization*, does touch upon them, and says frankly that 'the familiar scheme of a historical process which, starting from the creation of man, his temptation and fall, leads . . . to the redemption of the whole race by Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son of God . . . and culminates in the second coming of Jesus Christ in glory,' though it satisfied the imaginations of Augustine, Dante, Milton and Pascal, 'is not indeed possible for us to accept as more than a symbolic picture.'

> 'It is too late in the day to rehabilitate the credit of the book of *Genesis* as a faithful record of the origin of the world and of mankind, or that of the New Testament eschatology as an accurate forecast of their future destiny.'

Yet, though the historical *schema* of traditional Christianity is no longer tenable, the Christian cannot afford to dispense with history. Nor does the modern philosopher, as Hegel did, take that line. The problem cannot be thus easily solved.

> 'The philosophy of the present day, in Bergson, in Croce, in Troeltsch, in Alexander, in Whitehead, will certainly, by insistence on duration, on history, on the indissoluble union of time with space, on the event as the time unit of reality, discourage him from being content to pay this price for an inglorious peace.' [6]

Moreover, Christianity is indissolubly bound up with the emergence, in the course of history, of an historical personality. Perhaps here is to be found the key to the solution of the problem—the idea of the emergence in time, and in course of the evolutionary process, of a new type of humanity (a New Adam) who should be 'the first-born of many brethren.' But we leave the outlining of this new scheme to the theologians. The student of natural science, who walks upon the plains, may lift up his eyes unto the hills; but it is not his task to climb them. They are shrouded with clouds which only the eye of the mystic or seer can pierce.

[6] *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 340.

THE NATURE AND SEAT OF AUTHORITY IN RELIGION

THE title of this paper is 'The Nature and Seat of Authority in Religion.' Authority I should define as delegated power. The *Oxford Dictionary* gives two definitions of this power: (1) power to enforce obedience, and (2) power to influence action or opinion, that is surely to induce belief, and so to lead to action. It is this connection between belief held, and action which springs from it, which renders a distinction made by Boyle in the seventeenth century logically untenable. He says, 'I allow lawful authority a jurisdiction over my actions that I deny it over my opinions.' I mention this, because although we do not make so clear an assertion as this old writer, this division of the sphere of authority is an idea sometimes present in our minds.

Authority then is power delegated by the power behind phenomena, and as we are to deal with authority in religion, we leave out of account the authority to which we are subjected by the external order which results in simple reflex action, and confine ourselves to authority exercised by laws of the mind, and of this we can say with Dr. Illingworth:

> 'All authority, in the eyes of a theist, must in the last analysis be of divine origin, and can be adequately based on no other ground.'

Again, as we are to think about authority in religion, I take it that for us religion means primarily the Christian religion, and in that religion God is a living personal God, whose authority can only be delegated to living personalities.

I seem perhaps to be passing too rapidly from the 'nature' to the 'seat' of authority, but this is the point which I wish to make here, because authority is in its nature spiritual, its seat can only be spirit-indwelt persons. You cannot have the seat of authority in a book or a creed or a decree. A book is authoritative in so far as its writer is an authority; a creed is authoritative just in so far as it sets forth the considered pronouncement of experts, or, in Mr. Selwyn's excellent phrase, because it rests upon 'the consensus of those best able to judge'; but the letter is a dead thing and static, Spirit only is living. We cannot be bound to-day by the letter of a creed put forth in the fourth

century, but only by the spirit which caused it to be put forth. This is obvious. It is the interpretation which is put upon the letter by living spirit-indwelt persons to-day which is binding. To take a simple illustration: 'He ascended into heaven'; men some centuries ago conceived of the earth as a flat surface, above which was a sphere inhabited by spirits. Our way of thinking of the earth has changed. (There is an interesting paragraph on how our changed cosmogony has altered our way of thinking in the recent book by Dr. Matthews, *The Gospel and the Modern Mind*.) This is how Dr. Swete (than whom no more orthodox name could I find) has interpreted these words of the Creed for us. He says:

> 'As the Incarnation was not a physical descent, so the return of the Incarnate Son to the Father was not a physical elevation. The momentary lifting up of the risen Christ in the sight of the eleven can only be regarded as a symbol of the lifting up of our humanity to that spiritual order which is as far above our present life as the visible heaven is above the earth.'

Just the other day I came on these words of one who claims to write from the Catholic standpoint:

> 'When the Church proclaims that Christ ascended into heaven, the meaning is that He is part of the ultimately real, abiding, unchanging order.'

It is, of course, outside our subject to discuss these interpretations. I only wish to stress that they are interpretations of the ancient formula by people of to-day; and so when I find in an article that, in matters of authority the Reformed Churches look to the Bible and to the Creeds, whereas the Roman Church looks to an infallible Church, I cannot help seeing that the Roman point of view is the truer. Personally I should delete the word 'infallible,' for I do not think we have any right to demand infallibility in the human instrument through which the divine Spirit works; but for me, the seat of authority is the Church, the spirit-indwelt society which is the Body of Christ. This conclusion follows from the spiritual nature of authority.

Then, secondly, I think of the indispensable character of authority, which is quaintly expressed in Butler's distich:

> 'Authority is a disease and cure,
> Which men can neither want nor well endure.'

We cannot do without it; 'to be a member of a society and to do as you please is a contradiction in terms.' Someone must be in authority in the Church as in the State. Here I foresee there may be an objection: 'You were given the subject Authority in

Religion, and now you are speaking of the Church, as if religion and church were equivalent terms'; or it may be said, as I was told the other day, 'Religion is an individual thing.' To this I have provided myself with answers from two writers of recognized ability. Dr. W. R. Matthews writes:

> 'It has become clear to modern psychology that the person and his society are really inseparable from one another. The solitary individual cannot exist. We advance in the attainment of personality through fellowship, and if fellowship fails we wither and die.'

Baron Friedrich von Hügel wrote:

> 'Though the religion of any single soul is the most profoundly personal convicition within it, yet religion is a profoundly social force. Even the most aggressively individualistic of men, provided he be still religious at all, will always reveal large indebtedness to this social institutional element in religion.'

Granted, then, a society, you must have authority. Now where is the seat of this necessary authority in the Church? Let us go back to the earthly life of our Lord. His first hearers said, 'He speaketh with authority.' The First Gospel preserves His words, 'All authority is given unto Me.' Here again we may quote von Hügel:

> 'As He Himself alone had received Messianic power and call from God His Father, so He in turn selected twelve representatives, endowing them with intrinsic authority and power; later the preaching band automatically becomes the Church.'

In the early Church authority was not lacking. Think of the Council of Jerusalem sending forth its decree, which Paul, although such a compromise could hardly have been after his own heart, 'delivered to be kept, which had been ordained of the Apostles and elders'; think of his own words, when later in a letter, after having given what seemed to him good reason for a command, he ended with, 'But if any man seem to be contentious, we have no such custom, neither the churches of God.' After the time of the Apostles, the authority which they had received was handed on to others; Titus, whether by St. Paul or not we cannot say, is told to appoint elders in every city. This is in accordance with Clement of Rome's statement that the Apostles appointed from their first-fruits in every church certain to be officers in it.[1] One of this body of elders or bishops became the presiding elder at the celebration of the Eucharist, and later the term bishop was restricted in its use to him; he became the seat of authority; the Church spoke and acted through him. I am a convinced believer in the doctrine of Apostolic Succes-

[1] *Epistle of Clement*, xlii.

sion in its earlier rather than in its later form of statement, as, for instance, it is expressed by Prof. Turner[2]:

> 'The bishop of any Christian Church is the head and representative of his flock, and has been regularly and openly put into possession of the teaching chair in succession to a predecessor who had in turn been recognized in his time as the one proper possessor of his chair, and so on right back to the foundation of the particular local church.'

Later, diocesan bishops were grouped into provinces, and the provincial primate had authority over the bishops in his group. In Western Europe in the sixteenth century the excessive pretensions of one primate, coupled with the widely-held belief that he had betrayed his trust, led to a breaking away on a large scale from his authority. The united Western European Church was replaced in the north by a number of independent national churches, but in all of them the old authority was exchanged for a new. In England the authority of the Pope was exchanged for that of Bishops appointed by the Crown—appointed, not made, by the Crown; a king cannot make a bishop, a bishop only can hand on his authority to another. I am talking of normal procedure. Please do not draw logical deductions from this with regard to the whole subsequent history of the Church of Sweden, which failed on one occasion to preserve their line of bishops unbroken, or as to what would happen if, as some of our Roman friends would hail with delight, any belated evidence turned up which proved that there had been a flaw in the consecration of Barlow. The point I am making here is, no king has ever nor can ever make a bishop; and why I am enlarging on this now is because one meets fairly frequently the plea that the authority of bishops, especially in our own branch of the Church, may be flouted because the said bishops have been forced upon the unwilling faithful by the Crown. But this is not true; the Crown has never been able to force a bishop to consecrate. As a Church historian has said:

> 'If an improper appointment were made it would be the Church's duty to withhold consecration at the risk of temporal penalties.'

So if an unsuitable man is appointed and consecrated, it means that subservient and unsuitable men are found among the existing bishops, and the Church at large—the Church composed of laity as well as clergy—is responsible in any particular period for the episcopate it possesses. It has been said that a country has the government which it deserves; and may it not also be

[2] *Early History*, p. 105.

said that a church has the bishops which it merits? Before the Reformation, and indeed after it, bishops have not always been conspicuously subservient to the Crown; more than once a royal appointment has roused opposition. Here is a case from post-Reformation times: in 1733 one Thomas Rundle was nominated by the Crown (George II), but this nomination was so vigorously opposed that it was dropped. In the present day, it is of course common knowledge that the Archbishop of Canterbury is always consulted before the Crown issues a *congé d'élire*. So to-day for me the seat of authority, in that branch of the Church to which I belong, is the Bishop of Winchester, with appeal to the Archbishop of Canterbury, either himself personally or together with his Synod of provincial bishops, and it is *always open to me to rebel and to suffer the penalties of disobedience.*

Hence we are faced with the paradox: authority is necessary, yet to rebel against authority has seemed to many noble spirits the right and only thing to do. It is doubtful whether there would ever have been any progress without rebellion against constituted authority. 'Society moves only through the constituent individuals who differ and who initiate movements,' says Lord Morley. To go back in the annals of the Christian religion, its Founder, Jesus Christ, was its first great Rebel. He would not accept the teaching of those in authority in His time; conscious of His unbroken union with the Divine Will, He says, 'but I say unto you.' Shortly afterwards some of His followers were forbidden by a quite constitutional authority to teach; they continued to do it, giving as their reason, 'We must obey God rather than man,' *i.e.*, they appealed from a lower to a higher authority, and this has always been the position of all later rebels. It is not authority as such against which they rebel, but that they hold that those who are exercising authority are not faithfully mediating the authority which has been delegated to them. It is not enough that an official asserts his authority. Sheer authority, as Mr. Kirk reminds us, even if used to enforce a divine command, implies a superiority to all considerations of reason, which is closely akin to magic. Authority must justify itself. It must justify itself before the bar of conscience. 'There is no authority,' writes Canon Peter Green, 'which can for a moment compete with the clear voice of God speaking in a man's heart.' This is what the Friends call the inner light. We agree; but we cannot but think of the old Jesuit words:

> 'If the soul were quite certain that the movement it experienced was from God, it would assuredly have no need to seek any further; but since Satan sometimes transforms himself into an angel of light, it ought to be taken as a general rule that it is very dangerous for a man to wish to govern himself only by the movement of his will and certain interior feelings. . . . Our conclusions ought to be examined by the light of human reason.'

Authority has to meet the demands of human reason. In the last century, when Dr. Martineau wrote *The Seat of Authority in Religion*, and, to a certain extent, when Lord Balfour wrote his *Foundations of Belief*, men were concerned with the relation between authority and reason and with little else. They were nearer the time when Kant wrote his *Critique of Pure Reason*. To-day we hold there is no such thing as pure reason. We can no longer separate off one part of our personality and think it works alone; there is the volitional and the affective as well as the rational element in us, and it is for this reason that I think the words of Professor Höffding in his book, *The Philosophy of Religion*, appeal specially to us:

> 'The principle of Authority is subordinate to the principle of personality.'

Earlier in this paper we affirmed the position that we advance in the attainment of personality through fellowship. So we have arrived at thinking of authority not only in relation to individual conscience, not in relation to abstract reason, but in relation to the whole fellowship to which we belong. Now comes the demand for loyalty—loyalty, as Prof. Royce would say, to 'the beloved community,' a community where the individual is willing to co-operate for the good of the body. This loyalty to the body will not be without cost. Lord Morley wrote, and I do not think he is likely to be called a sentimentalist:

> 'We wonder whether duty to truth can possibly require us to inflict keen distres on those to whom we are bound by the tenderest and most consecrated ties. This is so wholly honourable a sentiment that no one who has not made himself drunk with the thin sour wine of an absolute logic will refuse to consider it.'

And once more von Hügel:

> 'There is no such thing as appurtenance to a particular religious body without cost, cost to the poorer side of human nature and cost, even, in some degree and way to the better side of that same nature. Hence the need of a generous payment of the cost where it affects the poorer side, and of a careful limitation of the cost, and a resourceful discovery of a compensation elsewhere, where the cost affects the better side of our nature. No religious institution, as such, can be asked to watch over the laws intrinsic to astronomy or anthropology, to be a society for research into history and philosophy of religion at

large; nor can the intellectually finest presentations even of the particular religious institution be expected to acquire more than a footing of toleration within such institutions. Especially will all these limitations be at work in religions of a large popular appeal and following.'

This is the only writer I have met who frankly faces the cost of loyalty. We often face the cost of rebellion. We look back on the acts of rebellion in our own branch of the Church, and how difficult it is to decide whether the price paid was worth while or not. Do we not, at least some of us, wonder whether, if we had lived in the sixteenth century, we should have followed Luther or Erasmus? You remember it was said in the hearing of the latter, 'Erasmus laid the egg, and Luther hatched it.' To this Erasmus replied, 'Ah, but the bird hatched was a different species from the egg I laid.' Still we ask, Was reform from within possible, or was it one of those moments when to rebel was the only course?

Whenever we have to justify rebellion—for if authority must justify itself, so must rebellion—two or three practical points seem to emerge: (1) There must be genuine sorrow on the part of the rebel. Every other avenue to progress must have been tried and must have been found barred. Rebellion must not be the act of a 'born rebel'; it is he whose earlier life has been characterized by obedience who can best lead a rebellion. (2) There must be no suspicion of personal profit, as was pointed out to me recently when I quoted Jesus Christ as our first Rebel. His path of rebellion led Him to the Cross. That was the price He paid, and we know He counted the cost worth while.

Not, however, to leave off on the note of compromise, may I in closing define the ideal condition for Authority? It is not the imposing on us of beliefs by someone outside us, but it *is* the realization of '*a fact supreme above us*' as being at one with '*a fact supreme within us*'; then indeed is authority of such *a nature* as to justify itself.

After writing this I came upon the words of Monsignor d'Hulst. Speaking of the sovereign authority of Christ, he says: 'What is conscience? It is the rule of right within us. What is Jesus? He is the rule of right without us. And these two rules are but one, and the rule within testifies to the rule without, and cries aloud, Truly thou art the Son of God.' So we are brought back to the *seat* of all authority, God.

S. M. Brotchie.

PALEYAN CHRISTIANITY

And he sighed deeply in his spirit, and saith, Why doth this generation seek after a sign? Verily I say unto you, There shall no sign be given unto this generation. MARK viii, 12.

A wicked and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign; and there shall no sign be given unto it, but the sign of the prophet Jonas. And he left them and departed. MATTHEW xvi, 4.

For as Jonas was three days and three nights in the whale's belly; so shall the Son of Man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth. MATTHEW xii, 40.

THESE three quotations, in their natural sequence, vividly illustrate one of the ways in which the fundamental truths of Christianity have been perverted, to the world's infinite harm.

From the Gospels it is clear that Christ was repeatedly challenged to prove his Messiahship by giving a 'sign from heaven.' Such signs as he had given might be wrought by magic, or the aid of evil spirits. But a 'sign from heaven,' such as when Elijah called down fire to consume his sacrifice, was proof positive of the direct act of God. This the Pharisees demanded; given this they would perforce believe that Jesus was the God-sent Messiah.

Thus these Pharisees within the limits of their mental environment were the prototypes of Paley with his *Evidences of Christianity*. From the remotest ages men have ever held that God's personal presence can only be known by a 'miracle'; by something beyond the power of mere man to produce. Exactly what a 'miracle' is may not always have been clearly defined; but the Pharisees did so define it in reference to the accepted ideas of their own age. It must be a phenomenon appealing so plainly to the senses that no one could overlook or deny it; and it must be one which no human being, even if possessed of occult powers or in league with evil spirits, could possibly produce. The only phenomenon of which all these limitations could be predicated was 'a sign from heaven.'

The later ages of Christendom have modified these limitations, and, from the days of Aquinas, the interpretation accepted throughout Christendom, both Catholic and Protestant, has been this—a 'miracle' involves a suspension or violation of the laws of Nature; it is a phenomenon which cannot be explained in accordance with any natural laws, known or unknown. Such an

event proves, and such an event alone can prove, the direct action of a Personal God. Paley did not invent this idea; it was a universal belief; all he did was to formulate it clearly, and prove that the alleged miracles of Christianity were attested by such a volume of convergent testimony as could be rejected by no sane man.

If, for example, Christ's miracles of healing could be proved to have been in nature identical with the apparently miraculous cures effected by M. Coué, then they would not have been real miracles, and could prove nothing as to the truth or falsehood of Christianity. They would be excluded from all books of '*Evidences*.'

Throughout this article I shall use the adjective 'Paleyan' to distinguish 'miracles' as above defined. For there are miracles and miracles. A 'Paleyan miracle' appeals to the intellect through the senses, and *compels* belief in the way in which a demonstration in Euclid enforces our assent. It may be proved that the undoubted miracles of Christianity are essentially anti-Paleyan. They do not appeal to the intellect; they appeal primarily to the spiritual in man; to his conscience, to his religious instincts and emotions. What Paley has proved in his *Evidences* is not really Christianity, in spite of its being clothed with the externals of the Christian story; the religion Paley proves is essentially and fundamentally heathenism.

For the essence of heathenism is the worship of Omniscience and Omnipotence. The essence of Christianity is the worship of self-sacrificing Love. Heathenism is the age-long and world-wide mentality of the brute male, which has created a god after its own image and in its own likeness, a mentality which relies accordingly, both in theology and in politics, on the compulsion of force, either of the body or of the intellect. Whereas Christianity is the 'perfect and consummate flower' of that which has increasingly revealed itself in the altruism of motherhood and of fatherhood, all through the aeons from the monad to the man.

It is noteworthy that the quotations which head this article show how the teaching of Christ himself gradually was perverted into Paleyanism. Mark tells us the mere fact that Christ refused to give the Pharisees 'a sign from heaven'; and Matthew adds Christ's emphatic warning that the only 'sign' that would be given would come too late. The warning was cryptic,

and was evidently not understood. We may infer that later on some commentator tried to explain it to the readers of a primitive gospel by putting a note in the margin. This marginal explanation proved so popular that it soon found its way into the text, where it remains unchallenged to this day. It now stands as the chief stronghold of the Paleyan ideal. For although Joshua's miracle of staying the sun, and the miracle recorded in Hezekiah's time of making the shadow on the dial move the wrong way, were more definite defiances of natural law, yet the story of Jonah's safe keeping in the whale's belly has impressed the popular imagination as the supreme instance of God's power of reversing all natural processes. Thus the ingenuity of some early commentator appears in this case to have inverted Christ's teaching, and made him sanction essentially the very Pharisaism that he so strenuously had opposed.

The Revised Version gives us an instructive parallel. In *John* v, 2-7, we have an account of Christ's healing an impotent man, who had long been waiting for the chance of being cured by the periodic activity of a medicinal spring. Some commentators had explained this periodic activity as the work of an angel who from time to time ' troubled the waters.' The Revised Version has relegated this explanation to the margin.

If we compare this story as told in the Authorized Version with *Matthew* xii, 40 (above) we shall see how close is the parallel. In both cases a miraculous explanation is sharply introduced—' For an angel went down . . .' ' For as Jonas was three days . . .' In both cases the story is made clearer by the rejection of the explanation; indeed, in the case of *Matthew* xii, 40, the explanation is demonstrably untrue and opposed to the whole drift of the context (cf. *Luke* xi, 29-32). For the story, as given in *Jonah*, shows us that ' the sign of ' that prophet could have had no connection with the recorded miracle of the whale.

He was twice sent on a mission to Nineveh to denounce God's judgment on that city for its wickedness. The first time he tried to escape from the jurisdiction of Jehovah by taking ship to Tarsus, in Cilicia. A fearful storm compelled him to confess this crime to his shipmates and command them to cast him into the sea. They did so; the storm at once ceased; and we are told that Jonah was swallowed by a great fish, which after three days and three nights vomited him out on the dry land.

The next time Jonah obeyed God, and travelled some six

hundred miles to the north-east to the doomed city, which he found would take three days to traverse. The first day he did nothing beyond crying aloud as he passed through the street 'Yet forty days and Nineveh shall be overthrown.' But the Ninevites repented, fasted in sackcloth and ashes, and God 'repented of the evil that he had said he would do unto them.' So Nineveh was saved.

The story implies that Jonah said nothing to the Ninevites beyond the threat of their impending destruction. He did not wish to convert them; he was very sorry when they were converted. He actually blamed God for being so merciful, and sat outside the city for two days, hoping against hope that after all it might be destroyed.

The Ninevites never heard of the miracle in the whale's belly. Certainly Jonah never told them. His only reason for so doing would have been to persuade them of the truth of his mission and so lead them to repentance, which was precisely the one thing he had all along dreaded (*Jonah* iv, 2). Not a soul knew about the miracle except himself. His shipmates could know nothing about it. Jonah says nothing about it in his recorded prayer. He says 'the waters compassed me about even to the soul, the weeds were wrapped about my head. I went down to the bottoms of the mountains.' So that this miracle could not have been a sign to the Ninevites. Indeed, Matthew does not say it was; he is merely trying to explain Christ's cryptic utterance about 'the sign of the prophet Jonah.'

But this explanation misses the historic meaning of the phrase 'the sign of a prophet.' When God sent a prophet on a special mission, as a rule, He gave that prophet some 'sign' to attest the truth of his mission. When Moses was sent to Pharaoh the 'sign' was that Aaron's rod should be turned into a serpent. When Joshua was appointed the successor of Moses the 'sign' was the drying up of the river Jordan, and the restoration of its waters as soon as the Israelites had passed over. The 'sign of the prophet' Samuel was the destruction of Eli's household. An unnamed prophet had previously given the same 'sign' to Eli (I *Samuel* ii, 34).

Thus any unbiassed reader familiar with Old Testament history would have understood that the 'sign of the prophet Jonah' was simply this—'Yet forty days and Nineveh shall be overthrown.' It was the cancelling of this 'sign' that made

Jonah so angry. If Nineveh was not destroyed his reputation as a prophet was gone.

Moreover the Gospel account of the close of Christ's ministry confirms this interpretation. Christ tells his disciples that not one stone of the Temple shall be left upon another. He warns them to flee to the mountains when they see Jerusalem compassed with armies; for the city shall be trodden down by the Gentiles and the people led away captive into all nations. When the Pharisees asked for 'a sign from heaven,' he implies that the 'sign of the prophet Jonah' will not be miraculous; it will be the result of moral and spiritual laws as inevitable as those that rule the winds and the clouds. He blames them for not using their own common sense; they could foretell fair weather or foul from the signs of the sky: why could they not read the equally manifest signs of the times? Such criticism would have been pointless had 'the sign of the prophet Jonah' been the future miracle of His resurrection, about which the Pharisees could know nothing.

Thus the whole meaning of Christ's utterance has been perverted from what it really was, *viz.*, a solemn warning based upon the inevitability of the moral and spiritual laws of the universe, into the attestation of a story in which physical laws are supposed to have been set at defiance. Indeed, if we take Jonah's own words as giving us 'the whole truth,' then the legend of the whale must itself have been the marginal explanation of some miracle-mongering commentator.

The result of this 'Jonah's whale' interpretation of Christ's warning has been that his condemnation of that generation as 'evil and adulterous' has been obscured. The word 'adulterous' in the Old Testament generally means deserting Jehovah for the gods of the heathen. What Christ insisted upon was that the attitude of demanding a sign was in itself proof positive that those who made this demand were worshipping a false god. In brief, that Paley's religion is essential heathenism. If Christ's resurrection from the dead is paralleled to Jonah's being vomited out on to dry land from the belly of a fish, it is thereby turned into a Paleyan miracle; into an intellectual proof of Christ's divinity from the fact that He thus set the laws of nature at defiance.

The harm which is done to religion by Paleyanism is twofold. First, it makes all religion unreal by divorcing it from

the realm of the natural in which all our thinking has been evolved; the realm to which Christ constantly refers in his profoundest utterances about theology. We are 'to be perfect as our Father is perfect, who maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.' We are to learn to trust in God's providential care for all our needs by looking at the care-free fowls of the air, and noting the beauty of the lilies of the field. Whereas such thinking is out of place in the miraculous.

But the most serious evil of Paleyanism is that it is inconsistent with the whole drift of modern scientific thought. Anyone who has accepted Evolution as the basis of his thinking will sooner or later reject all Paleyan miracles. And if he has been taught all his life to believe that the truth of Christianity is based upon such miracles, he will perforce reject Christianity and become an Agnostic. This is what is continually happening among the educated classes of society to-day.

James A. Aldis.

PSYCHOLOGY AND SACRAMENTS*

By the Rev. E. C. Dewick, M.A.

IT is the purpose of this paper to draw attention to some features of recent thought and literature on the subject of Sacraments, which merit the careful attention of all who are interested in the Christian message.

In order to understand the present situation, it is desirable to begin with a brief historical retrospect. During the nineteenth century (and indeed for some centuries before), Christian teaching with regard to the Sacraments had fallen into two main types. Almost all Christians were indeed agreed that through certain religious ceremonies, called Sacraments, the religious life of man receives a spiritual benefit known as 'grace,' but with regard to the conditions and methods of the working of these Sacraments and the nature of grace, there was a wide divergence of opinion. The two types of thought and language which mark the 'wings' of this divergence may conveniently be described by the terms (undesirable, perhaps, but almost inevitable), Catholic and Protestant.

*A paper read before the Calcutta Clerical Society.

The Catholic lays his chief emphasis on the *reality* of God's working, and of the grace given through the Sacrament; he readily adopts the language of physical life to describe these operations, speaking of Baptism as 'the implanting of a seed' from which springs a spiritual Birth, or of the Eucharist as a 'channel' through which spiritual food is transmitted to the soul. By his emphasis on the 'Matter of Sacrament' ('Res Sacramenti'),[1] he suggests that Grace is something—an 'It,' which may be conceived of and received in quantities, and is of a different character from the gift and indwelling of the Spirit of God which is received apart from the use of the Sacraments.[2]

The *necessity* of the external ceremonies of the Sacraments thus becomes absolute, or as it were a physical necessity, as absolute as the necessity of a channel for the transmission of water, or of physical contact for the production of birth or the reception of food.

The Protestant, on the other hand, tends to emphasize the moral conditions without which Sacraments are ineffectual, and the responsibility of man to meet God's gift with the response of faith. The symbolism most frequently used is the forensic language of Law and Covenant; the Sacraments are 'pledges' or 'seals' of God's gifts;[3] and Grace is conceived of in a more personal way, as the coming of Some-One, who may be described almost indifferently as 'God,' or 'Christ,' or 'The Holy Spirit,' but who in any case is 'He' rather than 'It.' According to this view, the necessity of the Sacraments rests primarily on the Divine Command or institution. For instance, while the Catholic may say: 'You must come to Holy Communion, because otherwise you cannot receive the Holy Food which is necessary for your spiritual life,' the Protestant will be more

[1] For the *Res Sacramenti*, see, *e.g.*, Darwell Stone's *Outlines of Christian Dogma*, pp. 154, 189.

[2] A friend recently said to the writer: 'We Catholics never deny that those who have no valid Sacraments may receive in rich measure of the gift of the Holy Spirit; we only say that they cannot receive true *Sacramental* grace.'

On the other side, in the Catholic view, grace appears to be different in kind from the indwelling of God in Christ; *cf.* Newman:

> 'And that *a higher gift than grace*
> Should flesh and blood refine;
> God's Presence and His very Self.'

[3] See, *e.g.*, *English Church Teaching*, by Bishop Moule and others, pp. 97—129.

likely to say, 'You must come to Holy Communion because Christ has said, "Do this . . . ".'

But while thus recognizing these differences between the Catholic and Protestant views of the Sacraments, it is important to notice the large measure of agreement between the two, at least in their traditional forms.

In the first place, they are agreed in regarding the Sacraments of the Church (whether they be two or seven) as 'supernatural,' in the sense that their method of operation differs from all else that we experience, in non-ecclesiastical life. Partial analogies between the natural world and the Sacraments there may indeed be; but the Divine element in the Christian Sacraments gives to them 'something more,' which must ever remain inexplicable, and which may not be tested by ordinary 'scientific' methods of appeal to human experience.[4]

This unwillingness to appeal to experience is another feature common to both the traditional views of the Sacraments. How often does the Catholic warn the young communicant to beware of any attempt to base his faith in the Eucharist on 'mere feeling'! And the Protestant, though willing enough to appeal to experience in some departments of religion, rarely seems to use this method in connection with the Sacraments.

As a rule, both the Catholic and the Protestant base their claims for the authority and necessity of the Sacraments, not upon any 'experience of value' which may be tested from the facts of present-day religious life, but upon deductions from certain proof-texts of Scripture or Doctrines of the Church. The conclusions reached may differ in detail; but the method of proof adopted has been the same in both cases; it is the method of the dogmatic theologian, and not that of the scientific investigator. In the history of the conflict between the Catholic and Protestant views of the Sacraments, the nineteenth century witnessed the steadily increasing predominance of the former, at least within the Anglican Church. Nor is it difficult to see the reasons for this. The Catholic view lends itself to

[4] *E.g.*, in Father Bull's *The Sacramental Principle*, the opening chapters deal with 'Sacramentalism' in the natural world; but afterwards, in dealing with the Sacraments of the Church, the writer makes claims on their behalf for which little or no support can be derived from our knowledge of the 'laws of Nature.' And in Protestant writers the Divine Command is generally treated as giving a similar character of 'separateness' to the Christian Sacraments.

clear and simple definitions; its symbolism (of the seed, the channel, etc.) is more readily intelligible than the Protestant illustrations of the 'pledge' or the 'seal.' Moreover, it grew up together with (and partly as the fruit of) the great revival of aestheticism, mediaevalism, and reverence for ecclesiastical authority, which forms the most striking feature of Victorian Anglicanism. Further, the spread of Biblical criticism weakened the force of the old Protestant appeal to proof-texts, whether for purposes of defence or of attack; while the unwillingness of both sides to appeal to experience freed the Catholic from any fear of an attack from that quarter, and at the same time left the Protestant dependent upon 'Divine Commands,' which were not always historically impregnable. And finally, within the last few years, the Protestant has been faced with an unexpected attack from a quarter towards which he had hitherto looked for support. From the 'liberal' camp came the surprising thesis of Kirsopp Lake, that Primitive Christianity was thoroughly Catholic (not to say 'magical') in its Sacramentalism, and that the Protestant view of the Sacraments had not even the merit of being Apostolic.[6] Lake, no doubt, implies that the corollary of his theory is, 'So much the worse for Primitive Christianity!' but the Catholic, while repudiating so impious a conclusion, saw that Lake's thesis offered him a welcome relief from the rather dangerous theory of 'doctrinal development,' which he had sometimes been driven to adopt in order to outflank the old Protestant argument from the apparent absence of Catholic doctrine in the Primitive Church. Obviously, if Lake's theory were true, that argument was completely undermined.[7]

Hence, owing to a variety of causes, the Catholic view of the Sacraments grew steadily in popularity, till by the end of the nineteenth century, it seemed as if the choice of the future would be 'Catholicism or nothing' in the matter of Sacramental doctrine.

The Catholic theory was clear-cut and popular; its literature was prolific—even if not very profound or permanent. Moderate Anglicanism was obviously uneasy; it claimed to rest upon the

[6] Lake's *Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, etc. In Germany, Wernle and Pfleiderer had previously maintained a similar thesis.

[7] The consternation caused in Protestant circles by Lake's book may be seen in Forsyth's *The Church and the Sacraments*, chap. viii.

formularies of the Church of England; but if challenged for an explanation of them, it was inclined to plead for 'a reverent reserve in sacred matters.' Protestantism on the whole remained stubborn, especially in Free Church circles; but it was obviously fighting a losing battle, and generally it avoided the subject of the Sacraments, or was inclined to admit that its teaching might be defective or obscure.

Such was the position of affairs twenty, or even ten years ago. But the last few years have seen the rise of a new line of thought with regard to the Sacraments (both within and without the Anglican Communion), which may be traced in a succession of recent books and writings, *e.g.*:

1. (1916)—Streeter's *Concerning Prayer* (especially the essay on *Worship*).
2. (1917)—F. T. Forsyth's *The Church and the Sacraments*.
3. (1917)—A. J. Tait's *The Nature and Function of the Sacraments*.
4. (1919)—The Mansfield Conference volume, *Towards Reunion* (especially Carnegie Simpson's essay on *Grace and Sacrament*).
5. (1919)—Streeter, etc., *The Spirit* (especially Emmett's essay on *Grace* and Miss Dougall's on *The Sacraments*).
6. (1920)—Oman's *Grace and Personality*.

These books, while differing in many details, show a well-marked similarity to each other in their line of approach to the Doctrine of the Sacraments. Four characteristics are specially worthy of notice:

1. The Appeal to Christian Experience.

In contrast to the older views, which generally explained what *must* happen, on the *a priori* basis of a given text or dogma, these writers begin by asking: 'What *has* actually happened, and what *is* now happening, in and through the Sacraments, as far as we can gather from the witness of the spiritual experience of Christian men and women, both past and present?

Such a method of approach has become very popular in the last few years, largely through the Inter-denominational Conferences on the subject of Re-union, at which the Anglican leaders have made frequent protestations of their high regard for the spiritual experience of non-Anglicans; and it has received the *imprimatur* of the Lambeth Fathers of 1920, both in their 'Appeal' and in their Resolutions on this subject. None the less, and in spite of the halo of authority thus acquired, this 'Appeal to Experience' is a distinct novelty in Christian con-

troversy; and it seems to be leading to some very far-reaching (our forefathers would have said 'revolutionary') conclusions, both in the problem of Re-union, and in the doctrine of the Sacraments.

2. The affirmation of the Divine Immanence in the Sacraments.

These recent writers are unanimous in affirming that in every Sacrament—and indeed in every Christian gathering—God is *really present*, and *active*. This involves an attitude which is very different from the semi-Deism of much of the older Protestantism, which could place over the Lord's Table the text, 'He is not here.'[8]

On the other hand, the idea of a Presence which 'comes' or 'changes' at certain moments in the Sacramental rite, is no less foreign to this consciousness of a Divine Omnipresence, which may indeed be realized or recognized at special times in special ways, but which is always pre-existent, and independent of rites or formulas.[9]

3. The operation of the Sacraments is conceived of as a Personal Relationship.

The imparting of grace may be best compared, not to the infusion of a substance, but to the transmission of a spiritual influence, or indwelling; grace is not 'It,' but 'He'; and the reception of grace takes place through the soul or spirit, not primarily through the body, although the condition of the body may undoubtedly affect the receptivity of the soul. This view underlies the main thesis of Oman's *Grace and Personality*, and is clearly set forth by Forsyth,[10] Emmett,[11] and Carnegie Simpson.[12] Two typical passages from the latter may be quoted:

> '"Grace in Sacrament" is not some metaphysical or semi-physical influence or essence; it is essentially personal. It is Christ—God in Christ and through the Holy Spirit—doing something in this way.'[13]

[8] The present writer has recently seen this in a village Church in England.

[9] See, *e.g.*, Miss Dougall in *The Spirit*, p. 268*f*: 'By a Special Presence, then, in any place or time, we must mean a special awareness of the divine presence by human spirits.'

[10] Forsyth, *The Church and the Sacraments*, p. 167*f*.

[11] Emmett, in *The Spirit*, chap. v.

[12] Carnegie Simpson, in *Towards Reunion*. Essay on *Grace in Sacrament*.

[13] Carnegie Simpson, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

'When, then, the brethren of the rituals tell me that they have in the Sacrament something higher, holier, more than is here, I reply that there is and there can be on earth nothing higher, holier, more than Christ personally come to, speaking to, giving Himself to the Christian. . . . Those who think that there is more are deceiving themselves—with notions about corporeity or with whatever else—and are disparaging not merely the religious experience of multitudes of their fellow Christians, but the very Gift of Christ, who, to whomsoever He gives simply Himself, gives the absolutely and utterly best.' [14]

4. The conditions of Sacramental efficiency are in line with certain ascertainable psychological laws.

The writers seem to be agreed that a true estimate of the working of the Sacraments is not to be deduced, clear-cut and ready-made, from proof-texts or dogmas, but must be ascertained gradually and with only approximate accuracy, from a patient study of the phenomena of psychology and religious experience. They hold that the 'laws of Sacraments' are not separate from the laws of life in general. While refusing to draw a hard-and-fast line between valid and invalid sacraments, they recognize that there are varying degrees of *efficacy* in all kinds of religious rites; and they maintain that the most effectual sacraments for their proper purpose of transmitting grace, are those which take account of, and are in line with, certain important psychological principles. If these principles are recognized, several important practical conclusions follow:

(1) The value of a moderate, but not excessive, use of externals in worship. Where external forms are rightly adapted to their purpose, they will assist, and not hinder, the working of the Spirit in real worship. A recognition of this will guard us against the idea that the most spiritual worship is that which is the most devoid of external rites.

(2) On the other hand, a rite or ceremony does not at all times produce the same psychological effect; this will vary under different conditions, and in relation to different temperaments. If so, the idea that a rite may be so indissolubly connected with spiritual value as to 'contain grace' of necessity, needs to keep itself always open to modification in the light of experience. Otherwise, a rite which is treated as 'an end in itself,' or of Divine appointment for all time, may easily become a hindrance to spiritual religion.

[14] Carnegie Simpson, *op. cit.*, p. 106*f*.

(3) Religious experience teaches us the need for an ordered variety in the externals of worship which shall combine an element of freshness with a background of restfulness. Otherwise, the spirit becomes either wearied by monotony, or distracted by incessant changes.[15] If this principle is applied to the Sacraments, it will guard us against the supposition that they can necessarily produce an accumulation of grace by frequent repetition. It cannot (for instance) be taken for granted that Daily Communion will impart more grace than a weekly participation, or weekly than monthly; in each case the 'limits of frequency' within which the rite is most effectual for its spiritual purpose must be ascertained by careful observation, and not by the application of mathematical laws.

(4) Our writers frequently point out the value of the 'association of ideas' as a real channel of spiritual forces and personal influence; and it is to this (rather than to any idea of a 'channel') that they would attribute the efficacy of the Sacraments:

> 'Why is there a special presence of Christ, or a special recognition of His universal presence, in the Holy Communion? Simply because the whole rite is charged with the associations of His personality. The words, the elements, the acts carry us back directly to the supreme crisis of His life. No one can be present at the rite with a serious purpose without thinking vividly of Him. . . . To think earnestly and lovingly of Him is to realise His presence, to be with Him, to open the heart to all the influence which comes from contact with His Spirit, to be in Him and He in us. All this is not metaphor, but experience, widespread and in direct line with similar, though lower, experiences which come from intercourse with human personalities. Let it not be said that such a view is purely subjective, that it is a case of faith creating its object. The whole point is that there is something, or rather some One, really there. Faith, or the receptive mind, under the influence of the associations of the rite, realizes and appropriates to itself that which is there independently, and which is striving to reveal itself.'[16]

Or again, Dr. Forsyth:

> 'The action on the soul by means of grace is in the psychic region, and not in that of either physics or metaphysics. It is not like the action of two chemical substances, nor is it an infusion of divine essence. The action of person on person, the production of one act by

[15] *Cf.* Streeter in *Concerning Prayer,* p. 268: 'The maximum of religious appeal is often made where familiartiy and freshness can be combined. One may instance the best-known Christmas and Easter hymns, which are familiar because sung every year, but ever new because sung only once a year.'

[16] C. W. Emmett, in *The Spirit,* pp. 167*f.*

another, belongs to the region of psychology yet unexplored. But the fact remains. Word and Sacraments produce on the soul certain impressions and ideas in a psychological way; then these impressions act sacramentally on a still more inward life, and carry home to our moral centre the real presence of God in His saving power.'[17]

It is worth noting how emphatically all these writers affirm that their 'explanations' touch only the *method* of God's working in the Sacraments; whatever may be the theory on this point, the ultimate source of power remains unchanged—that is, the Living God.

It remains, in conclusion, to point out one or two of the more important consequences of the view which we have been describing, if it should come to be widely recognized in the Church.

It secures the recognition of the Divine Agency at work in and through the Sacraments, while avoiding the *negative* implications which have generally been associated with traditional Catholicism, with its clear-cut theory of the conditions apart from which all Sacraments are 'invalid.' To-day there are many who, while dissatisfied with traditional Protestant teaching on the Sacraments, have been unable to admit the exclusive claims of traditional Catholicism to possess a peculiar channel of grace, on the ground that these claims cannot be supported by the 'appeal to experience.' A broad comparison between the lives of sacramentalists and non-sacramentalists does not seem to reveal any such spiritual pre-eminence in the former, as might be expected if they alone had received a special sacramental grace; and the outstanding Christ-likeness of Quakerism is one of the most challenging of many facts which are hard to reconcile with Catholic claims. It has seemed as if God were hallowing many sacramental rites which the Catholic dismissed as 'invalid'; and—'What God hath cleansed, that call not thou common.'

The 'psychological approach' to the doctrine of the Sacraments seems to offer a prospect of conserving the Catholic consciousness of the real power and presence of God in the Sacraments, without drawing arbitrary lines to limit the number of such 'effectual rites,' or to separate rigidly between the Sacraments of the Church and the sacramental acts which form a part of all life. It is no doubt true that, even if tested by psychological principles alone, such rites as Baptism and the Eucharist

[17] Forsyth, *The Church and the Sacraments*, p. 261*f*.

have a special spiritual value; but their value, though pre-eminent, is not essentially different from the value which is associated with all symbolic ceremonies.

Viewed in this light, too, the Sacraments will no longer present the same obstacles to Christian Re-union as those which are inherent in the older theories; for there will be far greater scope for a wide variety of religious rite; and no one form will be able to claim for itself an exclusive Divine authority, or validity.

It may be that to some types of mind, this view of the Sacraments will seem to be lacking in that peculiar attraction which the 'supernatural' alone can exercise. But there are many to whom it is making its appeal because it seems to offer a view which does not require unproved assumptions, nor inculcate unwarranted denials of other modes of worship, and yet which retains a sober reverence and a well-grounded faith in the Sacraments as effectual signs of the real Presence and Power of a living God.

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CHURCHMEN'S UNION*

By Douglas White, M.A., M.D., Chairman of the Council of the Churchmen's Union.

YOU will mostly agree that the main object of our society is to affirm and maintain the progressive character of the Christian Revelation. That means that we stand for progressive reform, both of Church doctrine and practice. We live in an age of reformation of thought, if ever such existed—reformation more fundamental than that of three centuries ago, though not dissimilar in principle. In the lifetime of our older members changes have taken place in the very conditions of our thought, more profound and far-reaching than our reforming ancestors ever dreamt of.

The religious sphere has been invaded by science and criticism, so that it is impossible, not only for us, but for any think-

* An Address given at the London Annual Meeting of the Churchmen's Union, 1926.

ing man, to retain the same outlook as our fathers held. Many indeed try to deceive themselves into thinking that they have achieved this marvel of immobility; even if it were so, it were nothing to be proud of. If any man thinks that he has reached a permanently stable equilibrium of thought on any subject, religion included, he should remember that the only permanently stable equilibrium is death. Change has in fact been the necessary condition of vital religion, as it has of intellectual life. We are able to see and tabulate many of the main changes in religious thought. The conception, for example, of tribal Gods gradually changed and enlarged till men had to envisage a God of the whole earth. That was a great development; but was it greater than the change brought about by the astronomers who made the earth but one quite small planet in a universe of millions of suns? You may say that quantitative changes of ideas make no difference; but they do; to myself, both emotionally and intellectually, the change is very great. The quantitative in some sense involves the qualitative. God has not changed, but our thought of Him has changed. This shaking, not only of the earth but of the heavens, signifies the removal of the things which are shaken so that the things which are not shaken may remain. This is specially true of the last few years. The spatial and temporal conception of *infinity* has undergone a radical change, if indeed it any longer exists. There is nothing either infinitely great or infinitely small; neither infinite speed, nor infinite space nor infinite time. Infinity belongs to the pre-Einstein categories. When we used to talk of God as infinite—essentially a quantitative term—it was rather difficult to see what it meant; it has now become at least doubtful whether it means anything at all, since the category from which the word 'infinity' was borrowed has disappeared. Even if some meaning still attaches to the spatial idea of infinity, I do not see what it means when applied to God. What we seek in God is not extensity, but intensity; not quantity of power, but quality of character.

But the change of thought has not been confined to space-time notions. The meaning attached to the word '*Creation*' has sensibly and really changed. Creation is no longer thought of as an act or succession of acts in time; for time, space and matter are seen to be bound up with each other. It seems that we must shift our standpoint and regard the external universe rather as

the breath or the thought of God—the natural and inevitable product of the activity of His Spirit. I find myself incapable of imagining its beginning or end.

And while the root-idea of God's *transcendence* remains, its meaning has altered in quality. We no longer think of the transcendent God sitting in glory above or outside of His universe; we rather think of Him as the Centre of all that is, from which the whole diversified life of the universe radiates—Himself the originating centre from which it takes form, whose life-giving light radiates to its periphery. He is the Centre of it, not outside of it; for the universe means all that is.

These words, Infinity, Creation, Transcendence are perhaps rather abstruse examples of the large class of theological words and phrases whose content of meaning has really altered. It is of no use for theologians to say that religious thought has not altered because they can still repeat the same words. There has in fact been a great shaking.

In this, I am only trying to make clear that in standing for progressive thought in religion, we are not standing for something new; we are endeavouring to call attention to, and to commend, a process which has been happening always, but which is happening to-day with greater momentum. It is disastrous if religious teachers simply continue to insist on the same words, without appreciating and confessing their change of content.

We stand then for progressive reform of Christian thought. What should be our methods? They cannot be of a militant stamp. I am not sure that military metaphors have ever been well applied to Christian movements; at any rate, they are inapplicable to ours; we have no banner, no slogan, no effective advertisements. Our main virtue is that we ourselves are trying to think, and trying to get others to think. That is a slow and sometimes a tedious process. Organization is necessary up to a point; that point will vary with the richness and the clarity of the positive ideas that we can set forth, whether by the spoken or the written word; but if we seek high organization merely for the sake of enlarging our society, I think we shall fail of our aim. For thought is a thing of peculiar character. Probably most of you know of that singular class of substances which are called unorganized ferments. They are substances produced only, up to the present, by living organisms; they themselves are not

biologically alive, yet they possess in some remarkable degree the qualities of life. All ferments probably are ultimately unorganized, *i.e.* they are complex chemical substances produced within the body of some animal or plant, be that body large or small. In mammalian bodies, the best-known ferments are pepsin and rennin; pepsin digests proteids; rennin clots milk. They do not act as ordinary chemicals, by combination; by the influence of their presence, they cause these changes to occur, themselves remaining unchanged. A very small quantity of such a substance is able to produce its marvellous change in a very large, probably indefinite, quantity of the material on which it acts, given the necessary time. It acts silently, steadily, and without fuss. A few drops of rennin solution, in suitable conditions, can clot very large quantities of milk, and can be recovered unchanged. The motto of such ferments is *Nec tamen consumebatur*. Chemicals, on the other hand, such as high explosives, do their work quickly and noisily, but are themselves disintegrated in the process.

In these substances we find, I think, a fair analogy of the progressive pervasive thought for which we stand. Such thought is only produced by living organisms; once produced and made operative by expression, it cannot help producing its reaction on other minds, quietly, unobtrusively; given time and suitable conditions (just as the ferment requires suitable conditions of temperature, acidity or the reverse), having done its work on one mind, it passes on to work again on others. For truth too, like the burning bush, is not consumed by its own activity. Its rapidity of action depends on the conditions in which it works. As with ferments, too much heat or too much acid damages or may even destroy its action; and beyond a certain point you cannot hurry it.

I would ask you to think seriously of this picture of our activities. If it is a true picture, it excludes advertising or swashbuckling methods. It demands that we shall *be* something rather than *do* something. When true ideas have once got into circulation, their activity is certain and continuous. Our society, in my judgment, ought to be a home of true ideas about religion, toward which any person, cleric or lay, man or woman, may turn, who is seized with a desire to think freely on religious matters.

The term free-thinking has in the past been associated with

irreligion; but to-day the best religion is associated with free minds, that is, with minds which are prepared to release themselves from conventional trammels, to prove all things, and to hold fast to that which is true.

It needs some courage to think deep in things religious. It involves censorship, and maybe abandonment, of long-cherished views. Nor is the process completed in a day; it is apt to go on in periodic waves. But the man who has once dared to think has begun the process; once begun it can only be stopped by fear, or by inability to think further. To each one of us there comes some crisis when we have to decide whether we shall so dare, or whether we shall funk. This forms the real difference between one theological writer and another—is it fear or courage? is he marching forward or is he digging himself in?

Now in every school of religious opinion, *some* men are beginning to think things out. It is not confined to Modernists or Liberal Evangelicals; it is taking place among many who call themselves Anglo-Catholics; in every school, in fact, where intellectual responsibility has not been abrogated or delegated. As soon as men begin to think in that way, they want company, they want a home. If the Churchmen's Union can become—as it has already become to some extent—such a home, people who are daring to think will flow to it from all sides, not from one school of thought only, but from all; not only, we hope, from High Church and Low Church, but from No Church also; for many men of high character, who have formerly thought themselves excommunicate, are now finding that they are Christians.

We cannot all think exactly the same in detail; none of us can all at once rid ourselves of our personal or ancestral thought-system; if we could there would be no stability. Hence the need, even among ourselves, for a wide and comprehensive charity; for laying aside, as far as practicable, of needless polemic against those whose upbringing has taken place in a different entourage from our own. Neither the Evangelical nor the Anglo-Catholic cares to hear abuse of the ideas in which his traditional religion seems to him to be rooted; yet gradually, if they be provided with a common home of thought, the seemingly radical antipathies tend to disappear. Here I speak feelingly; for at various periods of my thinking life I have felt drawn into sympathy with widely different points of view. I remember the time

when, though trying to think, I rejected, off-hand, outlooks which I now regard as right and true. I have even weeded out of my small theological library books which I would fain possess to-day, and kept others which are now of small value to me. Some of the books I rejected have influenced my mind more permanently than many which I kept. Yet even now I do not care to hear derided the views which I once held; after all, they are part of the stuff out of which my mind has developed. But quiet, reasoned criticism, even of opinions which form part of my present stock, I can freely welcome. We are all developing our outlook from different starting points; we are trying to think, and we are all at different stages. The process has not finished for men or for you. But inasmuch as this Union stands for free and progressive thought, it has been a valued home to me, as it has been to many of you; I would seek to make it a home for others, no matter where they stood when they first began to think.

But if we all have to think, we must also have a common basis of thought. Beneath the things which are shaken, there is something that remains. What is the central point round which Christianity turns? It is not primarily doctrines regarding Bible, Church, or Sacraments; not even primarily regarding the person of Christ. Christianity is first of all a belief in the God of Christ. To believe vitally as He did that the Great Spirit at the centre of the universe is a God of Love, a God of Truth, of Righteousness, of Beauty—that was the faith which He proclaimed, for which He lived and died. The man, who really believes that, is a Christian; and so believing, he cannot but regard with most humble reverence, as Lord and Master, the marvellous being who stamped this message on human history. Such a Faith in a God of Love, if real and vital, not formal and verbal, is bound to alter, both in form and colour, a man's whole character and outlook; for all men fashion themselves after the pattern of the God in whom they believe.

Do you tell me this is too simple and easy a definition of Christianity? I will tell you that men and women of to-day are finding such a faith increasingly difficult. On its face it runs counter to the facts of science, history, and actual life as we know it. Fifty times easier to assent contentedly to all the articles of long and difficult creeds, than whole-heartedly to believe that the great Spirit of the universe is a God of Love. Its implica-

tions are vast. How many of us can say that we keep steadily up to that high peak of faith? Yet, failing that, Christianity has no meaning. It involves a great and difficult venture; if I mistake not, faith in the God of Christ is the great adventure of life.

Yet, though at crises of individual or social life, such a faith is heavily strained, it is not merely a distant hope that perhaps, after all, it may be true. To me at least it seems the only means of unification and rationalisation of the universe. Philosophically, it is assailable, like any other philosophy; but it is strong as the only known basis of social and international policy which offers hope of practical success in human affairs. It works.

Just as biology outranges physics, though in harmony with it, and just as psychology outranges both, so religion must outrange though embracing all. Even if it were logically controverted, we should have to demand an alternative working hypothesis.

I do not say that the Love of God is *all* that Christianity may involve; but it is the foundation on which any superstructure must be built. Let each of us beware how we build, gold, silver, precious stones, or wood, hay, stubble. For sure enough the stubble is already in the fire. It will perish, but the gold will survive.

So, while the Churchmen's Union cannot hold itself aloof from serious controversy any more than it can claim immunity from attack, I would fain that its primary object were to become in larger measure a storehouse of gold, silver, precious stones, from which all those who so desire can draw, or to which they can bring of their own product for the building of others.

We are all members of, and lovers of, the Church of England; this Church I believe to be richer to-day in its thought contribution than any other Church; but neither can we deny that it also stands in more urgent need of such contribution than any other comparable body. It is the bounden duty of each one of us, not only to make known but to enrich this our storehouse; and not least to show that a modern theology is productive not only of sound scholarship, but of sound lives.

THE TASK OF THE MODERNIST*

By the Rev. A. H. Streeten, M.A., Minor Canon of St. Paul's Cathedral.

I have a baptism to be baptized with; and how am I straitened till it be accomplished. *Luke, XII*, 50.

IT is natural that St. Luke, a Gentile missionary, who presents the Gospel from its universal standpoint, should record this utterance of Christ. In this passage He views His death under the image of a baptism or new birth into a larger world than He could reach while on earth. The baptism of death was to set free His Spirit for a wider ministry to His other sheep, 'not of this fold.' During His earthly life He felt Himself straitened and confined by those limits of time and space imposed upon Him by the very mode of Incarnation. He was bound to confine His message to one nation, 'the lost sheep of the house of Israel.' But He had always the larger vision of His work before Him; and here He looks forward to the future emancipation of His message from its Jewish setting. In another passage He compares His death, and all the suffering it would mean both to Himself and His friends, to the travailing pains of a new birth.

We are almost surprised that it was St. John, and not St. Luke, who records the incident of the deputation of Greeks brought to Him by Andrew and Philip with their request, 'Sir, we would see Jesus.' There is the same vision of new vistas opening out before Him: 'The hour is come that the Son of Man should be glorified'; the same feeling of constraint, the same insistent temptation to escape from the straitened path of His purpose: 'Now is my soul troubled, and what shall I say?' Then in the power of the reassuring voice from Heaven the temptation passes, and He can go on to sum up His universal work in the wonderful sentence 'I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me.' It is only by death that the corn of wheat will bring forth much fruit. If Judaism was the sheath prepared

* A sermon delivered at the Corporate Communion of the Churchmen's Union at St. Andrew's, Ashley Gardens, Westminster, June 9th, 1926.

for the seed of the Gospel, the Gentile world was the soil, no less prepared, in which it was to fructify.

It was St. Paul, himself first set free on the road to Damascus from a straitened Pharisaism, who was the first to see that the Church, though cradled in Judaism, would have to adapt itself to the wider environment of the Gentile world if it were to live and grow. In the Council held at Jerusalem, he was able to convince James and the rest that this was the direction in which the Spirit of God was leading the Church. The result of that conference was the first step towards the emancipation to which Christ looked forward. St. Paul was the chosen vessel to rescue Christianity from perishing as an insignificant Jewish sect.

That is the law of all growth, that the organism must adapt itself to its environment or perish. The environment of religion is the 'thought-world' of the age; and religion, if it is to live and grow, must ever be seeking to correspond more and more closely with this environment. It was in this way that the Spirit of God, moving on the face of the waters, built out of chaos order, richness and variety; and just as it has been under the guiding of God's Spirit that a new environment has ever prescribed a new direction for physical life, so we believe that the same Spirit has been at work shaping the environment in which spiritual life has attained and will yet attain greater richness and variety.

But the Church has always been slow to trust this guidance; she has been afraid of that contact with the otuside world by which alone religion can develop. The early Church, when set free from the limitations of Judaism, gained from as well as gave to her Gentile converts. There were many things that the disciples could not bear which our Lord has been able to say as the changing 'thought-world' has made it possible. In each successive age the Spirit of Truth has taken something more of His and has shown it unto us. We are begining to realize that the conversion of nations like India and China may serve to develop new aspects and implications of our faith unrealized before.

We stand to-day, I believe, at the dawn of a new emancipation of Christ. At no time in the history of Christianity has our religion been so urgently needed. 'Sirs, we would see Jesus,' is a very real, though largely inarticulate, demand to-day. The more complex our civilization has become, the greater

is the need for the practical application of the Gospel to the problems that confront us. We are being forced by very circumstances to realize the need of the Christianization of all life, social and international as well as individual. The spread of education, of free thought and free speech, has prepared a new environment and indicated a new direction for religion that is fraught with boundless possibilities of development. The world-call of the mission field presents as urgent a challenge to the Church as when the first great world-call of the Gospel came. In all the unrest and turmoil of to-day, may we not see the travailing pains of a new birth of Christianity?

Yet at no time, perhaps, has Christ been so straitened or His Church so out of touch with the thought-world of the day. It is of no use to look back to that epoch before the dawn of modern science, when religion corresponded more closely with its environment, nor to attempt to bind the faith again with fetters which it has already burst. Christ must be set free to speak to-day, in the language in which He will be understood, the message so urgently needed by the world.

That language will no longer be the language of arbitrary authority. When Kant claimed for his study 'the fertile paths of experience,' he was claiming for Philosophy the inductive method already employed by Science, and which can be the only true basis for religion in a generation which breathes the very atmosphere of the scientific temper. As the decay of Judaism was, under God's providence, the means of the emancipation of the Gospel into the thought-world of the day, so the decay of the sense of authority in religion may be God's method of throwing us upon the firmer ground of a personal and immediate experience of Himself and His relation to the individual soul.

The matter could not be better expressed than in words occurring in one of the *Times*' Saturday sermons: 'The quest of Truth is impassioned by the knowledge that it can be recognized when seen and thus relieved from the burden of authority.' It was with just this feeling of relief from the burden of an external authority that the men of Sychar, after the visit of Christ to their village, were able to say to the woman of Samaria, 'Now we believe, not because of thy saying; for we have heard Him ourselves and know that this is indeed the Christ, the Saviour of the world.' And it is always, for most of us, with an instinctive

feeling of relief that we discover that the Truth can stand on its own feet and need not be bolstered up by such doubtful authority as that of the General Councils and Papal decrees. Such authority may have served to protect the seed of truth in an earlier age; it will have little power to-day.

We of this generation have seen the capture of the last stronghold of external authority, the theory of the verbal inspiration of the Bible. We are now free from the burden of all the difficulties and contradictions imposed by such a theory. We are free to regard the book of *Genesis* for what it is, the allegorical presentation of Divine Truth, and not a rival text-book of Science; free to regard the Old Testament generally as the progressive discovery of God, in which the jewels shine all the more brightly from a setting that is often rough and uncouth.

Matthew Arnold has shown us, too, by his analogy of the pen and the pen-wiper, that the miracles of the New Testament need no longer be regarded as authoritative evidence of the truth of Christ's teaching. The Churchmen's Union is not committed to a disbelief in miracles, though we may recognize that the evidence for some is stronger than that for others; but rather to a different way of regarding them. It would be truer to say to-day that we believe in the miracles because of Christ, rather than in Christ because of the miracles. It is a distinct relief to be able to see in the miracles, not the authentic proofs of Christ's Divinity or of the truth of His message—He refused to regard them so Himself—but rather actual vehicles of teaching and 'signs' of a saving power that is still available for us to-day, where He can find the requisite faith.

Authority of any kind, religious or otherwise, is most simply defined as 'the accumulated experience of humanity.' The authority we can claim for creeds and formulas is that they are the expressions in words of certain real experiences. Such doctrines as those of the Trinity, the Atonement, or the Divinity of Christ grew up naturally and inevitably as a result of those early experiences of Christ's character and work. 'God hath sent forth the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father.' That was the experience from which the doctrine of the Trinity arose. Let it be with those words ringing in our ears if we must say the Athanasian Creed. 'God commendeth His love towards us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for

s.' There lies the true authority for the Atonement, though ot for all the extravagant theories about it. 'For in Him welleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily'; it was that onviction that demanded, and still demands, belief in the ivinity of Christ.

These doctrines have held their own because they are true, nd because the experiences they enshrine are universal. It is ot the Christian dogmas that are resented to-day so much as e attempt to force certain definitions of them at the pistol-oint. It is not for us to say 'Let sleeping dogmas lie,' nor to nbark upon the hopeless task of re-defining the truths behind em; but rather to endeavour to make them live again, to solve them into the experiences from which they sprang. The ernal truth underlying them must be so presented to this eneration that it will be 'recognized when seen.' The living ed protected by them must continue to bear fruit again in indi-dual conviction.

There is no reason why we should not keep the old creeds nd formulas; what we do claim is liberty of interpretation of e words we use in common. Each of us must be continually owing into our creed, re-discovering and recognizing for our-lves the eternal truth that lies behind the words we use. It is nly as we are doing so that we can say in the fullest sense 'I elieve.' We shall find that, guided by 'the faith once for all elivered to the saints,' we shall be like travellers who verify nd enrich their map by their own experience of the beauties of e country which it indicates.

But we must never allow ourselves to be content with an ademic aloofness from the great problems of the day. We ust not confuse means with ends. The aim of a society like e Churchmen's Union is to set Christ free to speak His mes-ge in a way that will grip this generation. We are accused of ing academic and destructive; here is an aim that is essen-lly practical and constructive.

The Church is faced to-day with open attack. The whole sis of Christianity as a way of life is being challenged on ery hand. The spirit of Bolshevism, the modern anti-Christ, spreading all over the world. Missionaries find themselves against a real antagonism to their message, at least among e intelligentsia of the Eastern nations. We are not afraid of

open hostility—it is almost a relief from passive indifference—restoring, as it does, something of the zest of adventure with which the disciples went out to turn the world upside down.

But the Church must fight unencumbered; she must discard an obsolete armoury, and above all get the right men on her side. 'What we fear,' it has been truly said, 'is not open attack, but the silent desertion of intellectual men, who go away for lack of instruction which they can understand and accept.' Except these remain in the ship we cannot be saved. They must be kept in the ship or got back into the ship. That is pre-eminently the task of the Churchmen's Union.

'Christianity is organized for calamity.' Whenever there is 'distress of nations, . . . men fainting for fear and for expectation of the things which are coming on the world,' it is just at such times of travail that the 'Son of Man comes in power and great glory.' It is for us by every means in our power, both as a society and individuals, 'to prepare the way of the Lord.'

BOOK REVIEWS

AN IDEAL ALSATIAN.*

Prof. Paul Lobstein was a true son of Alsace. His forefathers, as far back as the seventeenth century, were born in the province. His sympathies were with Alsace, and he lived the greater part of his life at Strasbourg. His biography, compiled by his widow and son, possesses both an historical and theological interest. Prof. Lobstein passed through the great national crises of 1870-71 and 1914-18, and shared in the anxiety and sufferings of his compatriots. In theology he forged a connecting link between French and German Protestantism, and by his exceptional knowledge of both languages he was able to introduce French theology to German readers and *vice versa*.

Paul Lobstein was born at Epinal in Lorraine on July 28th, 1850. As a boy he went to the Protestant gymnasium of Strasbourg, and took his degree of L.-ès-l. in 1869. He turned then to the theological faculty, and attended the lectures of Auguste Sabatier, who was expelled by the Germans in 1873, and became Dean of the theological faculty at Paris. Lobstein's studies were, of course, interrupted by the Franco-Prussian War. He refused to leave Strasbourg during her time of trial. That spirit was characteristic of the citizens and their leaders. When Strasbourg was threatened with bombardment, General Uhrich issued a defiant proclamation to the inhabitants:

> 'If Strasbourg is attacked, Strasbourg will defend herself as long as there remains a soldier, a biscuit, or a cartridge' (p. 28).

**Un Alsacien idéal.* Librairie Istra. Strasbourg, 15 Rue des Juifs, and Paris, 5 Rue de Richelieu. 1926. 12 fr.)

From November, 1870, to August, 1871, Lobstein continued his studies at Tübingen, but he expressed his dissatisfaction with the German preachers, who talked politics in the pulpit, boasting of the success of Germany and, like true Pharisees, thanking God that they were not lost and corrupted like France. At the end of 1871 he was back again in Strasbourg. About this time he felt bound to make his option between Alsace and France. Although he believed that Protestantism would rejuvenate the heart and spirit of France, he did not feel called to emigrate to France. On the other hand, the Germans could not help Alsace by their benefits after the insults which they had inflicted upon her. Only those Alsatians could help their country who, condemning themselves voluntarily to sharing the condition imposed on their brethren, associated themselves in heart with their misfortune and freely accepted their disgrace and humiliation. This honest conviction is put in the form of a long and searching self-examination, which reveals the writer's affection for his native land.

In 1875 Lobstein pursued his studies at Göttingen and attended the lectures of Ritschl and Lotze, the former of whom exercised a permanent influence on his theology. In the following year he took his degree in theology, and produced two dissertations in German, one entitled *Die Ethik Calvins* and the other *Petrus Ramus als Theologe*. In 1883 Lobstein married for the first time Mlle. Anna Wennagel, who died a year later after giving birth to a daughter. At the same time, he published his first French work on *The Pre-existence of the Son of God*, which occasioned an animated but friendly correspondence between him and Prof. F. Godet, of Neufchâtel. In 1886 he married Mlle E. Kopp, by whom he had three children.

In 1898 the Dreyfus affair broke out in France. Prof. Lobstein followed the course of this controversy with keen interest, and expressed his hope that the cause of freedom would triumph, and that the Protestant as well as the Catholic Church would come out of the great crisis endowed with new life. In passing, it should be noted to the eternal glory of Alsace that Lt.-Col. Picquart, who braved the wrath of Army and Church in protesting against this monstrous injustice, was an Alsatian.

Prof. Lobstein was very fond of his children, and noted their artless remarks. Once he said to his daughter Annette, 'If I chastise you, it is because I love you.' She replied, 'It is also because I love you that I give you trouble.' His journal recorded in 1908 the fact that his son Edouard decided to go to Berlin University. It was there that we met one another, and attended the lectures of Profs. Harnack and Kaftan. In the Easter holidays of 1909 I spent a very pleasant time at their home in Strasbourg.

The war of 1914-18 was another terrible ordeal for Strasbourg. In 1915 Lobstein retired from his post at the University, on which occasion he received a friendly letter from Graf Baudissin, lecturer on the Old Testament at Berlin. After the Armistice, Lobstein became again Professor of the Theological faculty, and reorganized it. But his health and strength were failing: he was over seventy years of age. The end came, almost unexpectedly, in 1922. He died on Maundy Thursday, and the funeral took place on Easter Day in St. Thomas' Church at Strasbourg.

Prof. Lobstein's son, now working as pastor in Alsace, contributes, at the end of the book, a short summary of his father's theological works.

In general, it must be asserted that Prof. Lobstein was a convinced Liberal. He was deeply influenced by Schleiermacher and Ritschl. Yet he was not a negative critic. It was said of him, 'Lobstein has nothing

negative in him ; when he demolishes, it is in order to reconstruct ' (p. 219). This agrees with his conviction of the aim of criticism :

> ' Critical analysis has for its function to distinguish the permanent religious element represented by a dogmatic affirmation from the temporary form provided by the environment in which it originated ' (p. 220).

In his first French theological work, *The Idea of the Pre-existence of the Son of God* (1883), Prof. Lobstein attempts to show that the pre-existence of Christ was only a translation, in the language of apostolic times, of the religious value of the personality of Christ, the eternally predestined organ of the Divine will, the perfect revealer of an inviolable holiness and an infinite charity. If we grant that the human soul of Christ was predestined, and even pre-existed ideally in the mind of God, the affirmation does not appear to us to be adequate. We prefer the statement of Dr. Rashdall in *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology* (p. 444), which seems to do justice to both sides of the truth :

> ' It was the Divine Logos that pre-existed, not the human Jesus.'

On the other hand, we should probably agree with the criticism of the Kenotic doctrine, which, at least in some of its forms, appears to reduce the Divine element to a vanishing-point in the earthly life in order to do justice to the manhood. The Divine self-limitation was at the same time the fullest self-expression possible under the conditions of human life.

In the *Doctrine of the Lord's Supper* (1889), which was dedicated to the memory of Ritschl, Prof. Lobstein treats the question from the historical standpoint, and approximates in his conclusions to the conception of Zwingli. ' The Lord's Supper,' he says, ' is nothing else but the sensible figure of the gift of His (our Lord's) whole being.' Its subjective meaning is that it is a joyous commemorative meal of thanksgiving. It should be remembered that Zwingli asserted the real and spiritual presence of Christ in Holy Communion. Zwingli said in his Confession :

> ' We believe that Christ is truly present in the Lord's Supper ; yea, that there is no communion without such presence. We believe that the true body of Christ is eaten in the Communion, not in a gross and carnal manner, but in a spiritual and sacramental manner, by the religious believing and pious heart.'

In any case, the Lord's Supper is not reduced to a mere memorial service.

The next work, *The Dogma of the Miraculous Birth of Christ,* appeared in 1890. It will no doubt be better known to English readers, as it has been translated under the title of *The Virgin Birth of Christ* for the Crown Theological Library in 1903. Here again, Prof. Lobstein believed that a distinction should be drawn between religious symbolism and historical fact. As he says himself :

> ' In disengaging from Christian symbolism the imperishable truth which it contains, we remain faithful to the thought of Jesus who founds His unique communion with God, not on the physical miracle of His supernatural birth, but on the sovereign election and the perfect revelation of the Heavenly Father ' (p. 223).

This would not be the place to enter into any detailed discussion of the doctrine of the Virgin Birth, but we should like to suggest that the Virgin Birth may be regarded as a symbolic fact, an outward sign of our Lord's perfect holiness, rather than a product of pious imagination. But in any case we may be thankful for Prof. Lobstein's insistence on the spiritual union of Christ with His Father.

Another point that Prof. Lobstein brings out very clearly is that Christian theology is based on religious experience. In his *Introduction to Protestant Dogmatics* (1896), he declares that 'the religious knowledge of Jesus Christ, I mean the personal experience of His love and holiness, gives me the religious knowledge of God, myself, and the world' (p. 231). As Dr. Temple has said, spiritual experience precedes dogmatic definition. Again, in his *Studies on the Christian Doctrine of God* (1905-7), Prof. Lobstein points out that the conception of God may be constructed by speculative reasoning, or it may proceed from a spiritual instinct. He prefers the latter method, and applies it to the metaphysical attributes of omnipresence, omniscience and omnipotence, showing that they proceed from, and are justified by, the religious and moral sentiments of mankind.

In 1909, the four-hundredth anniversary of Calvin's birth, Prof. Lobstein returned to his former studies by publishing *The Religious Consciousness according to Calvin.* He shows that Calvin, though he was convinced of the relative and symbolic character of our religious conceptions, placed the doctrine of predestination and other doctrines under the sanction of an implacable authority, and became the inquisitor and executioner. In 1911 he drew the attention of his Protestant brethren to the works of Fr. George Tyrrell in *Some Teachings of Modernism.* The valuable elements in Catholic modernism were, according to Prof. Lobstein, (1) the condemnation of Protestant individualism; (2) the evolutionary explanation of the Gospel revelation; (3) the interpretation of religious authority in the spiritual and moral sense; and (4) the distinction drawn between revelation and theology, faith and dogma.

We must, however, close our survey of Prof. Lobstein's theology with a quotation from an article, which appeared in 1923 after the author's death, entitled *Christian Apologetics before the Modern Consciousness.* The Professor summed up his conception of the Christian faith with the words:

> 'The religion which Jesus has given us is not an idea or a rule, a formula or a rite, present and operating in His person; it is a life, a divine force, a salutary and regenerating power' (p. 252).

Whether we agree with Prof. Lobstein's general views on theology or not, we must admit that he was an earnest and devout seeker after truth. He was at least one who loved our Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity, and endeavoured to serve Him to the best of his power both in teaching and in life.

L. PATTERSON.

DEAN INGE'S HULSEAN LECTURES.*

In his Hulsean Lectures on *The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought,* Dean Inge has purposely omitted footnotes and appendices except one note which informs us that the younger Jesuits are Platonists. Hence we find that the book explains itself and may be read carefully in a comparatively short space of time.

The Dean, although in later years a Fellow of Hertford College, Oxford, was educated at King's College, Cambridge, in the palmy days when Westcott's Christian Platonism so widely influenced well-disposed undergraduates. And no doubt it was truly with pleasure, as he said it was, that Dr. Inge delivered in Cambridge his Hulsean Lectures on a subject best illustrated by such Cambridge worthies as the Cambridge Platonists, Whichcote, More and Smith; the Cambridge poets Spenser,

**The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought.* (Longmans. 1926. Price 4/-.)

Wordsworth and Coleridge; and, last but not least, the Cambridge saint and seer Westcott, of blessed memory.

Dean Inge cannot believe that Christ intended to found a society with a divinely guaranteed monopoly of certain spiritual benefits. Accordingly he shows that the spiritual benefits that belong to Christianity are shared by many outside the Christian society as well as many inside. And notably that the exponents of Christ's religion are lay as well as clerical.

The Lectures show us next what the life presented to us in Christian Platonism is. It is an inward and outward experience and inspiration of human beings in the realm of the good, the true and the beautiful in this life and, variously apprehended, in a possible future existence. He does not claim that Christian Platonism covers the whole ground of spiritual life, even for Church people. This is in part covered by Catholicism and Protestantism, which are both leavened by Christian Platonism, and leaven it in turn.

Other aspects of Christian Platonism are that its aim is not material benefit. And, in contradiction of the old Calvinist and Lutheran view that the mercy of God is apprehended in proportion to the wickedness of man, Platonism teaches the character of God is apprehended by those who most resemble Him in His goodness.

Dr. Inge believes that Christian Platonism suits the English mind. He declares that the logical precision of the Genevan theocracy and the emotional piety of the Lutheran Church, as well as the authoritativeness of the Catholicism of the Latin races, are anti-pathetic to the English character, which, he says, contains 'a sturdy individualism, a strong vein of sentimentality, a high estimation of external morality and a peculiar blend of idealism and practicality, which foreigners are apt to call hypocrisy.'

Such a character is congenial to the idealism which he traces back, centuries before Christ, to Asia, and afterwards to Greece and South Italy. It was a revolt against the worship of the forces of nature. The essence of the then new movement was 'the recognition of an unseen world of unchanging reality behind the flux of phenomena, a spiritual universe compared with which the world of appearance grew pale and unsubstantial and became only a symbol or even an illusion.'

The Dean recognises the affinity between Platonism and Indian philosophy. He says :—

> 'In the Upanishads and other Indian sacred writings we find the doctrine of the transcendental Self, an efflux of the invisible Ruler, "whose body the earth is; who inwardly rules the earth; who, dwelling in all things, is other than all things; who, dwelling in mind, is other than mind; whose body the mind is; who inwardly rules the mind; the inward Ruler, the deathless. He unseen sees; unheard hears, unthought thinks; uncomprehended comprehends. He is thy Self, the inward Ruler, the deathless."'

Of this mystical faith Plato is our great exponent. It was revived in the New Platonism of the Roman Empire, from which it passed into the theology and philosophy of the Christian Church. It had indeed influenced the Jews before the birth of Christ and came to influence the interpretation of Christ's teaching in some of the canonical books of the New Testament.

But although St. Paul had said 'The things that are seen are temporal, but the things that are not seen are eternal,' 'the immateriality of spirit was perhaps not quite clearly asserted by any writer before Plotinus' (b. 205 A.D.).

In the Dark Ages that followed, Christian Idealism was driven underground by the barbarism of the West and the severance of East from West which practically extinguished Greek learning in the West for several centuries.

The Catholic Mystics indeed were idealists, but they were exceptions. The prevalent idea of religion was a lifeless dogmatism which was practically opposed to the fact that Christ was primarily concerned with awakening into activity the consciousness of God in the individual soul.

But by a fortunate mistake the writings of an unknown Neoplatonist were attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite, St. Paul's Athenian convert. About the middle of the ninth century he was translated by John Scotus Erigena, and his theology was introduced to the West, and it was proclaimed that 'authority proceeds from right reason, and not reason from authority.'

But Plato himself was a veiled figure, save now and then as in the case of Roger Bacon and Grosseteste, till the Renaissance, when Grocyn and Linacre and Colet and Erasmus drank more or less into the spirit of Platonism as it prevailed in Italy, having deeply influenced Ficino and Pico. 'Love God,' said Pico, 'we rather may, than either know Him, or by speech utter Him.' His end came amid the prayers of Savonarola.

But during the struggle at the Reformation between Catholic and Protestant the gains of the Renaissance were almost entirely lost.

Again they were almost lost in the seventeenth century amid the struggles between Roundhead and Cavalier. Then it was that the light of pure Christian Platonism shone in its beauty at Cambridge in the teaching of John Smith and Henry More; especially of John Smith who was at once Saint and Christian Philosopher, dying, alas, before he reached the age (thirty-seven) of our own F. W. Robertson. There were at that time other men, not so strikingly Platonists, but no less votaries of the Religion of the Spirit, such as Whichcote and Cudworth at Cambridge, and at Oxford Falkland, Hales and Chillingworth—not to mention the Quakers who at first were Christian Platonists without knowing it.

And afterwards in the dark, wicked, comfortable eighteenth century people were not left destitute of the ideal light, who could receive William Law's interpretation of Jacob Böhme.

The emancipation of the human spirit which we associate with the French Revolution of 1789 brought to us in due course such great Platonic teachers, essentially Christian, as Wordsworth, Coleridge and Shelley.

Christian Platonists have never formed a party, but they have leavened all parties. When, in the nineteenth century, Dean Inge was receiving his education at King's College, Cambridge, the chief Christian Platonist among Cambridge teachers was Brooke Foss Westcott. He formed an association of Anglicans called the Clergy School. Such was the variety of types of Churchmanship represented in the Clergy School that it was called 'Dr. Westcott's Mixture.' This is a good example of Christian Patonic method.

More or less contemporary with these Platonists of the early and middle nineteenth century were such idealistic teachers as Ruskin, Emerson, Green, the Cairds, Bosanquet and Martineau. 'These men,' says the Dean, alluding to all—Traditionalist or not, 'were nearly all laymen . . . The characteristics of their type of Christianity are a spiritual religion, based on a firm belief in absolute and eternal values as the most real things in the universe; a confidence that these values are knowable by man; a belief that they can nevertheless be known only by whole-hearted consecration of the intellect, will and affections to the great quest; an

entirely open mind towards the discoveries of science; a reverent and receptive attitude to the beauty, sublimity and wisdom of the creation, as a revelation of the mind and character of the Creator; a complete indifference to the current valuation of the worldling.'

So far I have given mainly a faint outline of the first lecture. A few more illustrations of and additions to what I have said may be culled from the remaining three lectures.

In the second lecture it is insisted that, while 'Lord Bacon and Hobbes, Puritan and Prelatist, agreed in treating philosophy and religion as things wholly different in kind,' men like Whichcote and John Smith found an identity between them. For instance, speaking of man's natural state, Whichcote says 'Reverence God in thyself, for God is more in the mind of man than in any part of this world besides.'

Accordingly, many of Whichcote's aphorisms 'find' us.

> 'It is a great deal easier to commit a second sin than it was to commit a first, and a great deal harder to repent of a second than it was to repent of the first.'
>
> 'The sense of repentance is better assurance of pardon than the testimony of an angel.'
>
> 'He that is full of himself goes out of company as wise as he came in.'
>
> 'No man's inferiority makes him contemptible. Every man taken at his best will be found good for something.'

Henry More had been, like other Puritans, brought up on Edmund Spenser; accordingly his writings, like Spenser's, illustrate what the Dean insists on, that there are no expounders of Christian Platonism equal to the poets who are inspired by it.

Of John Smith space does not allow me to say more than in Dean Inge's words: 'Smith's discourses—the best university sermons that I know—are the work of a spiritual genius, full of life, light and beauty, and withal the work of a genuine philosopher.' John Smith and Henry More were greatly valued by John Wesley.

The third lecture is on the poets who are Christian Platonists of the Elizabethan and Wordsworthian periods. Dr. Inge says 'the best of our English wisdom, and our clearest visions of the invisible, are enshrined in our poetry'; and he cites Mr. Yeats, 'Whatever of philosophy has been made poetry is alone permanent.'

Again, says the Dean, 'We value Spinoza for his "flashes of vision . . . Plato is for ever unintelligible till we read him as a prophet and prose-poet, and cease to hunt for a system in his writings.'

It is as poetry that Professor Stewart is quoted as saying: 'Platonism is the mood of one who has a curious eye for the endless variety of this visible and temporal world and a fine sense of its beauties, yet is haunted by the presence of an invisible and eternal world behind, or, when the mood is most pressing, within the visible and temporal world, and sustaining both it and himself—a world not perceived as external to himself, but inwardly lived by him, as that with which, in moments of ecstasy, or even habitually, he is become one.'

This is called 'personal' Platonism. It differs from 'traditional' Platonism, which is an 'intellectual system' rather than an experience.

It is well that, in dealing with the poets, Dr. Inge notes that the Platonist who is not an ascetic is a *dilettante*. But he may subject himself to Plain Living rather than Mortification.

The last lecture contains a delightful illustration of Political Philosophy from Plato's *Laws* which would please Ruskin, who read Plato daily.

Dean Inge says, 'From Coleridge to von Hügel and Clutton Brock the deepest and most forceful teaching has come from lay writers.' He must mean from the death of Coleridge (1834). John Caird, F. W. Robertson, F. D. Maurice and Wescott were deep and forceful, but I suppose not so deep, forceful or numerous as the lay writers.

In conclusion, I cannot resist citing two modern lay non-traditionalist writers whom the Dean accepts as congeners. The great idealist philosopher, Bernard Bosanquet, shortly before he died published a little book, *What Religion is* (1920), in which, quite apart from Christian Traditionalist dogmas, he sets forth the essentials of religion which he is able to hold in common with many orthodox believers on such subjects as 'The Peace of God—Salvation—Justification by Faith; The Nature of Sin; Prayer and Worship; The Religious Temper.'

And as regards what Religion is *not* I may cite Clutton Brock's *The Ultimate Reality,* in which he speaks of an evangelist who prayed at a mission meeting that 'many might that day lay the basis of a successful commercial career by finding Christ.'

The Dean's book is written partly to confute people who discuss religious views 'as men discuss a cricket match or a prize fight.' Some of these are the sort of people who call him 'gloomy.' Let them read these lectures that they may have a glimmering as to who really *are* pessimists.

G. W. C. Ward.

AN ALEXANDRIAN NOVEL.*

Few tasks for a literary man are harder than to write a satisfactory historical novel. Some of the greatest of the English Victorians tried their hands at it, and *Romola, Hypatia* and *Esmond* remain as classics. But there have been many failures. The novelist, in spite of cramming, is likely to carry into other times the sentiments and the manners of his own day: the scholar is seldom successful in making an interesting tale. Dr. Tollinton writes as a scholar with an accurate knowledge of the times of which he writes; but he is fairly successful from the literary point of view, and he is specially interested in the religious phenomena of which he treats.

The hero, Pyrrho, is a young Greek of Alexandria, who sets out about the beginning of the third century A.D. in the determined search for truth in philosophy and in religion. For two years he wanders from city to city, then returns to Egypt at the time when it is visited by Septimus Severus, on whose staff he finds an appointment and whom he serves at Rome and on his expedition to Britain. This course of experience brings him into contact with all the religions with which the Roman Empire in general and Alexandria in particular were seething. His mother Nannion is a votary of Isis; his best friend is a Jew; of the women who attract him one is a Christian of orthodox type, one a lecturer on Valentinian Gnosticism. A lecture on Apollonius of Tyana by Philostratus comes in. And though not brought on to the stage, Clement of Alexandria and Origen are in the near background. Dr. Tollinton, it should be noted, has written an important work on Clement. On the Roman wall in Britain, Pyrrho comes in contact with the religion of Mithras, and the Professors of the Museum of Alexandria have occasion to discourse.

The novel does not merely consist of philosophic and religious discussions, though these naturally take a prominent place. The character of

**Pyrrho.* A historical novel by Bertram Tollinton. (Williams and Norgate. 1926. Price 7/6.)

the Emperor Severus is strongly outlined, and the ceremony of his Apotheosis depicted; the topography of Rome and Alexandria is described, and a rather vivid picture is given of life on the Roman wall. In all this Dr. Tollinton writes with the accuracy of a well-trained scholar who has kept up with recent discovery. The plot of the tale is elaborate, and is worked out with care and skill. Though there is no tragic development, and very little love-making, there is a steady interest running through the book, and tediousness is carefully avoided.

But no doubt to the readers of the *Modern Churchman*, as to the author, the religious interest outweighs all other. The main features of all the clashing faiths are depicted with masterly hand, and the votaries of each are well selected. The devoted mother Nannion naturally cleaves to the mother goddess Isis, who appears to her in mystic vision: 'I did not find Isis as the accepted divinity of my devotion. Isis in all her gracious munificence came into my life. The best things are ever the gifts of the gods rather than the achievement of human effort.' The 'new woman,' Festa, who expounds the Valentinian doctrine of aeons and emanations to enchanted audiences, but begins to despair when her audiences fall off, is quite a possible type. Her story is told not without humour, some of it perhaps derived from occurrences in Oxford lecture-rooms. The story of the husband who erected an altar to Silence in order to moderate the volubility of his wife is certainly amusing.

The climax of the book, which is skilfully led up to, comes in the nineteenth chapter, where the principal characters, meeting at a dinner, set forth in a manner like that of Mr. Mallock in his *New Republic* their respective points of view. Origen had recently appeared in Alexandria, attracting hearers from all schools and all religions; and it is in reference to his teaching, which might be called Modernism or Neo-Christianity, that the *dramatis personae* express their views. The first to discourse is Ambrosius, a Valentinian Gnostic. He expresses great admiration for the young teacher, but objects to his doctrine of the future life. 'We Gnostics hold that salvation is assured to the elect.' 'Now such assurance is impossible according to Origen. For he teaches not only the doctrine of many future worlds, with which a Gnostic need not quarrel, but also the rise and fall of souls in the days that are to come. He who is safe in this world may be lost in another.' 'The salvation of Valentinian is more complete.'

The next speaker is Festa, the lady lecturer, whose attachment to the Gnostics is giving way under the influence of Origen. But she finds difficulties in the view of the Church. 'They say that Gnostic teachers err in distinguishing the Creator from the good God of Jesus the Christ. Yet in the God of Jesus I find love and mercy, whereas the Creator, the God of the Hebrew Law, is harsh and stern.' But Pyrrho has come to see that the intellectual pride of the Gnostics is anti-human. 'Knowledge is not the only good. Our Gnostic friends have little compassion for the multitude, and they are sometimes lax and indifferent in matters of conduct.' 'I have made no decision, but you see which way I am being led.' A young Jew who is present strikes in with a claim for the rationalist, as opposed to the universalist, type of religion. 'Our Origen, whose heart is as large as his body is small, would gather so many kinds within his church that he will make it indeed like the ark of Noah, full of a mixed collection of creatures, crowded together but not akin. The animals were much happier when Noah let them out, each to seek their own proper good in the separate pastures.' 'When he brings forward his apostle and says that the Jew and the Gentile, and the Greek and the barbarian, are all

one, I say to myself that they are not and that I should be sorry if they were.' The next speaker is Philammon, a sensible lay Christian, who falls foul of Origen's way of interpreting the Scripture as allegory, as not true in the letter but in the spirit. The lovely maiden in the Song of Songs is the Church, or the soul; Abimelech is not Abimelech, he is philosophy. When Jael slays Sisera, it means that the Church slays the flesh by the cross.

The company not unnaturally applaud Philammon. But a deeper criticism of the new teacher comes from Nannion, mother of Pyrrho, a devoted adherent of Isis. The Christians, she says, teach the fatherhood of God. 'Isis stands for motherhood. She cares, she watches, she comforts, she pities, she consoles as a mother alone can do. Daily, as one of the humblest of her daughters, I invoke her name. Daily I am aware of her holy presence in my life. If your Christian friends teach a divine fatherhood, and fail to teach a divine motherhood as well, then will their religion be partial and incomplete.' The hiatus noted by Nannion was soon filled in the Eastern Church by devotion to the Virgin Mother.

Pyrrho is still a wanderer and an eclectic: he has not much to say. 'Truth is ever larger than the bounds we set for it, and the life of man is a flowing river rather than a circumscribed lake. And yet, as I see it now, my friends who have found each his own philosophic way gain something by this limitation.' He is taken with Origen's spiritual interpretations. 'So large a liberty of mind, such an emancipation from the foolishness and pettiness of the letter, might a pilgrim of the spirit, as it seems to me, find in the life of the church, if our young and surely inspired teacher may be believed.' But Pyrrho still hesitates.

The last speaker is Didyme, the unlearned Christian wife and mother. 'I know there is a Christian way of life. I try to live in that way, and if I fail He helps me, and if I succeed He makes me happy. I want no other religion.'

After full discussion, in Alexandrian manner, as to whether they shall marry or not, Pyrrho and Festa take that decided step, and with most of the other characters are gathered into the Church of Origen.

It is natural to compare Dr. Tollinton's novel with Kingsley's *Hypatia,* the scene of which is also Alexandria in early Christian times. *Hypatia* is instinct with the delightful personality of Kingsley himself. But it is melodramatic, and in places excessively Victorian. It seems to me that Dr. Tollinton has better caught the spirit of the time, with its learning, its cosmopolitanism, its wilderness of national and religious currents. If I must make a criticism, it will be that Dr. Tollinton might have translated his Latin quotations, for the number of educated writers who cannot do it for themselves is great. P.G.

EPOCHS OF BUDDHIST HISTORY.*

This is a most interesting and fascinating book. It is hardly elementary, for it contains a great deal of learning. It is really a work of Buddhist Theology, if such a phrase is permissible. Those who are familiar only with Buddhism as it is in Ceylon are apt to make generalizations and come to conclusions which are wide of the mark indeed. This book takes us back to the earliest days, and traces the development of Buddhist philosophy and practice in many lands.

The first half of the book is historical; the second half shows the different forms which Buddhism has taken in various countries where it

**Epochs in Buddhist History.* By Kenneth J. Saunders, Litt.D. (The Haskell Lectures, 1921). (University of Chicago Press.)

has taken root. The first half is the more difficult. We have to master some very long names, and are introduced to a large number of theological works, in which various doctrines are developed. It is of immense value to the student to have these properly analyzed and classified, and to find here a short and concise summary of the main ideas. The text is enlivened by many beautiful illustrations.

The fourth chapter gives the story of the great University of Nalanda, culled from the diaries of Hiuen-Tsiang and I-Tsing, who saw it at its zenith in the seventh century A.D. A detailed history of Nalanda would be the history of the Mahayana School from the second century to the thirteenth, for all the most noted scholars seem to have studied there. 'To travel-worn and weary pilgrims, both of them scholars and monks, what a haven of refuge it was! How eagerly they describe its peace and dignity, its intellectual achievements, its devotion to the cause they had at heart.'

It is interesting to watch the divergencies arising and increasing between the two great sections of Buddhism, the Hinayana of Ceylon and Burma, and the Mahayana of China, Korea, Japan, Thibet and Sikkim. The difference is not one merely of ritual or ceremonial, or of emphasis, as are the differences between the several parts of the disunited Christian Church. The differences in Buddhism go much deeper. They are in the realm of fundamental doctrines. It is too big a task to develop these in a short review; to follow them the book itself must be read. Ceylon seems to have developed too exclusively the ascetic ideal of the Arhat, the Buddhism of the hermit and the Sangha, but in the countries of the Mahayana emphasis is placed upon the Bodhisattva. This latter ideal is set forth in a beautiful paragraph, which is typical of the literary merit of the whole book.

'The Bodhisattva of the Mahayana is certainly an arresting figure: charming, gentle, and compassionate, full of tender and affectionate thought, unbiassed, serene; he is zealous, and ever girded for the duties of his high calling: and has no thought that is not pure and wise. He rouses others to good deeds, and stirs them up by his activities to realise that the phenomenal world is empty. Himself walking in the highest perfections of knowledge, meditation, strength, patience, and virtue, he rouses others to a noble emulation, so that in countless multitudes they are established in enlightenment and provide for innumerable Buddhas the gifts in which they delight.' It is a beautiful picture of an ideal of unselfish service, which will surely find an echo in the ideals of our Lord Christ. It makes to us a stronger appeal than the more self-centred quest of the Arhat for personal salvation.

It is not in this ideal alone that the two schools of Buddhism differ from each other. The Mahayana world of ideas appears in marked contrast from that of the Hinayana again and again. We are no longer in an agnostic atmosphere of lonely struggle and barren negations, but in the richer, warmer air of an active and living faith in one who saves men by his grace, 'grasping us as the tigress grasps her cubs.' Worship, prayer, bhakti or loving devotion, and even the doctrine of transferable merit are all found.

How are these transformations to be accounted for? 'It is not sufficient to urge the claims of the human heart, nor even the demands of the human reason, though here is the nucleus of a true answer; man needs a conception of the Divine; he *will* argue back to a First Cause, and in it he will always postulate compassion as well as wisdom; he cannot well get along without belief in a Creator and a Saviour.' This is one explanation,

what may be called the human cause. But there is another also which is historical. 'There is the historic fact that converts, trained in Hindu philosophy, brought back into the main stream of Buddhism doctrines which the Buddhist reformation had, for the moment, submerged.' Hindu philosophy takes its revenge. 'So there appears in Buddhism a formulated pantheistic idealism, and a universalistic note which has made it a gospel for the many.'

There are some in Ceylon who have openly declared that there is a root antagonism between Buddhist and Christian teaching. Let them not be in too much of a hurry to make up their minds. Dr. Saunders writes from the depth of his rich experience of Christianity, and of his first-hand knowledge of Buddhism, these momentous words: 'If it were not tragic it would be comic indeed that the followers of the two greatest religions of the world are still sitting for the most part in opposite camps, ignoring or misinterpreting one another's beliefs. I would make a plea not only for an attempt to understand one another, but for resolute co-operation in all idealistic enterprises. The enemies to-day are materialism and militarism, and Christianity and Buddhism as it has developed in China and Japan may humbly confess that each has received the truth as a free gift from the Father of Lights, who is indeed a wise physician of souls, and knows best how the truth may be revealed to each nation as to each individual. Impressed and inspired by the solemn and beautiful ritual of Buddhist temples in Japan, the Christian student will be deeply moved as he begins to immerse himself in their teachings, and in the Wasan or hymns in common use he will find that ideas and titles of the Buddha which seem to him most Christian can be traced back to the "Lotus Scripture" and to the later "Awakening of faith."'

To some of us this may appear to say too much; but we can agree, not that Buddhism and Christianity are on a par and that it does not matter which a man is, but rather that there is often to be found a true 'praeparatio evangelica' in the seekings of the human spirit expressed in many ways. Wherever we find this we can rejoice; and we should be reluctant to close any avenue to friendship, for it is only by friendship that men can be won.

The literary gifts of Dr. Saunders are well known to those who have read his earlier books. One of these, *Buddhist Ideals*, published some sixteen years ago, gave me an insight into the inner spirit of Ceylon which time has only deepened, not corrected. Dr. Saunders has so much sympathy and human kindliness, joined to the insight of an artist and the culture of a scholar, that his word-pictures are exquisite and remain for ever in the mind. There are many instances of this in his book; from amongst them here is one—a description of the first approach of the missionaries of Buddha to the Diamond Mountains of Korea:

'On the exquisite sea shore near On Chung Ni may be seen to this day a rock in which the pious imagination sees the overturned junk which brought there fifty-three missionaries (now called Buddhas), and near by sits one of them, himself turned to stone! Let us suppose that it was the clear autumn weather after the typhoons were safely passed, that they landed somewhere on this rock-strewn shore. Around them sparkled a clear sea, and the peaceful valley stretched before them: but beyond towered the mountains, and their voice has always called louder to the Buddhist monk than that of the sea.

'Following the course of a rocky stream they began to climb, and soon found themselves in one of the loveliest mountain ranges in the world. Their hearts must have leaped for joy as they passed now through glades

where clean, deep pools reflect the autumn foliage of oak and chestnut; now through mountain gorges where the serrated battlements of grey peaks and the blaze of the maples stab the clear blue of the skies. And as they halted for their evening meditation their minds must have filled with wonder and awe and with a solemn peace, as the rocks flamed in the sunset, and the great moon sailed into a cloudless sky. At last they stopped by bubbling waters, and amid these spacious glades they built their first small hermitage, whose upturned gables and deep sloping roof were to set the standard for all succeeding ages. There were moments when these great waterfalls and deep pools seemed to them haunted, as Ruskin would have us believe, by demons and dragons, and many an ancient legend tells of how by the power of the Good Law they cast them out. Soon the towering rocks were crowned with little shrines to the merciful Kwanyin and other benign beings; it is not hard in these still places to believe that God is love, and to worship him under these kindly forms. Moreover, monks who train themselves to meditate, and to find a unity in all life and the Buddha nature in the exquisite things around them, cannot but develop a symbolic art, and soon the temples began to blaze with colour within and without, as they do to this day.'

The book is well printed, and has six appendices and an index. I have discovered only one misprint—where on p. 197 the height of the Lhassa plateau should be 12,000 and not 1,200 feet. The book is the fruit of many years' research and thought, and will be a rare treasure to those who possess it.

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ANGLICAN FACTS AND FIGURES.*

The 56th edition of *Crockford's Clerical Directory* (1926) issued by the Oxford University Press maintains its high standard of full and accurate information. The Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Oxford has taught us to think of the Church of England not so much as a branch of the Catholic Church as an aggregate of English parishes each possessed of its own history, customs, endowments, buildings. This is not the only true view of the Church of England, nevertheless it is perhaps the truest. So *Crockford*, as we peruse it, seems to encourage us to think of the Anglican Communion as a hierarchy of bishops, deans, archdeacons, rectors, etc., presiding over assemblies of nebulous laity. This is not the only true view of the Anglican Communion, but for practical purposes it is probably the truest.

Crockford's Preface, consisting of twenty pages, is a compressed Annual Register of the Anglican Communion, which provides its reader not only with accurate facts but also with judicious criticism of current ecclesiastical endeavours. Crockford's comments on the policy of increasing the Episcopate and the method of raising the parochial quota are worth citing:

> 'Perhaps the time is not far distant when the Church will have to decide definitely whether it is better for the Church as a whole to have so many Bishops that every layman can know one, or so few that they can all know each other.'
>
> 'We are not sure, however, whether Higher Official Circles realize fully how much the raising of the quota depends on the good-will and energy of the Incumbent, nor, where it is paid in full, how large a part generally comes out of his pocket.'

**Crockford's Clerical Directory* (56th edition), published by the Oxford University Press (1926).

The Editor does well to emphasize that an important function of a athedral is to be a school of sacred learning. He also criticizes adersely, and as we feel justly, the resolutions passed by the Church Assemly for the instruction of the Committee in charge of the Patronage Reform easure. We would commend these criticisms, as indeed the whole Prece, to the attention of members of our Church representative bodies. It marked by English practicality and common-sense. H.D.A.M.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE REAL.*

Mr. Milburn's *The Theology of the Real* should be read for three easons. It is a *thorough* book. 'Truly our business,' said Cromwell, 'is to eak *things*.' Things, not words—that is the key of Mr. Milburn's enavour. Pierce through the words with your gimlet of sincerity; through rbal paper, coating, stale wrappage, drive on till you come to a hidden *ing*, which you mean to draw out and to clothe afresh with some sort of ing thought and language. He calls his theme 'the pursuit of objecvity in theology.' He may not be wholly successful in finding his game. t he has sounded the bugle and led off in a momentous chase, and I for ne hail a true theological sportsman.

Of course, this is ever the note of religious reformers—to get through pearances and conventions to the facts. St. Bernard rebukes Papal xury: 'In all this painted pomp you are not Peter's successor, but Conantine's.' George Fox denounces the formalists: 'The power of God undered among them, and they flew like chaff before it.'

It is a *daring* book. We Modern Churchmen† are for advance. We ust not stop at short, safe, circumspect advance which breaks no bones. old, even erratic, advance, if honourably inspired, must command our terest and our most patient, just consideration:

> I thence
> Invoke thy aid to my advent'rous song,
> That with no middle flight intends to soar.

This reflection is specially apt to Mr. Milburn's proposals for moral form. 'All is not well,' he writes, 'with the sexual ethics of the Church d of Society.' We may not accept, we may even painfully regret, parts his treatment here; but he faces the problem which many of us shirk. e steadily walks up to it, as it shows its hideous teeth, and tackles it repidly. *Omnia munda mundis*.

It is a *lofty* book. Its pages glow with quiet, high resolve. The *ectator* writes of it in a full review as 'a work whose sincerity of purpose d whose high moral intention are never for a moment in doubt.' That is Agree or not agree, praise or blame, you must respect.

HUBERT HANDLEY.

THE DEVOTIONAL LIFE.*

The change in the meaning for us of Creation has brought gain not y in the recognition of it as a 'continuous and ever-present process,' also in the recognition that in that process man has a part to play. eligion,' says Archdeacon Lilley, 'seems to demand a creative or semiative faculty in man' (p. 60; while the title of Miss Street's book shows

**The Theology of the Real.* By R. Gordon Milburn. (Williams and Norgate. 10/6.)

†Mr. Milburn is a member of the Churchmen's Union.

**Worship, Its Necessity, Nature, and Expression.* By A. L. Lilley, M.A. (S.C.M. e 2/1.)

**The Creative Life.* By Fanny Street, M.A. (S.C.M. Price 2/-.)

**How can I Pray?* A new enquiry based on the Lord's Prayer. By the Very . R. O. P. Taylor, M.A. (Nisbet and Co. Price 3/6.)

a similar belief. Both of these writers deal in a stimulating way with questions concerning man's religious life and needs; how can we ensure our being in touch with that Source of power which will enable us effectively to play our part in Creation?

Archdeacon Lilley frames his answer in terms of worship: his book is a 'consideration of the general principles which underlie and fruitfully regulate all sincere aspiration towards the Divine' (p. 6). Man is inevitably a religious creature: the sense of wonder, reverence and love—all of which seem a part of his very nature—make him naturally a worshipper. But if worship is a necessity to man, it needs directing and informing. The writer traces the effects which religious beliefs about God have had upon the worship of succeeding generations of Christians: at each stage, belief was 'right' in so far as it 'placed God in a known relation to the universal order' (p. 52), and so it assisted worship. This is especially important because 'Religion is healthy only when the harmony of belief and worship is unquestioned and secure' (p. 31); and if worship is to be kept free from the dangers which inevitably surround it, belief must be 'the most adequate possible at each particular moment' (p. 53). This may lead to variety of form, but 'what matters supremely is that through one form or other the habit of worship should be recovered' (p. 88).

The worship of the Christian must be rooted in the consecration of all his faculties to God. And this involves discipline—not that ascetic discipline which sought to escape from self, but that moral discipline which requires the deliberate training of each faculty into perfect agreement with the will of God. And so self-offering reaches out towards communion, and in this mystical fellowship worship finds its consummation.

Miss Street's book is, on the whole, easier reading, but she travels the same way. He who would live that life of spiritual usefulness which comes from active contact with the Source of power must train himself in submission and self-forgetfulness. But submission involves 'hard study and clear thinking' in order that God's purpose may be understood and the will be kept in tune with it; while self-forgetfulness means, not a false humility, but becoming absorbed in something greater than self. This life of consecration must involve the element of adventure; men should not wait for 'full illumination,' but 'make individual and corporate experiments with the light they have' (p. 42). And since the traveller is always watchful for signs that he is on the right track, the writer warns him that along the mystic approach to God such signs do not consist in trance or ecstasy but in a fuller comprehension of life, so that gradually 'the various unrelated fragments of one's idea of life and the universe fit together better and form a coherent whole' (p. 58). Miss Street's book is eminently practical, and she gives much helpful advice concerning prayer and praying. 'We ought never to think of prayer as mere petition,' she tells us 'but to include in it always the element of seeking—the effort to understand more of God's Nature and Will by every means available' (p. 86).

This is the lesson which the Rev. R. O. P. Taylor has tried to impress in his book on prayer. The introduction is wordy and confused, and its omission would have involved no loss to the rest of the book. We do not follow the author when he defends 'ejaculatory prayer' by the analogy of suggestion; what is the repetition of 'My Lord' intended to suggest and in what way will it be helpful? It hardly seems to us to mean 'praying with the understanding.' The main body of the book, however, is an exposition of the Lord's Prayer; it gives many practical hints and suggestions, and sets out to help us so to use the Prayer as to secure 'the vital point, which is the seeing of those for whom we pray as they are i

Heaven, and the keeping of them before our minds all through the act of prayer' (p. 127). We might call this a heart-to-heart talk on wrestling in prayer.' J.P.H.

HOW TO READ THE NEW TESTAMENT.*

We should welcome these books if it was only for the protest which each of them makes against the desultory way in which Christians read their Bibles—if they read them at all. The 'chapter a day' habit has inevitably deadened intelligent appreciation of the New Testament writings; only rarely do we sit down and read right through an Epistle, though without such an effort we must fail to get a true perspective. Each of these writers demands that we shall forget the division into chapters and aim at an understanding of the underlying ideas. Mr. Parry's book is a simple introduction to the books of the New Testament suitable for Sunday school teachers and others. His object is 'to make ordinary people turn to the pages of the New Testament in a natural way and with fresh interest.' It is most gratifying to have a book of this quality produced by one like Mr. Parry, who is a hard-working missionary at Kudat in Sarawak.

Canon Bate confines himself to St. Paul's letters, and his aim is to catch the main drift but 'not lose ourselves in the particular problems of interpretation' (p. 134). He has packed much information into a small space, and his careful scholarship and sane judgment have produced a book which should prove very helpful to the student who is willing to use it 'as an aid to his own independent study.' The writer shows how these letters, from being private and *pièces d'occasion,* came to be regarded as 'the gift of the Holy Spirit through the Apostle to the whole Church, and as a test and a guarantee of the Church's teaching' (p. 16). Two chapters are given to a discussion of the various influences which affected St. Paul's life and outlook; if in his 'Philosophy of History' he found the keynote in a revelation in Jesus rather than in the Mosaic Law, yet he was no convert from Judaism; he 'thought of it rather as an arrested development . . . doomed to failure because it would not accept God's way of bringing men into peace with Him' (p. 35). The rest of the book concerns the Epistles themselves; the date, destination and circumstances calling for each letter are discussed, and the *précis* of the letters which Canon Bate gives is particularly useful.

The writer is rather dogmatic on some points—as, indeed, he warns his readers. Speaking of Paul and the Mystery Cults, and referring to I *Cor.* xi, 27*ff*, he says: 'There is nothing "Hellenic" in what St. Paul says . . . he just says what any decent Christian would say' (p. 95). Again, that the Pastoral Epistles were known to St. Ignatius we should have thought 'possible' rather than 'almost certain'; and in any case it might have been considered side by side with the fact—which Canon Bate omits—that Marcion rejected them, probably because he doubted their genuineness. There is also an occasional slip, as for example on p. 176—it was Titus, and not Timothy, who was asked to come to Nicopolis.

Prof. Barry's book is a stimulating study of the *Epistle to the Ephesians,* and is written especially for 'the non-theological students in the colleges.' In a short introduction he discusses questions of authorship and destination, and shows that the object of the letter was both to give 'a

**How to read the New Testament.* By E. Parry. (Jackson. Price 2/-.)
**A Guide to the Epistles of St. Paul.* By H. N. Bate, M.A., Canon of Carlisle. (Longmans. Price 5/- (cloth), 3/6 (paper).)
**A Philosophy from Prison.* By F. R. Barry, D.S.O., M.A. (S.C.M. Price 4/- and 2/6.)

re-interpretation of the meaning of the Christ, which supplied Christianity for the first time with an adequate intellectual position,' and to combat the dangers of Oriental speculation by 'a positive and constructive world-view' (p. 32). The running commentary which follows is on the whole helpful and often inspiring—as, for example, the comment on Ch. iii, 1—12, under the heading of 'The Meaning of History' (p. 95*ff*). Occasionally the writer pins his faith to a slogan which does not make for lucidity, and causes us even to wonder how far St. Paul is having a philosophy thrust upon him. Such a slogan, for example, we see in the statement that in Jesus God 'broke into History.' It seems a little difficult to follow that if St. Paul was 'attempting to give a coherent and considered account of (his) general attitude to the Universe' (p. 44), he could at the same time have believed that 'in "Messiah Jesus" God had broken into History' (p. 45), and have accepted 'the idea of a purposive, developing process through which a creative plan is being realised' (p. 46). If the latter is true—as we believe it to be—then the former seems to be deprived of its natural meaning. However, this book makes interesting reading, and we commend it as one which will make its readers think. J.P.H.

THE EXPERIMENTALISM OF PROFESSOR LAKE.*

The Stewardship of Faith is the most important charge laid upon the Christian Church. It was also the title chosen by Dr. Lake for a volume published ten years ago; that volume has many points of contact with the present work, which is concerned with the same subject. In clearness and attractiveness of style Dr. Lake has few equals among theologians. His often provoking, but never dull, pages abound with epigrams, all of them brilliant and some of them true. But his style does not conceal his seriousness and even anxiety as he writes about the way in which alone, as he believes, the stewardship of faith can be effectively discharged in the modern world. If it is not properly discharged, he fears, not that faith will vanish from the world, but that a priceless continuity will be lost and that the Christian Church may be no longer steward.

The opening chapters, which contain lectures delivered in Oxford on the Hibbert Foundation, are devoted to an admirable summary of the ideals, the achievements, and the causes of the failure of historical Catholicism and of traditional Protestantism. Historical Catholicism broke down in the sixteenth century for three main reasons. Intellectually it refused to accept any truth which demands a recognition of past error; politically it exploited, in its own supposed interests, its own organisation, which, being above nations, could only legitimately be used in the interest of all nations; spiritually its sacraments were used to advance the claims of the hierarchy and to strengthen the organisation rather than for the good of men and women. Early Protestantism was strong where Catholicism was weak, though in some important respects it did not succeed where Catholicism had failed. Its great moral strength Dr. Lake sees in the root of the doctrine of Justification by Faith, and in its individualism. Neither education nor legislation can cure sin, which is a perversion of the will, an evil which goes much deeper than the crime and vice which are often, but not always, its manifestations. On the human side the only cure for sin is *individual* action, by which men dedicate themselves to the service of the good. 'Each can do it for himself; he cannot do it for anyone else; and none can do it for him' (p. 33). The neglect of this obvious and frequently proved truth, based on a delusion that it is no necessary, can never be counter-balanced by any amount of grandiloquen

**The Religion of Yesterday and To-morrow.* By Kirsopp Lake. Christopher's. 7/6.)

talk, often out of all proportion to resultant action, about social service and the salvation of the community. To-day this neglect is conspicuous and coupled with such talk, which means that we are engaging in the verbal pursuit of one ideal, while neglecting another without which the former can never be realised; hence our idealism resolves itself into merely seductive phraseology because it lacks the power to become anything else. Early Protestantism avoided this error and emphasized, perhaps over-emphasized, the corrective truth; this, and the escape it effected from the intellectual tyranny of Catholic theology, are its permanent contributions to the religious world. Its weaknesses are seen in matters in which Catholicism was, and might have continued to be, strong. Protestantism has failed to supply a supra-national society and to meet the need for sacraments and make adequate provision for the spiritually sick—many of which needs are nowadays being met by non-ecclesiastical agencies.

In Dr. Lake's opinion, however, historical Catholicism and traditional Protestantism alike belong very much to the religion of yesterday: they are not even susceptible of any repair which stops short of relaying the foundations. The Nineteenth Century witnessed the break-up of the authority of the Revelation on which both are based. Apart from specific New Testament criticism and the new picture of Jesus which emerges therefrom, and a consequent difference of opinion about Christian origins, the New Testament writers, themselves already Christians, based their teaching and their interpretation of the facts they record on a view of the Old Testament which it is no longer possible to hold. Though the controversy ensuing upon this discovery at first necessarily concerned itself with secondary matters, Dr. Lake holds that it has now become clear that the result has been the collapse of the edifice of traditional Christian theology. The result is that the old denominational lines of division between Protestant Churches has lost all intellectual meaning. The only real intellectual division is this: 'To the Protestant, adherence to truth means a willingness to learn, to confess ignorance and error, to accept new facts, and to follow the light; to the Catholic it means the acceptance of the unchangeable opinion of the Church speaking with the voice of God. Between these there can be no compromise and no peace' (p. 58). This is an obvious fact, and it divides Christians into camps sometimes different to those in which, by their choice of doctrines and nomenclature, they imagine themselves to stand.

The situation of confusion caused by the breakdown of traditional Christian doctrine has produced three classes of people representing three ways of dealing with it. To these Dr. Lake gives the names Fundamentalists, Institutionalists, and Experimentalists. The first class shuts its eyes to all change and discovery, desiring only enough light to enable it to denounce heresy or to bewail loss of faith. It is a 'partial and uneducated survival of a theology which was once universally held by all Christians' (p. 61). The Bible, taken uncritically as it stands, and traditional Christian dogma are on the side of Fundamentalism. At the opposite pole stands the Experimentalist. He is really the Modernist, but Dr. Lake prefers his new word, inasmuch as the Modernist is sometimes an Institutionalist in some sense (to us not at all clear) in which the Experimentalist is not. The position of the Experimentalist cannot be formulated in clear-cut phraseology; for him, in religion as in everything else, experiment is the basis of knowledge. He realizes that there is a purpose in life with which he can co-operate, and with which he chooses to co-operate, and that there is a source of life which imparts help, comfort and purification (p. 64 *f*). He demands that Churches shall provide a home for all who wish so to experi-

ment, without first expecting them to accept in advance the conclusions of former experimentalists formed centuries ago. Churches should not be societies for the preservation of ancient opinion, but for the furtherance of living religion. The Institutionalist is a mediator; he seeks to reduce to a minimum the amount of former opinion to be accepted, regarding as unessential such doctrines as he has come to doubt, and uses old language to express new meanings. His real interest lies not in thought, but in institutions as such. The greater part of Dr. Lake's book, apart from a chapter called 'Jesus' which has already appeared in the *Hibbert Journal*, consists of variations on the theme of the relations between these three parties. Each has its strong and weak points. Whether between them they will be able, before it is too late, to work out a theology which will provide satisfactory intellectual expression for the religious experience of the next generation depends on there being no compromise of principle between them, coupled with toleration in practice. The need is for ecclesiastical leaders wise enough to prevent any party from driving out the others until erroneous principles are seen to be erroneous (p. 71).

Dr. Lake does not doubt that ultimately the outcome of the struggle between the three parties will be the victory of the Experimenalist, but he fears that this may be delayed for generations by a temporary triumph of Fundamentalism, for which he seems to regard the Institutionalists as likely to be responsible. It seems to us that nearly all he says about the three parties has reference to America rather than to England, and our anxiety is perhaps somewhat less than Dr. Lake's, inasmuch as we believe America will be influenced by events in England rather than England by events in America. We have our Fundamentalists, though they are neither many nor influential. Certainly there is no danger that the control of our Education will pass into their hands. The only danger in England corresponding to Fundamentalism in America comes from a section, but by no means from all, of our Anglo-Catholics. But taken as a whole, that party has abandoned the main platform in the Fundamentalist position—its attitude towards the Bible. Dr. Lake recognizes this when he says that Anglo-Catholicism 'seems to stand for Catholicism without the Bible. It attempts to preserve the Catholic theology while abandoning its basis; but the intellectual weakness of the position is covered by the religious intensity and spiritual power of its supporters' (p. 54). Nor is it the case with us that our theological divisions correspond with our political and economic differences; there is little likelihood therefore that the one may be used as a handle to give power or victory to the other.

We should be inclined to regard the frequent and severe criticisms of the Institutionalists as also referring only to an American phenomenon did we not remember that, when Dr. Lake delivered his Hibbert Lectures, similar criticisms were made of English Modernists. At the time, we thought the force of the criticism weakened and the personality of the critic made the more attractive by his frank admission that, if he were in the position of the English Modernists and doing their work, he would probably do as they were doing. Frankly, we do not think there are many, if any, theologians in England who believe the whole system of traditional Catholic or Protestant doctrine to be undermined and who yet never say so; who, while denying as much as the Experimentalist, differ from him only in that they do so by perverting historical formulae instead of admitting that they have given up belief in them. It is true that in England, as in the case of Dr. Lake himself, men have not passed from Traditionalism to advanced Modernism at one bound, or at least the more thoughtful of them have not. And if there are those who do not believe, *but who do not say so*, one

might ask how their position seems to be understood so well? Willingness to use traditional formulae in a new sense, which new sense is also publicly preached, and that as a temporary measure in order to avoid the disruption in the church and continuity in its life which Dr. Lake so much deplores, is one thing: to conceal one's unbelief, while insisting on the acceptance of credal statements in which one does not believe, is quite another. Where to-day are there among us men who, yielding to criticism on all the really important points, appear before the world as having overcome it gloriously? It is true, neither of to-day nor of yesterday, that Institutional Liberals do this. It was, and is, the claim of those Fundamentalists who deign to reason at all. It is, of course, true that there are Modernists who have fought the good fight for many years and who have won the measure of liberty they desire. They have their reward; and we who are younger share it, and gratefully acknowledge that it is they who have made our own position possible and tolerable. At the same time, if they not only stand fast in the liberty wherewith they are free, but demand that it shall necessarily limit their younger successors, those successors will steadily maintain that they have not so learned Liberalism, which they understand to mean, wholly agreeing with the words of Dr. Lake, 'not a series of relatively unorthodox opinions, but a receptive and tolerant frame of mind towards all opinions which can be logically defended' (p. 162).

Readers of Dr. Lake's book will probably feel that the author is himself an ardent Institutionalist in the only sense in which English Modernists are such. He is most anxious lest continuity be broken and lost. 'It would be worth while to do almost anything to preserve the continuity of the Churches' except 'to sacrifice the freedom of the Experimentalist to the statesmanship of the Institutionalist.' Modernists agree; and, no more than Dr. Lake, have they the least intention of attempting 'to make the safety of institutions more important than the principles for which they are founded.' They would also accept without reserve such statements as

> 'The only satisfactory action for those who do not accept the Creeds in the sense in which they were written is to say so plainly and to urge their abolition as official statements of the doctrine now held in the Church' (p. 100);

and

> 'Their use as theological statements for the prevention of wrong opinion or heresy is antiquated, and ridiculous because ineffective; it ought to be abandoned' (p. 101).

Further, there is no doubt that the dread that without the assent to the Creeds at present demanded, undesirable persons would enter the ministry is an illusion.

> 'Creeds keep out the intelligent and the conscientious; they cannot exclude the ignorant or the deceitful. . . . The questions in the Ordinal are hopelessly out of date, and ought to be abandoned. Willingness to serve and ability to give service are the two necessities, not an immature agreement with ancient opinions' (pp. 103 and 107).

Yet withal our Experimentalist author realizes that the question is not so simple as the dropping of Creeds as intellectual tests. He thinks of them as integral parts of an extraordinarily beautiful work of art—the Christian liturgy, and not merely as theological documents.

> 'It is perfectly true that the theology of this liturgy is quite alien to mine. So is the theology of those who built Durham Cathedral. Nevertheless the liturgical art of the services of the Church, like the

> architectural art of its cathedrals, rouses a response in me which cannot be awakened by any modern service or by any modern building, even though its theology may be irreproachably up to date' (p. 101*f*).

Accordingly, unlike some other Modernists, Dr. Lake would not make the use of Creeds optional, though this is what he expects, and we hope, will come to pass. And he further sounds a necessary warning against dropping one Creed and retaining others, since all the valid and permanent objections 'apply to the Apostles' Creed as much as to the Nicene, and to the Nicene as much as to the Athanasian' (p. 104).

It should not be forgotten that Modernists who do not agree with Dr. Lake disagree with him because they feel that neither history nor any other science requires them to adopt his position, any more than they feel historical criticism of the New Testament necessarily leads to his estimate of the historical Jesus. They are in complete agreement with him in so far as they do not pretend to believe that there is any body of theological statement for which we have divine sanctions of approval or truth. If they are inclined to agree that the religion of to-morrow will have a theology rather vague and of little definite content, they have greater hope that the third day will see a theology more rational and more true, though not necessarily more final, than that of yesterday. Some of them think it already exists, if only in embryo. Nor do we think it is true to regard them as Institutionalists of the type

> 'who seem to have studied deeply the story of Jonah and hasten to throw overboard those who are attacked, or at least to leave them undefended, on the ground that they have been irritating in their manner, or insufficiently "spiritual" in their speech, or are wrong on some minor detail' (p. 162).

But Modernists may gladly own that they are unrepentant Institutionalists when Dr. Lake acknowledges that without Institutionalists 'the churches would disintegrate into contentious disruption' (p. 70).

There are other reasons why the Modernist is an Institutionalist, and why he is possibly less anxious to get rid of all old language than is Dr. Lake. The Modernist does not believe that either the genesis or the validity of religion depends on belief in historical propositions, true or false, though history may and undoubtedly does afford the most striking confirmation of the reality of religion. Despite its past association with thought and views of history no longer tenable, much of the language of religion is common to many theologies and as capable of as many meanings as is religion of modes of theological expression. Again, though the Modernist has sometimes had cause to wonder whether the saying about offending 'one of these little ones' was the only genuine saying of Jesus (until he has bethought him that some of Christ's words must have offended the 'little ones' in Judaism), he is also aware that the conception of theology and the road to reality which is outlined in Dr. Lake's book is altogether too steep and at present quite impossible to vast multitudes who yet know something of religion and who comprise the bulk of the Institution to which he belongs. These, as well as the enlightened, have their rights, and provided the Modernist has his own freedom acknowledged, he will probably continue to feel that he is true to the spirit of the religion he professes when, while trying his utmost to lead the multitudes in other paths, he yet remembers that those who have not shared his advantages cannot be expected to move at his pace in new ways. The transition rendered necessary by modern knowledge is inevitable, but beset with difficulties. When people who know the difficulties and claim education, enlightenment and

the Christian name, nevertheless refuse to lift a finger to reduce the difficulties, stand outside the Church demanding that, before they enter, every burden shall be removed by others to whom meanwhile they preach, the Modernist may perhaps be forgiven if he sometimes feels their attitude to partake less of moral integrity than of humbug. For such the Modernist is working to secure dogmatic freedom and nothing less; he is as keen on that as is Dr. Lake, though neither the Modernist nor Dr. Lake would insist that the only possible conclusions to which that freedom leads are these sketched in Dr. Lake's latest book. But in an age which stresses that Christianity is, before all else, a social gospel, it ought not to be necessary to insist that every Modernist, whether inside the Church or outside it, must, in relation to his less enlightened or otherwise persuaded brethren, exercise his freedom as one who remembers that he, without them, cannot be made perfect. J.S.B.

A GOSPEL OF FREEDOM.*

Those who are working for a larger measure of openly recognised dogmatic freedom within the Church of England naturally have an interest in those who in earlier days desired a like blessing, but who, finding its realisation hopeless, withdrew from her communion and departed into the wilderness for conscience sake. Among that neither inconsiderable nor ignoble company were the religious forbears of those now known as Unitarians. Two books celebrating the completion of a century of existence and work by the British and Foreign Unitarian Association have recently been published. Dr. S. H. Mellone traces the history of the demand for spiritual freedom from the passing of the Act of Uniformity in 1662, to which the history of many English Unitarian Churches is linked. The story is the familiar one of great struggles against tremendous odds and under civil disabilities which have now happily passed away. There has been success, but it has been fluctuating and by no means uniform or spectacular. Dr. Mellone tells his story with admirable restraint, almost dispassionately, and generously acknowledges indications of a larger spirit whenever he finds it exemplified in members of the established Church.

The two essentials for the vitality of Unitarian Christianity are 'a demand for spiritual *freedom* and a demand for lucid and definite religious *teaching*.' Difficulty arises from an occasional and unfortunate opposition between them. We need not insist that their realisation in harmony is the most pressing problem with which intelligent Christianity is faced at the present time. The nineteenth century witnessed great changes in the Unitarian as in other forms of the Christian religion, and they made their way among Unitarians with less travail than they have done and are doing in more dogmatic ecclesiastical organizations, though changes in Unitarianism have not been successfully accomplished without great searchings of heart. A century ago

> 'Unitarian Christianity was, broadly speaking, a Biblical Religion, accepting miracles and rejecting creeds, not as incredible, but as non-Biblical, resting its hopes on an external revelation and attaching little importance to what it regarded as the uncertain inferences and promises of natural religion. Through the century a steady movement of doctrine can be traced, a movement springing from influences springing from the personality and teaching of William Ellery Chan-

**Liberty and Religion.* By S. H. Mellone, M.A., D.Sc. (The Lindsey Press, 1925. Pp. 238. Price 2/6.)

**Freedom and Truth.* Essays edited by J. Estlin Carpenter, D.D. (The Lindsey Press, 1925. Pp. 352. Price 6/-.)

> ning, Theodore Parker, John Hamilton Thorn and, above all, James Martineau. The result of that movement has been that the Seat of Authority in religion is no longer found within the covers even of the best and broadest of books, but in the reason and conscience of man, not of any individual man, but of mankind.'

We venture to think that very much the same development is the destined programme of all Christian Churches unless organized Christianity is to become insignificant as an obscurantist sect, plus a few men of possibly great but peculiarly constituted minds. We are far from maintaining that there is no great usefulness for a Church which is as the shadow of a great rock in a weary land, but the more virile and necessary type of religion will not thrive in a shadow. Nor are all attractive shadows the shadows of a rock: there is a shadow of death.

We hope that Dr. Mellone's book will be widely read among Anglicans, many of whom, we fear, often use the term 'the Churches' in a sense not inclusive of Unitarians. As Modernists, we are familiar with Unitarianism, often prefixed by some deprecatory adjective, as a term of reproach applied to ourselves by our Anglo-Catholic friends. We regret this, chiefly on the ground that it is dishonouring to those who so use the designation of a body of Christian men and women. Such names as James Martineau, J. J. Tayler, Stopford Brooke and J. Drummond suggest services to Christianity by no means confined to the Church to which they gave allegiance. Nor should we find it difficult to name some of their living fellow-Churchmen whom we always read with profit and inspiration.

We cannot, in this short notice, do justice to the volume *Freedom and Truth,* which consists of ten essays by various Unitarians, including Dr. Mellone and Dr. Gow, together with a sermon by the late Dr. Martineau and an introduction by Dr. Estlin Carpenter, who is well-known outside his own communion for his work on the Hexateuch, Comparative Religion, and the Gospels. Dr. Martineau's sermon, preached in 1869, deals with the Unitarian conception of God, claiming that it does not involve the loss of the values of the Trinitarian conception, while escaping its difficulties. Dr. Mellone's contribution overlaps to some extent what he has written in *Liberty and Religion.* Modern Unitarian theism admits of manifoldness in the unity of God; it allows a conception of Deity which is Trinitarian, but not tripersonal.

> 'It does not exclude even the most exalted conception of Christ's person, or the most limited conception, for it says nothing at all about Christ's person.'

It does not deny that a Trinitarian theism can be philosophically defended. The orthodox Athanasian doctrine is as insistent as Unitarianism that God is One Mind, not three. Modern Unitarians are only concerned to deny that Trinitarian theism must of necessity be held by all faithful Christians. So far Modernists agree with them. While we hold that it is necessary to think out to the utmost limit what is implied by our experience of God as we see Him in Nature, in History and in human consciousness, the important thing for religion is the nature of God thus made known to us, not the mode of His existence.

A third essay deals with the development of the idea of God during the last hundred years, and this is followed by two essays on Jesus, the more interesting of which is Dr. Henry Gow's on 'The Value and Significance of Jesus.' The statement 'apart from Jesus I have no assurance of God' Dr. Gow regards as essentially agnostic, and he makes no claim that Jesus means as much for the Unitarian as He does for Evangelical or Catholic

orthodoxy. The position of Dr. Gore meets with the criticism to which it is always open, that it is an example of arrested theological progress. Dr. Gow also feels the position of Modernists like Dr. Percy Gardner to be unsatisfactory. This position he understands to be that the historic Jesus may be entirely human, and yet the eternal Christ may remain 'the unique Incarnation of God and a perpetual divine presence in our life.' We do not deny Dr. Gow's claim that herein Unitarians may be nearer the 'genuinely orthodox' than the Modernists. We are more concerned with our nearness to the facts. For the first Christians the Christ of experience was none other than the Jesus they had known, and where we think Dr. Gow misunderstands Dr. Gardner, is in the statement that for him and other Modernists 'there seems to be almost a gulf between the historic Jesus and the living Christ.' There is no gulf, only the narrow stream of death. But for the experience of the living Christ, we may doubt whether we or Dr. Gow would ever have known the historic Jesus. Dr. Gow claims the same experiences which Modernists share, and says the difference is one of phraseology. Again we are inclined to agree; but for us the Jesus of the Gospels is the Christ of Christian experience.

Of the remaining two essays, one deals with Unitarian Philanthropy. It is followed by a summary description of the Unitarian movement generally. This book covers some of the ground covered by *Liberty and Religion,* but it is well worth reading and affords another instance, of which many might be given, that the old denominational barriers are breaking down, and owe their remaining strength chiefly to denominational sentiment. J.S.B.

SHORT NOTICES.*

The aim of the author of this work is 'to reconstruct the whole story and make it live in a new way' (p. 8). He believes that much light can be thrown on the stories of the Burial and Resurrection of Christ by a clearer understanding of the nature of the tomb in which the Body of Jesus was placed. Accordingly he gives an elaborate description of what he believes this tomb to have been like and then interrogates the various Gospel witnesses with a view to enlisting their support. Chief among his witnesses are the angels, and pages are devoted to a subtle analysis of their conduct. Then others are called—the women, the disciples, etc.—and we are sure that the reader will agree, if with nothing else, at least with the author's surprise in noting 'what great significance lies in small details.' However, by this means, the writer attempts to reconcile discrepancies—or rather, such discrepancies as he has chosen to point out. For, while some of the discrepancies which he seeks to solve may be explained by the evangelist's stylistic revision of the Marcan source, some of the more important divergencies—as, for example, the question of the appearances of Christ in Jerusalem or Galilee—are not even noticed by him.

It is of little use choosing this or that statement for criticism in a book which we believe to be based on quite wrong presuppositions. For example, though the author uses the term Synoptist there is not the least sign that he understands its significance. He assumes that he has four independent witnesses before him, and concludes that 'St. Matthew obtained his information from Joseph of Arimathaea, St. Mark from Mary

**The Empty Tomb and the Risen Lord.* By the Rev. C. C. Dobson, M.A. (Wells, Gardner, Darton and Co. 3/6.)

**Christianity in Politics.* By the Rev. H. W. Fox, M.A., D.S.O. With a preface by the Rev. H. R. L. Sheppard. (Murray. 1925. Price 5/-.)

The Group Spirit in Church Life. By the Rev. E. T. Slater. With a preface by the Bishop of Manchester. (S.P.C.K. 1925. Price 2/6.)

Magdalene, St. Luke from Cleopas, and St. John gives his own evidence' (p. 47). Moreover, he regards his material as cumulative evidence, *e.g.* from the different words used by the evangelists (ἀπεκύλισεν, ἀνακεκύλισται, ἠρμένον) he concludes that 'the angel *lifted up* the stone and *then rolled it away to a distance*' (p. 54).

Occasionally the writer does not notice that a verse which he uses in an argument is absent from many important MSS.; this is the case with *Lk.* xxiv, 12; even apart from this his reconstruction of that chapter is almost grotesque. But in one respect he is more consistent than some. If we regard the Resurrection body of Jesus as one of 'flesh and bones,' we should naturally look forward to the re-habilitation of our own frames. And this is part of the writer's belief, for he hopes to arise from the grave, though he believes that it will need no grave-digger to set him free.

The Church has not had a very creditable record in the past as regards her connection with social and political objects, and perhaps it is this which has led men to acquiesce in that theory of Church and State in which each is regarded as an entity either opposed to or at least having interests different from the other. Mr. Fox sets out to disprove this and by providing a truer theory to stimulate Christian men and women to a sense of their responsibilities. As he points out in a survey of the past relations between Church and State, the failure of the past has been due to the fact that, in one way or another, religion has tended to become a pretentious clericalism. To avoid this in the future we must first be clear about our terms.

The Church, he says, is not any particular sect or creed, but 'that group of mankind who "profess and call themselves Christian"; it may even include individuals who stand outside all ecclesiastical organisations' (p. 34) but show by their lives that they are the followers of Christ. We may observe that this definition avoids the difficult problem of the organisation of a Church and its relation to the State, and the point is one which the writer does not discuss. But he is clear that the Church as a whole must have no connection with party politics as such; it is a more indirect influence for which Mr. Fox pleads. Christians in a modern State have a double status and a double responsibility, and in so far as they fulfil their duties as enfranchised citizens with conscious reference to their responsibilities as members of a Church the problem of Church and Politics will be solved. In all matters upon which Christians are asked to vote they should be able to say that this line is Christian and that is not. 'Our Christianity must be strangely colourless, indeterminate, and ineffective if it fails to guide us towards a decision' (p. 148).

Further, Christians, not only individually but corporately, should lead the way in pressing for reform where it is needed, and for this purpose some central body—some United Council of the Churches—is needed to act as a mouth-piece for the whole Christian body. There are great difficulties in the way of making such a body effective, but it is well that the writer should make us see its importance.

Mr. Fox writes in a clear and forceful way and is candid in his criticisms. Hope is written across his pages, and perhaps one thing to justify this is the increased study of social history made by the present generation. We can only hope that the writer is not too optimistic in his belief that 'the Church has now passed from opposition and apathy to a position of consideration and interest . . . it has begun to think and to act' (p. 78).

Mr. Slater treats what is practically the same problem from a different point of view, since the Christian's concern in the affairs of the nation is

only his concern in family or industrial life 'writ large'; he first draws out the importance of the 'group spirit' in the various activities of human life and then traces the working of this spirit of fellowship first among the early Christians and later in the Medieval Church. The Medieval experiment in the relation of Church and State proved a failure; and, after examining some of the reasons for this failure, the writer seeks to apply its lessons to the Church of to-day. Thus he emphasises the value of spiritual leadership in the affairs of a nation and, in common with Mr. Fox, he urges men to supply the necessary spiritual authority by a more active support of the World Alliance of the Churches. Only by such means can we solve the problem of national *versus* international interests and 'arrive at the highest and fullest development of group life in which all lesser loyalties are reconciled in loyalty to the universal, and that means to God' (p. 84). J.P.H.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman.*

A MENACE TO FREEDOM IN THE CHURCH.

Sir,

Broad, or Liberal, or Modernist Churchmen are now faced with what, I submit, is perhaps the most serious question affecting their position in the National Church which has arisen during the present century. This crisis has long been foreseen by some of us, and at the time of the promotion of the Enabling Bill we prophesied[1] with complete accuracy, as it turns out, that one of the first fruits of that measure would be an attack on the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ecclesiastical Causes. Fortunately, the Council of the Churchmen's Union, with admirable foresight, appointed a Committee to examine the question of the reform of our Ecclesiastical Courts, and to make recommendations to the Council as to the attitude which Liberal Churchmen should adopt on this vital question. The Committee under the chairmanship of the late Dean Rashdall, did its work thoroughly, and its report was, in substance, adopted by the Council and published under the title *Quis Judicabit?*, a title most happily suggested by the late Canon Glazebrook. I would urge readers of the *Modern Churchman*, without delay, to obtain a copy of this report and to read it side by side with the report of the Church Assembly Commission, when the issues at stake will clearly emerge. I have no hesitation whatever in saying that if, through indifference, lethargy, or shrinking from controversy, we, as a body, fail to inform public opinion clearly and accurately of the position for which we stand in relation to the Final Court of Appeal, we shall place the inevitable halter round our own necks. The Council of our Union will, no doubt, carefully examine the Report of the Church Assembly Commission, and make its own pronouncement upon it by way of supplementing *Quis Judicabit.* But every Churchman who feels that, in principle, his views are represented in *Quis Judicabit,* and can wield a pen should do his best to make our point of view, with which, undoubtedly, large numbers of Evangelical Churchmen are in agreement, known in the Press, not omitting local papers and parish magazines. It will be for the Nation in Parliament finally to determine the questions which have been raised, but the danger is that under the plausible plea of the necessity for restoring discipline in the Church, which will, undoubtedly, appeal to Parliament,

[1] See *Modern Churchman,* Vol. VI, p. 495; Vol. X, p. 429.

changes may be accepted in the constitution and procedure of the Final Court of Appeal without an adequate realization of the menace to liberty involved in those changes. What, then, is the *crux* of the whole matter? It is this: Ever since the abolition of appeals to Rome the English tradition has, in practice, been that the appeal to the Crown in ecclesiastical causes should be to a Court which was itself the sole judge of every question submitted to it.

This was true of the Court of Delegates (1559 to 1832), which, though varying from time to time in its constitution, seems for the most part to have consisted, either preponderatingly or exclusively, of lay Judges. It is also true of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (1832 to 1926) which, since 1876, has consisted exclusively of lay Judges. Prior to 1876 Episcopal Privy Councillors were for a time members of the Committee, but, since that date, the Court has been an exclusively lay Court, sitting with Episcopal Assessors for consultative purposes only, their opinions not being binding on the Court. It is now proposed by the Church Assembly Commission that a new Court should be substituted for the Judicial Committee composed, it is true, of lay Judges, but when any question arises as to what is the doctrine, discipline, or use of the Church of England, the Judges are to refer such question to an Episcopal Assembly, the opinion of the majority of which is to be binding on the Court. Moreover, the Prayer Book and Articles are not to be included in the expression 'Act of Parliament,' and so would be transferred from Judicial to Episcopal construction. Obviously, under such a system as this, the Judges would in a heresy trial, in effect, be converted to mere legal assessors, and the real Judges would be the Bishops. Dangerous though it would be to acquiesce in so serious and extraordinary a departure from the English tradition there might possibly, even under such a system, be a glimmer of hope for freedom and comprehensiveness so long as Bishops are appointed by, and at the unfettered discretion of, the Crown. But, under a new system of election by which the Bishops become the representatives of the dominant ecclesiastical party, that freedom which has been so notably preserved by the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council will indubitably be lost. However this may be, the proposed change is, I submit, fundamental. It is for those who believe in a free and comprehensive National Church to decide whether they will, through lack of energetic and united action, allow our freedom to be lost, or whether they will rouse themselves and save that freedom of thought and teaching in the English Church which was never more needful and precious than it is to-day.

H. F. WALKER.

St. Alban's.
1st July, 1926.

SIR,

CHURCH PATRONAGE REFORM.

The following may, I hope, be of interest to your readers. A copy of it is being sent to the National Church Assembly and to the Bishop of Chichester.

RESOLVED June 29, 1926.

'That this Ruridecanal Conference of Lyndhurst believes the points of primary importance in Church Patronage are: (1) A large diversity in the patrons; (2) An adequate opportunity for open consideration; and (3) A clear personal responsibility for presentation. It therefore holds that no increase in the patronage or control of Bishops

should be made; and that the function of any Diocesan Board should be restricted to hearing, and if necessary criticizing, the intentions of Patrons, in which functions a parish concerned should have an effective part.

This Conference believes the simplest and best means of carrying out these aims to be a requirement that all patrons should exercise their patronage with two diocesan and two parochial assessors, forming a board of five for each particular appointment, the patron being chairman and alone entitled to propose any clerk for consideration, who must be supported by a majority before being presented for institution or collation. The diocese and parish should be untrammelled in the choice of their respective assessors, these being Churchmen.'

E.P.B.S.

The Gloucester Diocesan Magazine for July records the discussion on Church Patronage by the Diocesan Conference and the passing of a significant resolution, with only two dissentients, to the effect that the Patronage Report is undesirable and unnecessary. The mover of the resolution regarded the general idea behind the Patronage Board as bad and retrograde. We believe that there is a deep-seated and extending opposition to the main proposal of that Report, the substance of which is that the patronage of the diocese should for all practical purposes be vested in the Bishop and a Diocesan Committee. The Editor of *Crockford*, who speaks with no little authority, is also opposed to the Report. The Council of the Churchmen's Union ought to take the matter up at the earliest opportunity.

Ed., *M.C.*

Sir,

PAPERS IN MODERN CHURCHMANSHIP.

It may be of interest to the clergy to know that the *Papers in Modern Churchmanship*, referred to in your current issue, can be obtained from the publishers, Messrs. Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 39 Paternoster Row, E.C. 4, *for re-sale on Church Bookstalls only*, at a discount of 25 per cent. This discount, of course, makes all the difference between selling the pamphlets at a loss and making ends meet, after paying postage.

Charles Jenkinson.

St. Paul's, Barking, Essex.
21st June, 1926.

Sir,

ST. PAUL'S 'THORN IN THE FLESH.'

I venture to think that Dean Farrar's theory of bad eyesight is a little stronger than Mr. Tasker, in his very interesting article, seems to suggest.

1. Is it not possible to translate the word ἀτενίζειν in a sense of '*straining* the eyes,' *i.e.*, on the part of a person suffering from weak sight? It is significant that in one of the passages in which this word occurs (*Acts* xxiii, 1-5), St. Luke tells us that after 'looking steadfastly' on the Sanhedrin, St. Paul began to speak (evidently without the permission of the Council), and on being rudely interrupted by the high priest he uses language which is disrespectful and even abusive. When called to order by those who stood by, the Apostle's excuse is 'I wist not (οὐκ ἤδειν) brethren, that he was the high priest.' If, as Mr. Tasker suggests, St. Paul enjoyed very good eyesight, then his excuse appears, on the face of it, to be worse than his offence. But the Greek seems to convey the idea that St. Paul was not able to *see* the man who ordered him to be struck on the mouth, and this in spite of the use of the word ἀτενίσας at the beginning of the passage. The explanation which is sometimes offered—namely,

that as Ananias was appointed to the high priesthood in 47 A.D. St. Paul had not seen him before—is a very lame one, and it is difficult to suppose that 'a Pharisee and son of Pharisees' would be unable to recognize the high priest when he saw him seated at the head of the Sanhedrin. The theory of partial blindness seems to explain the facts much better.

2. At this stage, and indeed for some time before it, St. Luke's attendance on the Apostle seems to have been continuous. Is it probable that St. Paul's weak sight developed into actual blindness as he advanced beyond middle age?

3. The theory of blindness may perhaps explain the peculiar style of the Epistles of the Imprisonment.

4. St. Luke speaks not only of St. Paul's use of his eyes, but also of his hands—a very common habit with blind speakers.

W. E. J. LINDFIELD.

St. Mary's Vicarage, Kingswinford, Dudley.
19th June, 1926.

SIR,

THE SPIRITUAL GOSPEL.

May I, in thanking your reviewer for a very kindly notice of my small bood *The Message of the Fourth Gospel*, call attention to a misunderstanding for which I am, I fear, more responsible than he. It is in connection with the words, partly quoted from myself: 'It is "highly reasonable, though it may not be imperative," to suppose that John had access to sources of information to which the Synoptic authors had not.' May I say two things? First, in the passage partly quoted I am trying to give the uninstructed reader a general idea of the the attitude of modern critics to the view that 'John' may be to some extent a witness of facts concerning Jesus who is independent of the Synoptists. Not wishing at this stage to intrude my own opinion, I use, rather inaptly, the words *though it may not be imperative*, which the reviewer, quite naturally, interprets as meaning that nothing can with confidence be said on the matter. It would have been nearer my own conviction, though not going quite its length, if I had written: 'It seems to the present writer extremely probable,' etc.

Second. The reviewer will notice that the confidence indicated in the above sentence, as amended, has reference particularly to 'some of the scenes of the Passion' (*Foreword*, p. xvii, line 3 from bottom). A brief statement of my reasons for distinguishing in this reference the record of the Passion from that of the Ministry of our Lord will be found in the *Notes* at p. 205*f*. In the case of a writer so fond of allegory and symbol as John it is not always easy to say what is *mere* symbol and what is literal fact. He would be a bold man who should say that there is nothing even in the record of the Passion that is purely symbolic. On the other hand, it would surely be a perverse ingenuity if one were to insist on finding something symbolical in the 'other disciple,' who was 'known to the high priest,' through whom Peter was introduced to the palace. I cannot ask for space to elaborate the point, but I am inclined to revert to my unfortunate mode of expression so far as to say that it is to me 'imperative' to believe that the 'other disciple' was either the Evangelist himself or an intimate friend of his.

LEWIS A. MUIRHEAD.

Bristol, *11th June*, 1926.

[*The Editor regrets that lack of space has prohibited the inclusion of several letters.*]